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**PROCEEDINGS**  
**OF**  
**The Fifteenth Indian Philosophical Congress**

**HYDERABAD**  
(Deccan)  
**1939**

**Part—II**

*Editor :*  
**S. K. DAS.**



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Presented by Sr S. C. Chatterjee

## Contents

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	Page
1. The Message of Indian Philosophy : Prof. M. Hiriyanna	... 1
2. The Problem of Value in Indian Philosophy : Prof. H. M. Bhattacharyya,	... 16
3. The Principle of Inexplicability in Philosophy : G. R. Malkani	... 36
4. A Psychological Study of Class Consciousness : Jamuna Prasad.	... 48
5. Karma and Fatalism : S. S. Suryanarayana.	... 68
6. The Empirical and the a Posteriori : P. S. Naidu.	... 76
7. Religion and Religious Approximations : S. K. Das	... 84
8. Are Mathematical Propositions Analytic ? N. V. Banerjee.	... 95
9. Pascal and the Problems of Existence : S. Vahiduddin	... 101
10. On a Significant aspect of the Role of Abnormal Psychology : P. S. Naidu.	... 111
11. The Vedantic Doctrine of Intuition : M. Yamunacharya.	... 117
12. Refutation of the Buddhist Doctrine of Aggregates T. R. Sundararaman.	... 124
13. How do we see Objects as we do ? G. Hanumantha Rao.	... 132

14.	The Moral War in the Markandeya Chandi : Subha Brata Roy Chowdhury.	... 142
15.	The Theory of Adhyasa : Jyotish Chandra Banerjee.	... 146
16.	The Relation of Knower to Known : S. C. Chatterjee.	... 157
17.	What a Thing is in itself : K. R. Sreenivasa Iyengar.	... 167
18.	The Elimination of Metaphysics Part II : Kali Prasad.	... 178
19.	An Examination of Rousseau's "Particular Wills" and "The General Will" : Bepin Vehary Roy.	... 192
20.	Conation and Feeling : P. S. Naidu	... 202
21.	Identities in Mysticism : Ram Murti Loomba	... 210
22.	Three Theories of Truth : A. C. Das	... 217
23.	The Rationale of the doctrine of Pre-established Harmony : A. Hady Taluqdar.	... 224
24.	The Two-Fold Path in the Gita : T. M. P. Mahadevan.	234
25.	The Meaning and Possibility of Knowledge : R. Das.	... 250
26.	The Conception of Love in Vaishnavism : Subha Brata Roy Chowdhury.	... 256
27.	The Definition of Being (Satvanirukti) according to the Nyayamrita : H. N. Raghavendrachar.	... 260
28.	The Doctrine of Liberation in Indian Philosophy. Liberation as the Highest Goal of Human life : Manubhai C. Pandya.	... 270
29.	Is Gaudapada Budhistic ? S. V. Dandekar.	... 274
30.	How Ought we to Educate our Philosophers ? J. F. Butler.	... 279

31.	The Conception of Self-Determination in Islamic Mysticism : Mir Valiuddin.	...	285
32.	The Passalong Test : S. N. Roy & N. L. Kanji	...	292
33.	The Psychology of Adhyasa : N. Venkata Raman.	...	298
34.	Gita and our Three Acharyas : B. T. Narasimhachari.	...	303
35.	Elements of Religious Belief : M. M. Zuhuruddin Ahmed.	...	305
36.	Immortality : E. Ahmed Shah.	...	314
37.	Gaudapada's Asparsayoga and Sankara's Jnanavada : P. C. Divanji.	...	320
38.	Is Knowledge a Kind of belief : C. Bhattacharya.	...	324
39.	An aspect of Causation : S. S. Raghavachar.	...	325
40.	The Development of the Advaita Doctrine of Antahkarana in Relation to Perception : G. Hanumantha Rao.	...	331
41.	Svapramanatva and Svaprakasatva : S. K. Saxena	...	340
42.	List of Members.		





# **The Indian Philosophical Congress 1939**

## **The Message of Indian Philosophy\***

**By**

**PROF. M. HIRIYANNA**

It was exceedingly kind of the authorities of the Indian Philosophical Congress to have asked me to preside over this year's session, and I desire to express my most grateful thanks to them for it. I greatly appreciate the honour which they have done me, although I cannot help feeling that it would have been much better if their choice had been different. The subject that I have selected for the address, which it is customary to deliver on such an occasion, possesses little technical importance. It is the old and familiar theme of the ideal of life ; only I deal with it here from the Indian standpoint. I trust that what I say will be found to be of some interest to all, and not merely to those who are conversant with Indian philosophy.

One of the most striking features of Indian thought is its many-sidedness. It includes all possible types of solutions of the chief problems of philosophy. We have monism and pluralism, idealism and realism of diverse shades represented in it. What is yet more noteworthy is that this variety, which characterises Indian philosophy as a whole, appears over again in more than one system. Thus when Buddhism came to be taught, it soon split up in much the same fashion, giving rise to various kinds of realistic and idealistic views within it. History repeated itself when still later the

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\* Address of the General President at the Indian Philosophical Congress held at Hyderabad (Deccan) in Dec : 1939

Vedānta emerged in its classical form, and became divided into several schools. Many of these doctrines have disappeared in the course of the long and chequered history of Indian thought, but even those that have come down to our time are sufficient to illustrate the wide variety of its forms. It may be that such speculative diversity redounds greatly to the credit of the Indian mind. I propose, however, to dwell at present not on that side of the subject, but rather on the element of unity which is found to run through all this diversity. That these systems are not altogether heterogeneous and admit of being unified is by no means a new idea. It was held by the old Indian thinkers themselves, and they tried in more than one way to reconcile the differences among them.<sup>1</sup> But those reconciliations were generally effected from a theoretical standpoint. There is, however, one view among them which, though neither so fully worked out nor so familiar, is of a different kind; and my present purpose is to draw attention to it.

It is well known that the West has for long believed that philosophy aims at satisfying the impulse of curiosity or the desire to know. To judge from the attitude towards the universe revealed in the earliest of the philosophic hymns found in the Veda, the first efforts at philosophising in India also seem to have been directed to the same end. But soon this interest in mere speculation ceased, and philosophic truth came to be sought mainly for the light which it might throw upon the ultimate significance of life. This practical interest has, as it is now well recognised, ever since been the distinguishing feature of Indian philosophy. The remarkable unanimity in this respect among the various systems

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1. See e. g. *Nyāya-mañjarī*, pp. 267-72. Jainism also, in its *Syādvāda*, may be said to have attempted a kind of synthesis of the various doctrines.

shows that the aim of Indian philosophy, as a whole, is to determine the ideal of practical life rather than merely to formulate a set of theoretical views of the universe.<sup>2</sup> And since this ideal, so far as it is realisable in the present life, is, as I shall try to point out, essentially the same according to the several systems, its inculcation may be regarded as the element which is common to them all. To the modern student, who has been nursed in the belief that philosophy is 'the child of wonder', such close linking together of theory and practice may appear to hinder the proper investigation of philosophical questions by importing notions like those of good and evil, higher and lower, which are, in his opinion, irrelevant to it. Whether or not it has proved a hindrance in the present case does not really concern us now, for I am speaking of the lesson of Indian philosophy as we find it; and it is not therefore necessary to enter into a discussion of the correctness of the standpoint which it has adopted. Besides any attempt to do so will take us too far away from our subject. So I shall proceed to state what I consider to be the common features of the ideal of life which the Indian systems generally have in view.

The first and foremost of these features is unselfishness. Sureśvara, whose place in the history of Vedantic monism is next only to that of Saṅkara, states that it characterises the ideal of practical life according to not only the Vedic but also the non-Vedic systems.<sup>3</sup> And he adds that one of the latter, viz. Buddhism denies the very existence of the self in order to impress on the minds of its adherents the importance of this feature. If the belief in a persisting self were false, it is obvious that all selfish activity would become

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2. Cf. *Agamānām virodhōpi nātīva vidyate purusārthe sarveṣām avirodhāt*, *Nyūya-mañjarī*, p. 267

3. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. Vārttika*, pp. 513-5

utterly meaningless. Thus the Buddhistic doctrine of 'no self' (*nairātmya-vāda*), according to Suresvara is, what is termed 'a fiction of ethical value'. Other schools may not have pushed their metaphysical views so far as Buddhism ; but they do not, in the least, lag behind it in the emphasis they lay upon this feature of the ideal. But we must remember that by unselfishness here is to be understood the entire abnegation of self-interest. An ancient law-giver,<sup>4</sup> who belongs to the pre-Christian period, defines a cultured person (*śiṣṭa*) as one whose heart is free from all personal desires. That is also the implication of the exalted place which the orthodox and the unorthodox schools alike assign to *samnyāsa*. The merits of detachment are not unknown to doctrines propounded elsewhere, and all of them teach it with equal fervour. Even the idea of complete or absolute self-denial is not foreign to some of them. A witty bishop, in speaking to children, is stated to have asked 'What is the Cross ?' and answered it himself by saying 'It is the "I" crossed out'. But the uniqueness of the Indian view consists in the special emphasis placed upon such self-denial.

This emphasis on the total exclusion of self-interest may suggest that it is a purely ascetic ideal which is here held up before the aspirant—an ideal which is negative and means a voluntary forsaking of the world. That, indeed, is now the prevalent belief regarding the Indian view of life. There is no doubt that the ideal is ascetic ; but, according to most of the schools, it is so in a positive and not in a negative sense. By 'positive asceticism', I mean such asceticism as goes hand in hand with altruistic activity and is never divorced from it. That is, the aim of life is not mere detachment, but detach-

4. Vasiṣṭha—See his *Dharma-sūtra*, (i. 6) *Śiṣṭaḥ punarākāmūtmā*. Cf. also Āpastamba : *dharma-sutra*, I.xx.1-4

ment and service. We have here a second feature of the common Indian ideal, viz. service, which shows that the pursuit of it does not mean running away from society and seeking passive isolation. Man's temptation, according to it, is not the world; rather his temptation, to put it compendiously, is the flesh. In other words, what is commended here is self-renunciation and not world-renunciation; and the common belief that the Indian ideal is mostly negative is not in accord with the prevailing spirit of Indian teaching. The greatest warrant for this conclusion is found in the *Gītā* which all orthodox systems, without any exception, reckon as a scripture of the highest authority. It insists upon the necessity of leading a life of incessant activity, although one may have no object to attain thereby for oneself. Life without action, it reckons, as almost a sin. The divine teacher here, who is necessarily also the exemplar of the teaching he imparts, says "There is nothing in the three worlds which I have to toil for; and yet I act."<sup>5</sup> The influence of this teaching is, in all probability, to be traced even outside orthodox thought as, for example, in the *Bodhisattva* conception of later Buddhism, according to which, Buddhahood, the very pinnacle of human aspiration, is sought because of the fitness it secures for rendering true service to others.

It may appear from what I have stated that renunciation and service are separate aims, which are to be pursued independently. But it is really not so, for they are conceived as standing in an intimate and vital relation to each other. Service is not regarded here as a mere concomitant of renunciation, but the very means of cultivating it. Consequently the aim is not renunciation *and* service, but renunciation *through* service.<sup>6</sup> It means that true detachment cannot be

### 5. iii. 22.

6. Here a few Indian doctrines differ. They teach that social service is not essential to the cultivation of renuncia-

achieved, except by living an active life in the midst of others and devoting oneself to their welfare ; only the activities, which such a life signifies, should be carried on without the least thought of advantage to oneself, if they should lead to complete detachment. As active service then, the discipline involves self-affirmation ; and as tending to complete detachment, it also involves self-denial. The excellence of the teaching is in bringing these opposites into harmony ; and it is able to do so by purifying the one of egoism and the other of passivity or inaction. But, these activities are not left to be determined by the choice or opinion of the individual, for the service which is to be the means of cultivating the spirit of renunciation is defined as consisting in the doing of *sva-dharma* or the duties of the station which one fills in society.<sup>7</sup> There is nothing, indeed, in the view precluding a person from engaging himself in any altruistic activity he may like ; but the point is that, under all circumstances, he should perform his own immediate duties first. This insistence on the performance of one's own duties implies the abolition of all distinctions of high and low among them for, when we consider duties as means to renunciation, it is not their content that matters, but the selfless spirit in which they are done. All can therefore be *samnyāsins* in this sense, because

tion, but that renunciation is a necessary precondition of all true service. Though the preliminary discipline thus becomes negative, it does not signify indifference to others as shown by the rule of *ahimsā* which is binding on all ascetics, no matter to what school they belong.

7. The conception of *sva-dharma* is wider than that of 'my station and its duties.' It includes the cultivation of self-regarding virtues also like humility and fortitude. But, for the sake of simplicity in treatment, we confine our attention here to the predominant part of it.

all have their places in society and the duties pertaining to them. Accordingly, we find the Mahābhārata representing as a pattern of true asceticism a pedlar who fulfils his functions in society conscientiously and with absolute disinterestedness.<sup>8</sup>

Renunciation and service, however, are not the only features of the ideal. There is a third feature also ; but before specifying it, it is desirable to find out in what respect the above training, which is meant to further the moral life, is incomplete. A great deal will, no doubt, be gained by a person that goes through this discipline ; but, though he may thereby be able to renounce all self-interest, he will continue to be aware of his agency. To state the same in the terminology of the Gītā though he may free himself from the idea that he is an enjoyer (*bhoktr*), he will remain conscious that he is a doer (*kartṛ*).<sup>9</sup> Such self-consciousness is, indeed, necessary inasmuch as the disciple in this stage sets before himself a definite purpose viz. the overcoming of selfishness through performing his duty. But all such activity, by its very character, involves the possibility of an internal constraint or strife within the self. Disinterested activity, even when it is the result of strife, may be quite commendable ; but it cannot be regarded as the ultimate ideal. The need for striving which may, at any moment, be felt in such activity is rather an index that the goal has not been reached. To reach it which, according to all Indian thinkers, is a state characterised by peace of spirit, 'a repose that ever is the same,' this need for effort must wholly disappear. Hence it is not enough for attaining the ideal to dismiss self-interest ; the notion of

8. xii. 267-70.

9. Cf. Ānandajñāna's gloss on Saṅkara's com. on iii. 25 & v. 8.



agency also must be given up. In other words, the agent should transcend the sense of duty itself by rising above himself completely. As the Mahābhārata puts it, we should first forswear all selfishness, and then 'forswear that by which we do so.'<sup>10</sup> The thought here is that unselfishness which is conscious of itself is not the perfect form of it. We have a sample of such a totally impersonal attitude, though but a transient one, in art experience, where the object is contemplated, neither as related to oneself nor as related to others, but solely for its own sake.<sup>11</sup> It is only when we succeed in liberating us from ourselves in this sense that we might

‘Love all loveliness, nor yearn  
With tyrannous longings ; undisturbed might live  
Greeting the summer's and the spring's return,  
Nor wailing that their joy is fugitive’.

But here the question may be asked whether such transcendence is at all possible in the case of moral activity, whatever be the truth as regards aesthetic experience. The answer is that it is quite possible as seen, for example, in a mother devoting herself to the care of her child. In bestowing that care, she acts as she ought to ; but yet it is not a mere sense of duty that actuates her, as it may be in the case of a nurse. Her response is on a higher plane where the sense of duty merges in love, and she grows completely un-selfconscious in attending to the needs of the child. This is what is meant by the saying that love is stronger than

10. *Tyaja dharmam adharmaṃ ca ubhe satyānṛte tyaja  
Ubhe satyānṛte tyaktvā yena tyajasi tat tyaja.*

—(Sānti-parva.)

11. Cf. *Sambandha-viśeṣa svikāra-parihāra-niyamāna-dhyavasāyāt sūdharaṇyena pratitaiḥ : Kāvya-prakāśa.*  
iv. 27-8.

duty. The same purpose is present in both the mother and the nurse, viz. the welfare of the child ; but, in the case of the mother, the service gains a new significance as the spontaneous expression of a unique attitude towards the object of devotion. The attainment of a similar level of action, in respect not of this person or that but of all, represents the Indian ideal of life. The agent passes in it from a state of striving morality to that of spontaneous service where he acts as he does, because he cannot but do so. The activity then becomes the natural manifestation of an inner attitude of soul, and is consequently characterised not by constraint or strife but by supreme joy which is the sign of liberation from it. The merely outward life, the common conventional morality which may not always point to a corresponding inner urge, altogether disappears. That marks the culmination of the discipline, and he, who has reached it, is no longer an aspirant (*sādhaka*) but is a perfected saint (*siddha*). Some of the best portions of the *Gītā* are taken up with a description of this super-individual or universal life.<sup>12</sup>

If such be the final ideal, then there is a wide gulf separating it from the discipline of the first stage ; and further training becomes necessary to transform the moral activity of that stage into spontaneous and selfless service. It may seem, from the example given above of a mother's care for her child, that love will suffice for such transformation ; but it cannot. It may suffice in her case, because the service is quite restricted in its scope. Her solicitude for the welfare of her child does not necessarily imply equal solicitude on her part for the children of others. But the service, which the complete achievement of the goal of life signifies, cannot be thus restricted. It can know of neither

12. See e. g. ii. 55 ff, xiv. 22 ff.

exclusions nor preferences. This service also undoubtedly involves love ; and an old Sanskrit verse describes the attitude of a person, who has reached the goal, as that of a parent to whom the whole world is like his own household.<sup>13</sup> But it is a love which is mediated by comprehensive knowledge. To know all, it may be said, is to love all ; or, to use the words of the poet, 'Utter knowledge is but utter love.' If one form of love is notoriously blind, all forms of it operate more or less instinctively and not with complete understanding. The only key to such understanding is philosophy with its synoptic comprehension of the universe. That is, the gulf between common morality and the ideal, referred to above, can be bridged only by philosophic knowledge ; and for the acquisition of such knowledge, a further course of discipline, which is predominantly intellectual, becomes necessary.

Here we see the relation of philosophic theory to the ideal of practical life. It serves to consummate the aim which is involved in the moral life.<sup>14</sup> For this purpose of consummating the ideal any one of the doctrines, which commends unselfish service, will suffice, provided it embodies, at the same time, a self consistent view of the universe. Further, since we are now occupied with the ideal of life realisable here, under empirical conditions and not elsewhere, it will suffice to take into consideration the teaching of the systems chiefly in so far as it concerns the place of the individual in the universe as a whole and to his relation to other living beings. This does not mean that the other parts of the doctrines are unnecessary or useless, but only that

13. *Ayam nijah paro veti ganānā laghu cetasām  
Udāra-caritānām tu vasudhaiva kutumbakam.*

14. Cf. *Sarvam karmākhilam Pārtha jñāne parisamāpyate*—Gitā, iv. 33.

divergences there, however important they may be for those who are concerned with the exclusive validity of particular doctrines, do not matter for our present purpose. There are, we know, such differences as, for instance, in regard to the ultimate nature of the self; but for us they only mean that the doctrines assign different metaphysical reasons to show the need for renunciation and service, which all of them alike admit as essential to the ideal. But whichever be the doctrine chosen, it is absolutely necessary that its teaching should, as a whole, be properly assimilated, if it is to have effective influence on everyday conduct. It is not enough to think and know; one must also feel and experience. That is, the knowledge conveyed by the teaching should be transformed into an immediate conviction, if it is to issue in unbidden action, like a mother's love. In her case also, there is a similar realisation. It is only such a living awareness, and not a merely conceptual knowledge, of reality that can inspire love which will transmute conduct. But it is necessary to remember that the two types of love are quite different. The one, viz. instinctive love is really a form of attachment (*mamata*) as shown by the exclusions it implies, whereas the other signifies, as we know, complete detachment and therefore equal love for all. The latter resembles what theistic creeds like Christianity term 'divine love'; but even from that, it differs in some vital points. To mention only one of them: we are there in the realm of faith and not, as here, of knowledge or insight into the ultimate nature of the universe. It is this insight or abiding enlightenment that forms the third and last feature of the common Indian ideal of life to which I desire to draw attention now.

When the ethical training of the first stage comes to be aided by such enlightenment, renunciation, instead of being merely an aim externally regulating conduct, becomes the natural expression of an inner conviction; and, in like manner,

service, instead of being a means to an end, becomes the necessary consequence of that conviction.<sup>15</sup> Or, to state the same otherwise, the constraint of obligation is replaced by the spontaneity of love. Owing to this total metamorphosis, moral action passes into a higher form. To a person that has reached this stage, the duties of his station, as such, to whose importance in the earlier stage of the discipline I drew attention, lose their special significance; and he reacts to presented situations without relating them as before, to himself. It is this transcending of all subjective or personal valuation which is the significance of the Upanishadic saying that a knower is not troubled by thoughts like 'Have I not done the right?' or 'Have I done the wrong?'<sup>16</sup> It means that he rises above the moods of self-approbation and self-condemnation. Consequently, though still an actor on the stage of the world like others, his point of view becomes that of an impartial spectator.<sup>17</sup> He will necessarily continue to work and help others, but the service which he renders will extend to all without any distinction whatsoever. Thanks to his enlightenment and the new perspective he has thereby gained, it will also be the best of its kind. That is, whatever particular form it may take—whether it be directed to soothing others' sorrow or furthering others' joy—it will not aim merely at their material wellbeing but will also tend towards their spiritual uplift. And by these efforts to raise others to a higher plane of life, he becomes their true benefactor. Even more important than this direct good will be the influence which he silently exerts on them by his life led in entire

15. Cf. *Sarvatraiva hi adhyātma-śāstre kṛtārthalakṣaṇāni yūni tūnyeva sūlhanāni upadiśyante*—Sāṅkara on Gītā, ii. 54.

16. See *Taittiriya Upanishad*, ii. 9.

17. Cf. *Sāṅkhya kārīkā*, st. 65.

consonance with the ideal. This is the Gītā conception of *loka-samgraha*: 'What the best men do, that becomes the standard for the rest.'<sup>18</sup> It is this ideal which is the culmination of the twofold training, moral and intellectual, that the Indian doctrines hold before us as *jivanmukti*. Even those who do not formally accept this type of release and maintain that the ideal can be attained only hereafter agree that this feature of enlightened and self-forgetting service characterises the final state attained in the present life.

Many a sage whose memory is preserved in Indian tradition, we learn, led a life of such disinterested and loving service. Of the instances that spring at once to mind, we may mention Vālmiki whose great epic of the *Rāmāyaṇa* has been the source of inspiration to successive generations of men and women. When Sītā, the queen of Rāma, was all too cruelly banished, he proved a ready refuge to her. He brought up her twin sons, restored them to Rāma and, realising how pure she was, he vindicated her against the infamy that had so unjustly been cast upon her. His sympathies, indeed, extended beyond human kind to all sentient beings; and, as recorded in the epic itself, it was his pity at the sight of a bird killed by a heartless fowler, when it was disporting itself, that was the occasion for the birth of India's classical poesy. This ideal of practical life, we also come across every now and then in the works of great Indian poets. Kālidāsa, in more than one place, expresses his conception of the supreme God in terms of it—as ever intent on the welfare of his creatures but with never a thought of himself.<sup>19</sup> Some of the best characters again which the poet has created, are meant to illustrate this ideal of what may be described as

18. fii. 21.

19. See e. g. *Mālavikāgni-mitra*, i. i; *Kumāra-sambhava*, vi. 26.

morality touched with vision. Kaṇva, for example, whose serene and benignant influence is felt throughout the play of *Sākuntalam* is a selfless sage who watches over the welfare of all about him and is, in particular, the help of the helpless, as shown by the belief prevalent in the whole hermitage that he looks upon the heroine, who is an orphan thrown on his compassion, as his life's all (*jivita sarvasva*). In the *Nāgānanda* of another poet, while the ascetic life is admired on account of its freedom, purity and simplicity, the negative form of it is condemned on the score that it shuts out opportunities for doing good to others.<sup>20</sup> In our own time, Tagore has immortalised the same ideal of disinterested care for good of others in various poems. It will suffice to refer to one where a young ascetic, Upagupta is portrayed as rushing to the aid of a castaway woman, whose enticing invitation he had once declined, saying that he would come when the time was ripe. One day thereafter, finding her lying in the shadow of the city wall 'struck with the black pestilence, her body spotted with sores', he was moved by love and 'taking her head on his knees, he moistened her lips with water and smeared her body with balm.' 'Who are you, merciful one ?' asked the woman. 'The time, at last has come to visit you, and I am here' replied the ascetic.

The message of Indian philosophy is that man should seek for the fulfilment of his highest being in such service. The distinctive features of this service, as I have tried to point out, are that it should be rendered in a spirit of absolute disinterestedness and that it should be rooted in an all-comprehensive love which is the outcome of complete enlightenment. Circumstances have in recent times tended to weaken the emphasis once laid on these features ; and the consequence has been the subordination, on the whole, of

spiritual to worldly ends in the pursuits of life. The idea of altruistic service is, indeed, there ; but its scope has been narrowed in various soul-cramping ways. Its quality also has deteriorated, particularly on account of attempts made to reconcile service to others with what is called 'reasonable self-love.' But though, by reason of these radical modifications, the old ideal has been much obscured, it has not fortunately died out, for our own generation furnishes an outstanding example of it in one whose unselfish labours in the case of not merely his countrymen but of all humanity is shedding fresh light upon our land. The great need of the hour is to revivify our faith in this ideal. Though it is a characteristic feature of the Indian teaching, there is nothing racial or credal in this ideal to restrict its applicability to India. It seems, on the other hand, to possess a permanent value for all. When we remember that the teaching starts with the watchword, 'Prefer not yourself to others,' we see that its value should be particularly great in guiding the present-day world, and saving it from the heart-breaking experiences like those through which it is now passing.

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# **The Problem of value in Indian Philosophy \***

By

**Prof. H. M. BHATTACHARYYA, M. A.**

## **The Place of Value in Philosophy**

The Problem of Value is up to this day a growing problem in the West ; but it has ever been the settled and central problem for the Indian mind. Western thought traces its historical beginning ; in India it is co-eval with Philosophy. As it is a growing problem in the West, as value is sought somewhere in the circumference of the ever-widening circle of life, there has been a considerable groping about it simply to make it all the more elusive ; for the Indian mind it is at the very centre of life's circle and is therefore all the more deep and intricate in conception. Difference in the perspective in which an object of investigation is viewed makes difference in approach as well as in achievement. And such a difference is conspicuous in the view-point, approach and achievement in the Western and Indian thought so far as the value problem is concerned. It is also true that in the systems of Indian thought there is hardly any clear-cut and well defined Philosophy of Value though Indian philosophic literature abounds in reference to Value in almost all its varied bearings. The reason for this apparently is that the Indian mind ever takes a synthetic view of Life and the Universe in which problems never fall into water-tight compartments. Hence the task of constructing a Philosophy of Value in all its implications from the Indian point of view is by virtue of its magnitude and centrality, so enormous that, within the limits

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\* Presidential Address of the Section of Indian Philosophy, 1939.

of an address like this, we would do well only to deal with the problem in its bare outlines.

The problem of Value to the Indian mind may be said to have been the problem of Life attuned to Reality. Excepting the system of the Carvaka, the only materialistic system of India, all other thought-systems of India are agreed in that life is not a truncated cone ; it is not to be viewed in cross-sections, nor in isolation from Reality. They are all agreed that all the life-forces are to be viewed as organised into a harmony and that Reality is in living relation with these life-forces. And if Philosophy, as the Indian mind understands it, is the intuitive apprehension of Life and Reality in their harmony, then the problem of Value, which comprehends within its sweep all the facts and expressions of life in tune with Reality, is certainly convertible with the problem of Philosophy itself. Even Buddhism, though much misunderstood and much-maligned on the score of its exoteric rejection of all unity and Reality, does not fall outside of the above generalisation, when it is understood in all its esoteric implications. Hence there seems to be as much truth in saying that in one sense there is in India no distinct Philosophy of Value as in saying that in another sense all Indian Philosophy is after all Value-Philosophy. And it is perhaps because of this that we do not find in the history of Indian thought, as we do in that of the Western, emergence, at a particular stage and with the rise of a particular philosophic genius,<sup>1</sup> of a new arena of thought-activities heralding the Philosophy of Value, as distinct from Philosophy itself. Nor did the Indian mind ever stand in need of a mouth-piece like a Münsterberg to declare that

1. cf. The remark of Hoffding in his *Philosophy of Religion* : "We are indebted to Kant's philosophy for the independence of the problem of value as apart from the problem of knowledge. He taught us to distinguish between

"through the world of things shimmered first weakly and then even more clearly the world of values"<sup>2</sup>. or an Urban to demonstrate that "there can be no existence without value and no value without existence".<sup>3</sup> The value problem is so vital and engaging to the Indian mind that instead of forming an appendix or after thought as in the philosophy of the West in general, it has exercised and marshalled all its thought-energies so as to make them converge to its own development into being the central problem of Life and Philosophy.

### **The Conception of Value in Indian Thought**

If, as above indicated, life is an integrated whole of its forces attuned to Reality, what must be the character of these forces and of this integration as also of the ultimate principle of Reality to which life is attuned, so that unfoldment of life's possibilities may be realised, and realisation of its fuller and fuller being may become a fact? For it is in this unfoldment of life's possibilities, in this realisation of its fuller and fuller being that the values have been thought by the Indian mind to manifest. Now the facts and forces of Life are indeed manifold. Some of them make up the vital part of our being, others belong to its psychical part and others again are relegated to its spiritual part. It follows then that the make-valuation and explanation." Also Kemp Smith observes in his *Commentary on the Critique of Pure Reason* (p. lvi): "what Kant does—stated in broad outline—is to distinguish between the problems of Existence and the problems of Value, assigning the former to science and the latter to philosophy."

2 Prof. Münsterberg quoted in *Philosophy To day* by Schaub and others.

3. cf. W. M. Urban's article, *Value, Logic and Reality* in the Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy.

up of our being is not exclusively biological, in which case it would have been a mere play of lower feelings and blind will—of passions and appetites on the one hand and desires and instincts on the other; nor is it merely psycho-biological, in which case it would have been a mere interplay of feeling and will on the one hand and intellect and reason on the other, resulting in the mere rationalisation of the feelings and desires. It is rather a triad of vital, mental and spiritual forces in what may be called a moving equilibrium. The complete being of our life is a moving equilibrium in the sense that in it, unlike in mere equilibrium, there is a perpetual drawing out, overhauling and readjustment of the urges of the vital and mental parts of our being by the urges of its spiritual part which is essentially dynamic. This perpetual readjustment of the vital-mental part of our being by its dynamic spiritual urges brings about gradual unfoldment of our life's possibilities—progressive realisation of the full stature of our being.

But this is not all. The full stature of our being is indeed its complete spiritualisation. But this process of complete spiritualisation does not mean annihilation of the vital and mental parts of our being, but rather their enrichment and transparency; it does not mean mere ascent from the lower to the higher rung of the ladder but descent of the higher into the lower parts of our nature with a view to their devitalisation and dementalisation. Now this is possible because there is immanent interpenetration of the ultimate spiritual Reality into every part of existence. It is this immanent interpenetrative aspect of the spiritual Reality with which Life is progressively brought into perfect tune, that we understand by God of Religion. All the systems of Indian thought may be said to be at one in so far as they hold in common this view of progressive unfoldment of our being in tune with the ultimate spiritual Reality in its immanent character, excepting the Advaitism of Samkara in which is

conceived in addition to the above a purely transcendental Reality which does not enter into the immanent relation with the world of nature and the world of finite spirits and therefore not into any valuational relation with them.

We are now in a position to understand what the Indian thinkers call value. If life is a progressive unfoldment of its possibilities, a perpetual realisation of the fuller and fuller stature of its being, then values are but those spiritual entities which manifest themselves in the course of this progressive realisation. They are said to manifest but not to be created, for they are eternally existent realities. They become progressively appreciable by the finite spirits as the life of the finite spirits attains its fuller and fuller being by the gradual devitalisation and dementalisation respectively of its vital and psychical parts. The commonly used Indian term *purusārtha* means that which is valuable for the *Purusa* or the finite spirit. That which is ultimately valued or prized by the finite spirit can only be that in which its true being lies, that which constitutes its highest good. The highest good of the finite spirit is its fullest nature to attain which is to attain *Moksa* or freedom. *Moksa* or freedom is therefore described in the Indian thought-systems as the highest value. We in common parlance are accustomed to speak of it as a value to be attained. But if, as we have seen, the values are eternal entities, then they cannot be said to be attained but can only be said to manifest. Knowledge, Goodness and Beauty are also values in their absolute sense because they constitute the very essence of the highest spiritual Reality. If the highest realisation of our being is to become one or consubstantial with the highest spiritual Reality then in that highest stage it becomes one with these highest values of Knowledge, Goodness, Beauty and Bliss of which the being of the Highest Reality is conceived to consist.

To the Indian mind values are thus not emergents, they do not emerge as nature grows in fineness and complexity, as Alexander would have them. They are not even creations out of nothing in course of the onrush of the blind principle of Life, as Bergson would have them. They appear to evolve or emerge as the growing fineness of our life renders it increasingly fitter for their perception and appreciation. They are the archetypal forces<sup>4</sup> which may be said to make up the very Immanent Spiritual Reality and therefore responsible for the creation and control of life and the universe as also for its guidance in the realisation of its fuller and fuller being.

### The Conception of Value in the West.

So far our analysis has led us to the understanding of the absolute values as the Indian mind has conceived them. It is clear from the above analysis that the Western conceptions of values stand widely different from the Indian owing to the fundamentally different outlook on Life and Reality, which the Western mind has generally adopted. In the West the psychical individual has been in some cases taken as an isolated self-sufficient unit over which the outside nature has been set as another and different entity. The foundational reality of the entire existence has either been lost sight of, or has been given an ideal or transcendental status apparently without any living relationship with finite spirits and the world of nature. The psychical individual again

4. cf. Nicolai Hartmann according to whom also value is a *power* which makes the existent to lose its equilibrium and draws it to itself. (*Ethics* Vol. I pp 272-273) But we beg to differ from him in that values have not merely the ethical ought-to-be as their exclusive structure but also the cognitive, aesthetic and religious structure.

7C 234

has not been viewed as an integrated whole but rather as a bundle of affections, interests and desires. The result has been that values which really lie deep down in the very framework of life and the universe have been dislodged from their proper setting and deprived of their proper function in life. These attitudes to Life and Reality have been responsible in the West for the Psychological or Subjective, Realistic and even Idealistic theories of Value which, taken with their isolated and independent claims, fall far too short of the comprehensive view-point which the Indian mind takes, and perhaps rightly, as the real explanation of the deepest and the most foundational problem of value. It is needless and perhaps irrelevant for my present purposes to enter upon any detailed analysis and criticism of these different theories of value formulated in the West. But since an examination of the basic conceptions in these Western theories is calculated to bring into relief the comprehensive character of the Indian standpoint we would do well to pass in review their most representative types.

In the psychological theories of value the starting difficulty is its separatist isolation of the individual psychical centre from the rest of existence which however is an organised whole and this is the fundamental difficulty under which any phenomenological or scientific view pitiably labours. But the more characteristic difficulty of the psychological theories of value is that they base themselves on unsound psychology. Mill, for instance, observing in his *Utilitarianism* that "that which is in itself valuable is in itself desirable" and that "such are only pleasure and freedom from pain" makes pleasure and the absence of pain to be intrinsic values. All other values are *derivative* from this value, and they serve as means to its attainment. According to the hedonistic theory, as is clear on its own analysis of an act, the objective content of the act is only a means, while

the real aim is the subjective feeling of pleasure for the acting agent. The structure of the act of will, in this view, is only *eidetic*, to borrow Husserl's terminology, without an objective reference. But the student of hedonistic ethics needs no reminder of the gross retroversion of the real situation here to discern that it is the objective content that is the real aim of the striving—that really attract the agent as a value. This objective content may in some cases belong to the system of the outer nature or in some cases to the inner life of the agent, and the feeling of satisfaction is only an index, a sign of attaining our aim. Meinong's psychological account of value, that it consists in the feeling of pleasure errs as much as Ehrenfels' which makes striving, inclination and desire to be the source of value. For while Meinong forgets that feeling is the clothing in which objective values appear in consciousness, Ehrenfels mistakes desires and inclinations for the source of values though they are in fact determined by values of which therefore they are the consequences. The psychology of feeling and volition may give us science of the psychic processes connected with values, but cannot furnish us with an account of values as they are in their true colour. Nor is Perry's biological interest' as the basis of value any improvement either, on the psychologism of Meinong and Ehrenfels, for besides sharing in the difficulties of the above accounts it degrades the evaluating agent to the biological level, ignoring the psychical and spiritual aspects of his being which tend him towards his finer fulfilment or higher spiritual destiny.

The Realistic theories of value are also the results of the separatist conception of existence needing two ultimates, spirit and nature, neither definable in terms of the other or an infinity of scattered existents each independent of the other without any disposition towards anthropocentrism. Value has no locus and reality of its own ; it is not a determination



either of the spirit or of nature ; but it emerges as a *tertium quid* from the intercourse between spirit and nature, as Alexander would have us believe. The spatio-temporal structure of the universe is neutral or indifferent to start with; but tends, (we know not why) towards evolution of values. It is subject to a perpetual process of growth into increasing complexity, into higher and higher levels of existence by the restless movement of Time, which he terms '*nisus*', towards a higher birth. This higher birth or the next higher empirical quality is 'Deity'. Deity is a variable quality and changes as the universe grows in time. Each level of existence has its own deity, as some unknown quality to be realised by the next higher level. In this perpetual process of growing into complexity when the mental level is attained the deity is the next higher empirical quality to mind and is appreciated as mental or spiritual. Here the deity, as the type of emergence, has its foundation on the life of the subject, though incapable of definition in terms of mind, spirit or personality. Now values are emergents among other emergents and have their *raison de'etre*, (if they really have any), in the relation of one reality to another in virtue of which a fresh reality is constituted. And as Alexander remarks : "The simplest example of a reality which is compounded of mind and a non-mental thing is the *person* itself in which the mind and body are compresent, and the person is neither subject-self alone, nor the object-self alone, but the union of the two." Values then emerge on the personal level, but only as furnishing material appropriate to the growth of deity : and God, as actual, is even not the eternal source of values, but values as emergents are said to form the substructure for the being of God. It is not God who evolves values, rather it is values that evolve God.<sup>5</sup>

##### 5. *Vide Alexander, Space Time & Deity.*

Another quaintly novel picture of the universe is presented to us by another class of Realists according to whom "everything is valuable to itself" or whatever is, is value. Value of self-maintenance is intrinsic and absolute as well as objective. There is no need of the distinction between fact and value, between the actual and the normative, between bare existence of any sort unrelated to any consciousness and appreciation. This is Laird's theory of value as 'natural election'; and almost an insignificant variant of the theory is given by Moore in his 'Conception of Intrinsic Value'. Moore's contention is that "a kind of value is intrinsic if and only if, when anything possesses it, that same thing or anything exactly like it would necessarily or must always under all circumstances, possess it in exactly the same degree". The necessity, here referred to, is said to be neither causal necessity, nor logical implication. It is the kind of necessity which we assert to hold, when we say that "if a given patch of colour be yellow, then any patch which were exactly like the first would be yellow too".<sup>6</sup>

The above representative realistic accounts of value in Western thought will suffice for our purposes of estimating their worth as explanations of the value-problem. Apart from the fact that Realism as a doctrine takes existence, not as an integrated whole of Reality but only as composed of *disjecta membra* of physical entities—an assumption which is subversive of all proper explanation of value as the Indian thinkers conceive it, there are more fundamental difficulties in the realistic conceptions themselves. First of all, it may be asked, how could, according to Alexander's showing, values emerge in the mere relation between the mental and the non-mental reality? For relation is a mere subsistence between two terms of the relation and if no one of the relata has any

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6. Moore : *Philosophical Studies*. pp. 260, 265.

value-constitution of its own, value cannot emerge as a mere mechanical glow out of the two non-valuational realities. It is perhaps because of this that Lloyd Morgan asked what makes the emergents emerge and his answer to this question was unmistakable that there is at the back of all of them the Spiritual Reality that guides the very process of emergence itself. Indian Idealism, as well as Western, does not disbelieve in the manifestation of value, what it denies is the historical and mechanical and not the teleologically determining character of values which, as elements in the life of the Divine, makes life and nature to be the field for their manifestation. Again Moore's conception of Intrinsic Value does not provide us with any criterion to decide whether mental states and organic wholes which contain mental constituents are objects of value, or whether purely physical states of affairs may have value. And curiously enough some of the saner realists themselves have given us the criterion for the decision. Dr. Broad, for instance, thinks it highly probable that "no state of affairs can be good or bad unless it is, or contains as a constituent some conscious mental state."<sup>7</sup> And later in his *Principia Ethica* Moore himself defines the Beautiful as that of which the admiring contemplation is good. We may then assert that there is at least a qualified agreement amongst realists that only mental states or states of affairs which contain mental constituents have intrinsic value.

Again Indian Idealist conception of values makes values to be the archetypal existences - real spiritual forces that determine life and the universe in their unfoldment of greater and greater fineness and their realisation of fuller and fuller being. The dynamic immanent Divine, constituted of these real spiritual forces penetrate life and the Universe through which he realises himself by self-manifestation. Beginning

7. *Mind and its Place in Nature* p. 488.

from the tiniest atom up to the mightiest mountain, all beings, inorganic living and conscious, live move and have their being in the immanent Divine and tend towards their fuller stature under the determinations of values which are not like the Platonic *essences* or the *eidos* without any living immanent relation with them but are rather their real determining forces. In the ethical motivations and aesthetic enjoyments of the self-conscious centres, values receive finer manifestations but not until in the religious consciousness they receive the finest expressions ; for in them is attained the absolute fulness of being towards which the whole existence is moving. The ultimately real values of Wisdom, Goodness, Bliss and Freedom are fully manifested to the religious consciousness in which life attains its fullest attunement to Reality. Of all the Western idealist accounts of value Dr. Nicolai Hartmann's seems to be the most well thoughtout and profound one in recent times, but to the Indian thinker it appears to fall short of the mark in as much as it considers values to be after all *essences* rather than real spiritual existences !<sup>8</sup> Another inadequacy which Hartmann's position suffers from is that he has not devoted his energies, with as much thoroughness to the problem of Religious Values as to the Moral ones. To the Indian mind the Moral Values in all their gradations are without doubt calculated to elicit the finer and finer strands of man's being, but unless they are re-oriented from the standpoint of the Divine Reality they do not reveal their real force in attainment of the highest end to which the entire existence points.

### **The Conditions that make Values possible.**

Among the conditions under which values manifest themselves *Dharma* occupies the foremost position. If life is a continuous unfoldment of its possibilities, a perpetual process

8. Hartmann's *Ethics* Vol. I Ch. XIV.

of concretion, this process of unfoldment or concretion cannot be an abstract and isolated one. The individual psychical centre is confronted with the world of nature which supplies it with the concrete environment. The world of spirits and the world of nature however are not two intrinsically distinct worlds set over against each other, for they are linked up into one concrete existence by the immanent interpenetration of the supreme spiritual Reality which expresses itself through it. Nature is not wholly nature but is permeated through and through by the supreme spiritual Reality, the spheres of whose self-expression are both the world of nature as well as the world of spirits. Hence Life's unfoldment or realisation of its fuller and fuller being must needs be linked up with nature. But the process of unfoldment cannot afford to be random but must necessarily be regulated. Now that principle which urges life to unfoldment and gives regulation and order to this unfolding movement is what the Indian thinker calls *Dharma*. The concept of Dharma in the Indian systems of thought amidst varieties of secondary implication has in it this common element of regulation—regulation of spirit and nature in Life's attainment of fuller and fuller being. The entire Life being a continuous movement towards the final fulfilment regulated by Dharma it operates as a common urge both on spirit and on nature. Values which appear in the course of such continuous movement may be extrinsic or intrinsic according as they relate to lower or higher grades of refinement or may be pragmatic or utilitarian, if they lead to the fruition of an immediate purpose in life ; but no such sharp distinction between one class of values and another has been felt to be necessary by the Indian mind. To it all the so-called classes of values have been regarded as only relative or lower as compared with the Ultimate Values of life, viz Knowledge, Goodness, Bliss and Freedom, which as absolute and highest, operate as the determining forces of the universe.

We have spoken of the Dharma as the general regulating principle of life's unfoldment but the Indian thinker has conceived also another and more specific form of it namely Swadharma which has a specific reference to the peculiar constitution of the concrete psychic centre. The process of unfoldment of man's inner being is no doubt a general movement under the general regulating principle of Dharma, but the Indian mind is also alive to the necessity of the peculiar vital-mental spiritual constitution of the individual psychical centre. The unconditional flow of Life's unfoldment is checked and chequered by the *Swadharma* which, as an inescapable principle of individual determination, cannot admit of evasion with impunity. The institution of *Swadharma* thus provides ample room for the differences in value, for the manifestation and appreciation of the pragmatic, extrinsic and intrinsic values which all however are graded and co-ordinated and are after all purely instrumental to the attainment of the highest and absolute values under the general guidance of Dharma.

The second important condition of value-manifestation is the Principle of *Karma*. In it the Indian mind finds not the principle of iron necessity but rather that of dedication. The sphere of the concrete individual is the sphere of activity ; life is undoubtedly a philosophy of activism. Activities of the concrete individual are not without consequences which need adaptation and adjustment in the economy of the whole. But this adaptation, this adjustment is rendered possible if the actions are performed under the regulating principle of *Dharma*. The Arthasastra will teach you the principles of the production and distribution of wealth, the Vaidyak Sastra will teach you the principles of health and Good life. Each of these is a value ; nor is enjoyment a disvalue, if cultivated in the spirit of *Dharma*. You are, as an active agent, bound to go on performing actions by way of which you are to come across these values, but the principle of

dedication underlying these actions requires adjustment and adaptation with the social whole of active agents. And such adaptation and adjustment is possible owing to the principle of *Karma* which thus keeps the social integrity in the midst of the diversities of individual duties. ४७८ १३४

The third condition of the manifestation of values is the individual psychic agent or what we call *personality*. The individual psychic agent is, as we have seen, is a complex of vital mental and spiritual factors. The individual agency entails an emphasis on the vital and mental factors of our being. So long as these factors reign supreme in the individual, life moves in a lower groove and the attainment of its fullest status in which the highest values manifest themselves suffers impediment. The *sreyah* or the good remains confounded with the *preyah* or the *desirable*. And within the province of the desirable the conflict between the opposite forces of feeling and will remains inevitable and the individual psychic centre is torn asunder between *raga* and *dvesa*, attraction and repulsion, which give rise to the positive and negative values of good and evil of all description.<sup>9</sup> Until complete spiritualisation of the whole being, finest perception is out of sight and highest values do not manifest themselves. When complete spiritualisation of our being is attained this conflict is over and all the spiritual forces of our life vibrate with the Reality of the Divine and highest values of Beauty, Love, Wisdom, Power and Holiness make themselves manifest.

Here a very important and subtle analysis of the relation between will and the spiritualised life is met with in the Indian systems of thought. The conflict between feeling and will being over in this transcendental state of realisation the urges of the vital mental parts of our being lose their

force and desires and emotions cannot any longer permeate the will which then moves in its own native harmony and spontaneous joy. In this joyous harmony of the will the sense of individuality and separation completely disappears and there appear also the unification and harmony of the individual wills and the divine. This is the teaching of the Vaisnavic systems of Indian philosophy where the personal will of the Divine absorbs and harmonises the wills of the finite psychic centres. Kant in his theory of the Kingdom of Ends could not realise the height of this conception of harmony of the finite wills with the divine, for to him the identity of being between the finite spirits and the infinite was an impossibility, though the harmony and fellowship between the finite wills was conceivable to him.

In the Tantras and in the Adaita-vada of Samkara we have a still higher spiritual outlook, so far as the function of will is concerned. In the Vaisnavic systems we have seen that the highest value lies in the organisation of the finite wills with the divine, in fellowship of man with God. Love therefore, in these systems becomes the highest value, and love cannot have any meaning without the personality towards which the finite wills must be attracted. The Will of the Divine Being is thus a supreme personal will which in its unification with the finite wills expresses itself as Truth, Goodness and Beauty in its transcendent, and as Power in its immanent aspect. In the Tantras however, though the will plays the supreme part it is not personal in its transcendent character. In its immanent character where it is Siva-Sakti it has full play in the creation and functioning of the cosmic world in its spatio-temporal and causal relations. But when the Sadhaka by dint of his sadhana refines his being sufficiently to make it the fit percipient of the highest values, then the transcendental principle does not manifest to him as a personal will but as *Niskala Siva* or the highest transcendental



Reality whose Will, Being and Consciousness are of a supra-personal and supracosmic character. For in this transcendent manifestation Sakti with all her creative and immanent function has no longer any meaning and value for the Sadhaka and, therefore, dissolves herself in the ineffable being of Siva. In this state of Tantric realisation the personal will of the Sadhaka has already been defunct and his whole being is merged in the transcendental (*niskala*) being of Siva who is all bliss and luminosity. And the consequence is that the relative values of the cosmic world no longer attract him and he enjoys the will less absolute values of Knowledge and Bliss. In the Advaitism of Sankara also this trend of thought has been developed with perhaps the subtlest metaphysical insight. In his system there is indeed the distinction between the immanent aspect of the Reality as well as the transcendental. The sphere of immanent Reality is the sphere of will and personality. Here Avidya or Maya does the duty of the Sakti of the Tantras. The immanent Reality in conjunction with Maya is a personal being with will and power, and is the embodiment of the higher values of Truth, Goodness, Power, Beauty and Bliss which manifest themselves to the soul in the progressive unfoldment of its inner being. In this form of realisation there is no doubt the identification of the finite soul with the being of God in which the finite soul feels the vibrations of free causality of his being. But these vibrations of his free causality are gradually assimilated to the Divine will with which his finite will acts in perfect unison. The finite soul in this state of realisation may be said to attain divinity with all its glories. It enjoys the higher values of wisdom, love and bliss of the Divine Being. But this immanent identification of the finite spirit still involves an element of duality or distinction between the finite spirit and the Divine. But the complete identification of the finite and the infinite cannot

be achieved in the identification of will but only in the identification of Being. And in this identity of Being lies the truest realisation according to Samkara.

One thing that stands out clear from this subtlest metaphysical or mystical speculation of Samkara is this that the fullest stature of the self is its Pure Existence which is identical with the Highest Freedom. All immanental relation of the finite self with the Divine, entails after all an element of limitation both on the side of the finite self as well as on the side of the Infinite self, only that the limitation on the latter side is self-limitation. We have seen that within this sphere of limitation the self as finite progressively realises its being in the cosmic existence which also is born of such limitation. And in such progressive realisation the goal is reached by the unification of the finite will with the infinite will. And during this progressive realisation, even when the final goal is reached, the element of duality that is still retained, remains responsible for the act of evaluation which appraises the values not only of the lower grades but of the highest grades also. Knowledge, love, power and beauty which may be counted as the values of the highest grade make themselves manifest to the still completely unidentified spirit in its act of evaluation, though it may be said to have attained the fullest realisation so far as the cosmic existence is concerned. Thus according to Samkara even the highest values have their meaning only within the realm of the act, as well as of the limitation involved in the immanental conception of Reality. When the empirical and immanental relations are transcended in the complete identity of Being between the finite and the infinite spirit then all acts and the evaluating self with all their limitations and duality subside in the transcendental Existence which is a pure Fact devoid of all acts. This is the realm of pure Truth and Pure Existence in which

Consciousness and Being are identical. This state of pure transcendence we call Subject as Freedom which is also identical with pure Percipience or pure Intuition. And it is for this reason that Samkara following the line of thought of the Brihadaranyaka has intimated to us that Truth or Existence in this transcendental conception is beyond the realm of values.<sup>10</sup>

So far as the limits of an address like this and my own personal limitations have permitted me, I have tried to present before you the problem of value as the Indian minds conceive it. Apart from the value you put on my presentation of the problem, one thing is certainly clear that the values of life are not mere delusions of the human mind, but are real spiritual forces, however, dimly envisaged. The vague and tentative insight by which man pierces beyond the present and the created, to the attainment of a dim and evanescent anticipation of a future stage in his spiritual development guarantees both the content of his aim and the continuance of his endeavour. The glimmering 'not yet' impels him in the name of good or value and invests itself with the force of an imperative. So in the teeth of vicissitudes of external environment, of the insistence of our biological demands, human progress has been an undeniable fact. The physical environment, biological needs, and the rationalising tendencies of the psychical level may have sometimes set the limits and narrow the channel of evolution, but the superior urges of the spiritual principle in man have ever overcome these limitations and have directed the course of progress in steady steps. The times we are passing through surely present an age of conflict of interests. Hatred and ignorance, fear

10. Dr. Sarkar's *Eastern Lights* ; also Sir Radhakrishnan : *Idealist View of life*.

and distrust, as the worst of disvalues, threaten the social fabric of the day with complete disruption, but an idealistic optimist can never despair of an ultimate adjustment of these lower urges in man. For in his true nature and constitution man is above all spiritual and the urges of his spiritual constitution are so radical and even volcanic in character, that they defy all suppression and would wash away all obstacles in their way. But the spiritual force of values is not always awake and active in man and to awaken the consciousness of values seems to be the pressing need of the hour.

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# **The Principle of Inexplicability in Philosophy \***

By

G. R. MALKANI, M. LIT. (Cantab)

Explanation is the one great demand of our thought. Whether we are studying things in empirical sciences, or whether we are philosophising, we are always seeking an explanation of things. We try to know the reason why things are what they are. This demand for explanation is a very legitimate demand. But before it can be met, we must know what it is to explain. Or in other words, when is a thing explained ?

This problem of explanation, it appears to us, is bound up with another problem ; and that is the problem as to the nature of the things to be explained. It is not all things that require an explanation. It is only things which have a certain character within our experience that require to be explained. And the sort of explanation which can be given in each case depends upon the kind of question to which the things themselves naturally give rise in our understanding. Of the things that require an explanation, there are first of all those things which *become* or come into being. It is evident that if a thing exists in itself, and does not come into being through the agency of something else,—or in other words, it is not caused to exist,—there can be no reason for its existence in anything beyond itself. The reason of a self-existent thing

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\*Presidential Address of the "Logic and Metaphysics" section read at the 15th Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress held at Hyderabad, (Deccan) in December 1939.

must lie wholly within itself. A self-existent thing would continue to be itself, even if everything else beside it became different or ceased to exist altogether. Nothing therefore could throw any light upon its nature or its reality. It is in some sense self explained ; and a problem of explanation with regard to it will be quite illegitimate, unless we make clear to ourselves the sort of explanation that may yet be demanded.

We shall pursue this point a little further. What is a self-existent thing ? A thing may be said to exist in itself, when it does not come into being. It is real without any beginning. But that is not enough. A thing may exist without beginning, and yet it may cease to exist at some later date. A self-existent thing however cannot cease to exist. It cannot cease to exist *of itself*. Of itself, it will continue to remain what it is. It can only cease to exist, if at all, through the operation of something else upon it. But if it does so, it cannot have a nature which excludes relations to other things. It cannot be impermeable to outside influences. How can we, under the circumstances, say that at any time it has unrelated or absolute being, or being that is not dependent upon anything else ? In fact, we cannot conceive a self-identical or "unchanging" thing *beginning* to enter into a relation with other things. It cannot be moved out of itself. If a thing enters a movement or a process of change it can in no sense stand *outside* this process. It can only stand *within* it as a moment in the process. It cannot be said to have a self-identical or self-existent being. Anything then that comes into being, or ceases to exist, or in any way becomes different from itself, is not what exists in itself. The self-existent must be at the same time immutable.

If we accept this interpretation of the self-existent, anything that is subject to change or modification will offer a problem. It will require an explanation. The reason for its

existence lies outside of it. We are said to give this reason, when we give the cause. But a cause which itself requires an explanation will not explain. The true cause must not itself change into the effect. It must be understood as bringing about the effect, while it itself remains the same. If this is so, the effect is dependent upon the cause, while the cause exists independently of it and in itself. Whether there is any ultimate cause of the changing forms of things which constitute our world is another question. It is also a question whether the effect, in so far as it is different from the cause, is really explained. This is a question to which we shall revert later in this paper. For the present, it is important to note that the demand for explanation of the changing forms of things can only be met by indicating an ultimate cause of things that does not itself change or that is truly immutable. Things that require to be explained must somehow be accommodated within it, or they must be left out as null and void.

It is not only things that arise or cease to exist that demand to be explained. All determinate existence demands an explanation. If something is A and not B, the question arises, why is it A? Why is anything, anything at all and not nothing? It is often thought that it is no part of a philosopher's business to make or constitute a world, or even to attempt to give reasons why there is any world at all. The fact of the world has to be accepted. We have to recognise the world as *given*. All that we can do is to seek to understand this world. Once we come to the conclusion, after empirical and rational investigation, that the world has a certain character and no other, we have no further problem left. We have to accept the world for what it is. The philosopher, like other human beings, is confined within the world. He must understand it from within. He cannot speculate about it from the outside.

It is doubtful in the extreme whether this business of understanding reality from within is itself a simple matter. It may be quite unilluminating, and certainly unending, unless we evolve a method of tackling reality which is not merely an adjustment of the empirical scientific method. We however contend that the question why anything is anything and not nothing is not illegitimate for the philosopher. It is no doubt illegitimate for the scientist whose sole concern is to get at the *matter of fact* character of reality through the empirical means of knowledge at his disposal. It is no part of his business to criticise these means of knowledge or to question the genuineness of the facts known through them. He is merely concerned with the progressive co-ordination and interpretation of certain facts which he knows objectively. He studies the object as such. The question, why anything is anything, or why there is a world at all, does not worry him. But it comes naturally to the philosopher who seeks an ultimate understanding of reality as a whole. Once something has a determinate character, this question of why arises. The determinate does not stand by itself. We shall see that it is what it is, because it is grounded in what is not determinate. The reality of the determinate cannot be thought of, apart from this non-determinate ground.

It is sometimes argued: "Things are what they are, because the ultimate nature of reality is what it is. All things are grounded in the Absolute. They are accordingly determined by the latter, and are deducible from it." Let us suppose that this is a plausible way of seeking to explain things. But the question remains unanswered, why is ultimate reality what it is and not otherwise? The contention that ultimate reality, having nothing outside of it, explains itself and that no legitimate question can be raised regarding it, is not tenable. Nothing that has a determinate character really



explains itself. The question cannot be suppressed, why is it that and not different? The determinate, however extended in scope and made inclusive, cannot be the Absolute. It can only be finite. We are obliged to go beyond it. It does not explain itself.

All being that is determinate is determined through certain relations. To say that a thing has a particular character is to exclude other things from it. If a thing is *here*, it excludes things which exist in other places. If a thing is *now*, it excludes things which exist at other times. If a thing is *such and such*, it excludes those things which are not such. It is only through these relations of exclusion that its own nature is determined. How can we say that such a thing explains itself or that it has a being *in itself*? Clearly, it is what it is, because of its relation to things which it excludes. These relations determine it, and in a way explain it. Determinate being then is not *in itself*. It has no self. Its self is in the infinite. The question, Why is it what it is?, is quite natural. But to raise this question is already to condemn this being in a way. It is to go beyond it to what is not determinate as the true explanation of it or the ultimate reason for it. Once again, the question whether there is any such reality which is non-determinate and non-objective, and which can be said to explain all determinate being, is an open question to which we shall come later.

Things that are impermanent and things that are determinate require an explanation. This means that all objects of knowledge, constituting our world, require to be explained. In fact, we shall go further and say that everything that we know has a disguised problem for us. The problem arises because of the peculiar nature of our knowledge of objects. On the one hand, every object of our knowledge has the appearance of being independent of our knowledge and so

self-existent. On the other hand, our only approach to reality being through our knowledge, we have no independent means of determining what really exists or what reality is in itself. Indeed, if all knowledge that we actually have were uncontradicted knowledge, and therefore true knowledge, the problem of things in themselves or of reality as it is in itself would not arise. But this is not the character of all our knowledge ; and certainly it is a question whether it is the character of any knowledge whatsoever. But since the self-existence of things cannot be established through the evidence of knowledge itself, and all knowledge by definition is of the self-existent, it is an open question whether any knowledge that we have is knowledge. The objects which we know have, to say the least, a dubitable kind of reality. And doubt is only the first stage of error.

In actual error, we misrepresent reality. In doubt, we have no means of deciding between reality and unreality, since the former looks so very like the latter. Logically then, doubt is only an incipient error. We have not actually erred. But we are on the way to it ; for our perception of reality makes no decisive difference between reality and unreality ; what we take to be real might quite as well be unreal. Where then our knowledge is open to doubt, we are already on the way to err. We are without the means of distinguishing truth from error, and we are confusing the two. The demand for the explanation of *all objects of our knowledge* is therefore a demand for the substitution of our present so-called knowledge by knowledge which is self-evidently true and which reveals reality as it is.

We inquire about the reason of things. But this inquiry is, by its very nature, limited from within. Not everything can be explained. There is first the upper limit. This comprises the reality which explains itself or about which

no intelligent question of explanation can be raised. Anything that we can decide to be the immutable first cause, anything that is real without being determinate and therefore truly infinite, and anything that is the object of self-evident knowledge or that is self-evidently true, cannot be the object of an enquiry for explanation. It is beyond explanation or self-explained. But there is also a lower limit which we do not often recognise. When we ask for the explanation of anything, we are not prepared to accept the thing on its face-value. It somehow appears to contradict our fundamental intuition of reality. We unconsciously make a distinction between the appearance of the thing to us and its reality. We are thus prepared in a way to find the appearance an inexplicable excrescence that has no place in reality. We maintain that the demand for explanation is not, and cannot be, a demand for complete or whole-sale explanation, in which nothing, not even unreal appearances, remain unexplained or unaccounted for. What demands to be explained is already rejected in *principle* as illusory and therefore inexplicable. This inexplicability is an ultimate fact. It is the only true answer to the original demand for explanation. This demand is accordingly not frustrated. It is fully met, and in a way which makes any further repetition of the original question meaningless. What demands to be explained is sublated by the truth, and wanders homeless like an illusory appearance. The most complete explanation is not that which can accommodate literally everything within a self-explanatory system (there is no such system), but an explanation which leaves no further problem of explanation by recognising the inexplicable. Paradoxical therefore as it may appear, a thing is fully explained when it is seen to be inherently and ultimately of the nature of the inexplicable. If it is not thus seen, the problem of explanation will only change its form, but it will never get finally

resolved. It will keep recurring in one form or another. To resolve the question, we must show it to be ultimately illegitimate. It should not arise. An irrationality is not a matter for explanation; for it is opposed to reason itself. We in fact get here to the end of reason. We see the real which reveals itself, and reject the unreal about which no further question can be asked.

In order to understand this clearly, we must now ask, when is a thing explained? We sometimes think that a thing is explained when we give its cause. But evidently it is only a certain interpretation of the principle of causality which would explain. The cause cannot be different from the effect. If it is different, the effect is not explained. The effect remains distinct from the cause; and one distinct entity cannot be any reason for the existence of another. If the cause is to explain, the following conditions must be fulfilled: (a) The cause must not be a finite cause. A finite cause is no cause. It merely postpones the question. It does not resolve it. The real cause must be both the ultimate and the infinite cause. (b) The effect cannot be really different from the cause. In so far as it is different, it is not explained. There must accordingly be a real identity of the effect with the cause. The effect is nothing but the cause. It is the cause itself. (c) The effect as something distinct from the cause cannot be real and cannot be explained. It is by its very nature inexplicable.

If this is the true analysis of causality, the effect cannot be deduced from the cause. All that we can say is that it is grounded in the cause which is its reality. It has no other status than that of an illusory appearance. It is not literally explained. Literally speaking, it is inexplicable.

We have so far argued that to explain is to give the cause. We shall now suppose that to explain is to show something to have a necessary connection with something

else or to follow self-evidently from the latter. We have the ideal of explanation in mathematics where certain conclusions are *seen to follow* from certain premises. Given the premises, the conclusion is necessitated. It is *contained* in the premises. We merely draw out the implications.

It is undeniable that the ideal of explanation can only be fulfilled when something is seen to follow self-evidently from something else. But while it is possible to see the self-evidence of the "following" it is a different matter altogether when we come to the truth of the premises. The truth of the premises is never self-evident. This process of explanation is therefore only applied where we have to do with certain mental constructions. We start with these constructions or ideal entities. We know the exact limits of their content. For this content is limited by our definitions: We then work out in detail a whole system of concepts based upon those ideal constructions. The process of deduction is the process of exhibiting in detail all that is contained in the premises. There is no surprise and no novelty anywhere.

The process of explanation is inapplicable to reality. The content of anything real cannot be prescribed in thought. It is in a sense infinite. A fact, however insignificant, has no definite limits. Again, a fact may be related to other facts, but it cannot be deduced logically from any other fact or set of facts. Indeed, it may form part of a larger whole. But unless we know the whole, there is no scope for inference. And after we have known it, there is no need to infer. The part will be *seen* to be an element of the whole; and any demand for the explanation of the part will have disappeared.

It may now be said that things are explained when they are seen to be necessitated by the nature of the whole of reality. Reality as a whole, or as an inter-connected system is such that a particular thing cannot be otherwise than what it is. But this is not really explaining. First of all,

we do not know the whole, and cannot therefore know the necessity of any connection. The part is, as far as we can see, wholly contingent, and therefore unexplained. Secondly, as we have seen before, the question as to the *why* of the whole cannot be dismissed. Why is reality the particular system it is, and not another? When there are several possibilities in thought, there must be a reason for the actuality of any one possibility. But nothing that we can ever know about the whole can give us this reason. In fact, all particularity, whether it belongs to the part or to the whole, demands an explanation. The particular as such is never self-explained. If it is said that the actual world-system or the actual world-course cannot be further questioned, it is to that very extent admitted that irrationality is at the very beginning of things. Indeed, we cannot give any reason why some other possibility should have been actualised. But the fact that no reason can be given for any particular course does not, for that reason, end the question. The question is on our hands, *why* the present course? Our inability to answer the question does not make it illegitimate.

The question remains, how can matters of fact be explained? There is only one way in which anything that has a factual character can be satisfactorily explained; and that is by showing it to be not a fact at all, but only an appearance of a fact. We must find a way to resolve its contradiction with certain fundamental facts of experience and thereby go beyond it to a reality that is self-explained, or about which no question of explanation can be formulated. A fact cannot be deduced from anything else. It is in this sense ultimate and inexplicable. But it is fully explained in another way, if it is explained at all; and that is when it is seen not only as not necessitated by reality, but as having no real connection with the latter. It is illusory in character, and therefore does not demand an explanation.

When we declare something to be, by its very nature, inexplicable, we do not mean that it has an explanation which we do not know or even cannot know. What we mean is that the question of explanation simply does not arise. The illusory is incapable of explanation. But this does not mean any defect in our understanding of it. To know the illusory as illusory is to realise it as what is self-contradictory, a *something* which is at the same time *not that something*, and which therefore offers no mystery and no legitimate question of explanation. It is completely uncovered, completely open to our view, and completely resolved as a mystery of being. It is known for what it is, and offers no further problem. Our understanding may be forced, because of its ineradicable habit of questioning, to entertain certain questions about the illusory. But in the end, and on analysis, they would be found to be quite unanswerable, just because they are illegitimate. To say then that the illusory is inexplicable is not to confess ignorance on our part. It is rather a claim to penetrate the veil of mystery that hides reality from us and to know reality as self-revealing and self-luminous. It is a claim for a higher and a truer knowledge.

This then is the limit of philosophical explanation. Unless we know the Absolute Real, the problem of explanation will remain. Philosophical explanation must take the form of a direct seeing of reality as it is. If however all that we want is a conceptual explanation, or an explanation which will be acceptable to the intellect as such, we are bound to remain without any real explanation. The only explanations that the intellect, in its normal activity, can devise, are the scientific explanations. These do not really go to the root of the matter. They do not explain. They merely postpone an ultimate explanation. They move within the sphere of what is called "matter of fact." The "matter of fact" may be the *end* of science. But it is only the *beginning* of

philosophy. We cannot for ever stay in the matter of fact. It demands an explanation. This explanation cannot take the form of certain "reasons" which the intellect can conceive. All reasons lead merely to further reasons. There is no end that way. What may be called "the sufficient reason" for anything is intellectually an impossibility. The best reason is necessarily beyond reason. It is to resolve the facts that require to be explained into that reality which does not require to be explained. Questions arise from defective seeing. We have only to see well and truly. This is the ideal of explanation which philosophy must help us to realise.

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# **A Psychological Study of Class Consciousness**

**By**

**Prof. JAMUNA PRASAD (*Patna University*).**

I am deeply sensible of the honour which the Committee of the Philosophical Congress has done me in selecting me to the chair of the section of Psychology. While expressing my thankful feelings, I must say that while it was easy for me to accept your choice, it was by no means easy to select a suitable subject for the Presidential address. Looking through the proceedings of the various sessions of the Congress, I came across most learned discourses on a variety of topics. While wondering what I might choose to speak on it occurred to me that perhaps Social Psychology had not received the attention which it certainly deserves. And in the field of Social Psychology, the most obvious thing on which one might talk, during the present times, is class consciousness. While it is true to say of the modern world as a whole that nothing has disturbed it to the same extent as class consciousness has done, it is even truer to say this of a country like India which is proverbially the land of castes and communities. Their frequent conflicts and clashes have now become such a regular feature of our social life that we are apt to regard them as normal happenings. As everybody knows, the communal problem of the Hindus and Muslims in the north and the caste problem of the Brahmins and depressed classes in the south are the most difficult problems in our social life.

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• Presidential Address to the Psychological section of the Indian Philosophical Congress Hyderabad, (Deccan) December 1939.

They are instances of the acutest form of class consciousness. It seems that our caste and communal consciousness is fast becoming neurotic. We have developed a mode of thinking which proceeds in terms of caste and communities. Almost anything that happens contrary to our liking, almost any frustration of our desires in the social world, is automatically put down to some alleged manoeuvres and machinations of people belonging to the rival caste or community. That is why the whole communal attitude seems to have become nothing short of neurotic. A psychological study of the problem has been long overdue. If psychology can lay bare the real and deeper causes of class conflict, the first stages towards a satisfactory and lasting solution of the problem would have been covered.

### **The Social Tie :—**

Classes, castes and communities are sub-groups within a wider and more inclusive group. Accordingly the psychological principles which govern class and communal attitudes must share the nature and characteristics of the more general principles of group psychology. The most general principle of group psychology is something non-rational. Social life is not based on any pre-conceived plan of arrangement, or a foreseen rational consideration. The theory of a social contract entered upon as the result of having foreseen the advantages of living together, after the fashion of Hobbes, or even of Freud, as implied in his theory of the "Band of brothers" uniting together in rebellion against the primeval horde father is purely a fiction of the intellectualistic imagination. The truth is that we do not know why we live together. That is why all the attempts to trace the origin of social life have remained unsuccessful. The instinct-psychologists postulate a herd or social instinct from which man's sociality is sought to be derived. The bulk of American

psychologists trace it to early training or conditioning in the family environment. Freud and his followers derive it from the primal parricide committed by the band of brothers to obtain possession of the women, the mothers, whom the horde father, had all monopolized to himself. This is not the place to enter upon a criticism of any of these theories. But whether we suppose the social tie among individuals of a group to be instinctive, or acquired during early life, or essentially libidinal in character, one thing stands out clear, namely that the basis of living together in group is rooted in the emotional constitution of the human mind.

This is further borne out by actual observation. For instance when two strangers come together in a railway compartment, there is not a mere colourless perception of each other. The perception of one human being by another is charged with feeling-tone, a like or a dislike at first sight, as a result of which there is either an approach or an avoiding reaction of one to the other. Such feeling-tone is present in a more pronounced form in a larger collection of people, specially in a more or less organized group. Even those social psychologists who deny the existence of a super-individual group-mind tell us that the mere awareness on the part of individuals of one another's presence in a group produces in each a mood\* a "Stimmung" i. e. an emotional set or attitude under the influence of which the individual's thoughts, feelings and actions are controlled and directed. From this basic fact it would follow that our social attitudes and relationships,—class consciousness being an instance of these,—should be largely emotional and hardly open to the guidance of reason. The antagonistic relation between emotion and reason does not leave it possible for reason to function properly where emotion holds the field. The laws of love and hate

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\* Vide R. E. Park--Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences.

hold undisputed sway here much more than they do in individual life.

However, the conclusion that social life is based on the emotional nature of man ought not to appear a matter for lamentation to the intellectualist philosopher, nor alarming to the man of reason. It is quite unnecessary to try to escape this admission since the deepest things of life and mind lie rooted in the non-relational and unconscious nature of man.

### **Group Behaviour :—**

The fundamental tenet of social psychology,—indeed the very foundation on which it rests,—is the fact that when individuals come together their thought and behaviour become very different from what they are when alone. This has been universally recognised to be due to their membership relation in the group. Under this influence he uncritically accepts the 'collective representations' i.e. the common beliefs and opinions. Ideas which are contrary to them, not only have almost no chance of being entertained, but may be violently and equally uncritically thrown out. An individual, when alone, may be independent and rational, but together, he is uncritical and excitable. And further than this, group influence reaches even beyond the limits of an actual congregate presence. Social institutions, common beliefs, traditions and customs etc., of the group mould the attitudes of an individual from early life in such far-reaching fashion, that even when he is not in actual presence of a member of the group, he is not mentally freed and isolated to a sufficient measure from the influence of the consociate group. Prof. Bartlett has ably demonstrated in his book on 'Remembering' that even the memories of individuals depend on social influences for their recall. Whenever a social stimulus occurs, a social set or attitude, acquired under the peculiar

social environment of the individual, also rises up in his mind, and imposes upon his response a distinctive pattern or stamp of his group. Class, caste or communal consciousness is the result of such social attitudes imbibed from the peculiarities of the group or sub-group in which the individual is born and lives his life.

### **Stereotyped Mental Attitudes :—**

Such social sets or attitudes are acquired as the result of more or less uniform group experience and training since childhood. They are formed in accordance with the pattern of the culture, institutions, beliefs and traditions common to a particular group or community. On account of their uniformity and unchallenged prevalence within the group, the social attitudes thus correspondingly formed in the minds of the members, also become fixed or stereotyped. Typical or uniform modes of social thought and behaviour follow as the effects of such stereotyped mental attitudes. For the sake of convenience they will be referred hereafter as "Stereotypes" after Lipmann, (Public Opinion) on account of their fixed or stereotyped nature. We carry about within us a large number of such fixed mental and social attitudes. They have for us the obvious advantage of serving as outline pictures or moulds into which all incoming impressions, both familiar and unfamiliar, are readily fitted. But they have also for us the disadvantage of defining the characteristics of things and persons before we actually experience them. No doubt, they economise the time and effort which would otherwise be required in examining things carefully in order to classify and labell them before putting them away into the pigeon holes of the mind. But the consequence is, as Lipmann says in this connection that "For the most part we do not first see and then define, we define first and then see." They may be likened to Kant's categories of the understanding and Jung's

archetypes within the patterns of which perceptions and thoughts are moulded. What are called prejudices and partialities are only varieties of such stereotyped social attitudes, but not identical with them, since the latter are a wider class.

Each group, caste, class and community has its own stereotypes which are commonly shared by its members. They serve, in certain definite ways, to keep them united together within the group in a sort of common fraternity. But they serve also to create and accentuate difference and distance between one group and another. Since they serve as the common source from where the aggressive impulses are collectively directed and aimed against a common target, i. e. the rival group or community they fulfil both of two opposite purposes:—namely (1) of intra-communal unity within the group or sub-group, caste or community and (2) of extra-communal discord and conflict between two different groups. Hate seems to have the power of uniting people no less than love. No wonder then that political leaders and agitators use more or less unconsciously the device of seeking to introduce unity indirectly within their group by the method of rousing a collective and common indignation and hatred directly against another group, rather than by really holding out something positive for achievement. Class consciousness, the other side of which is class conflict, the former implying unity within the group, and the latter strife without, is the result of social i. e. class and communal stereotypes. I will try to show that such social stereotypes are mainly responsible for class and communal conflicts.

### **Experimental Study :—**

Recent experimental researches in Social Psychology have demonstrated that such social stereotypes do ~~exist. They are~~

acquired normally not as a result of actual individual experience of people belonging to foreign group or nation, but are simply taken over from the prevailing opinions and attitudes of their own group, race or community, in the course of normal social life. I may refer to the works of Bogardus, Thurstone, Guilford, Katz, Braly, Young and others published in various journals. A short report of these is contained in a recent book on Social Psychology by Katz and Schanck. I may refer very briefly to some of them.

Bogardus prepared an intimacy scale containing seven steps, such as, to close kinship by marriage, to my club as a personal chum, to my street as a neighbour etc., in order to measure the degree of intimacy, or social distance to which an average American would be willing to admit members of certain races. A number of business men and school teachers of California were given the scale. The preferential rating obtained from them in the experiment showed that Canadians, English, Scotch, Irish, French, Swedes, Germans and Spanish occupied the first eight position, while Mexicans, Chinese, Japanese, Negroes, Hindus and Turks fell into the last seven position, in the order mentioned.

The result of the study of nationality preferences obtained by Thurstone shows a remarkable agreement with that obtained by Bogardus. About 250 students of the University of Chicago who served as subjects of the experiment, recorded their group preference of nations in the following order :—English, Scotch, Irish, French, Germans, and Swedes occupying the top of the scale, while Japanese, Mexican, Chinese, Hindus, Turks and Negroes at the bottom. The net result of these two studies may be summarized by saying that Americans generally like the North Europeans, particularly the English, more than the South Eastern Europeans and these latter more than the Orientals, while Turks and Negroes are liked the least.

Katz and Braly brought out the racial stereotypes of 100 American undergraduates by a simple method of getting them to assign descriptive adjectives to ten nations. "The Germans were regarded as scientifically minded, industrious and stolid, Italians received the common description of the supposedly hot-blooded, Latin peoples artistic, impulsive, quick-tempered and passionate. The characterization of the Negro followed the picture of the Saturday Evening Post : highly superstitious lazy, happy go lucky, ignorant, musical and ostentatious. The Turks were described as cruel, very religious, treacherous and sensual"—(Katz and Schanck—*Social Psychology* pp. 82-83). The subjects had no first hand knowledge and experience of several of these nations or races. Yet they had no difficulty in assigning the adjectives, which confirms what I have been trying to show, namely, that stereotyped group attitudes are imposed upon people by the society in which they live, and are owned as if they were their considered, independent and thought-out personal opinions. Besides it is also noteworthy that the adjectives used indicate a definite emotional tinge in the characterizations.

Such group stereotypes are not mere colourless cognitive characterizations. They are charged with definite emotional likes and dislikes. This is unmistakably demonstrated in the experimental finding of Young. After a course in race problems, he gave instructions to 450 American students to rank various races and nationalities in accordance with their innate abilities. Although the instructions did not require them to give a preferential rating, the rank order given by the students closely approximated the preferential rating of nations which were obtained in the experiment of Katz and Schanck referred to above.

Experimental investigations show that besides racial and national stereotypes, others relating to the various occupations and political parties also exist. We carry about within us a large



number and variety of such fixed social attitudes. In a manner analogous to the categories of Kant and archetypes of Jung, our thoughts, feelings and actions pertaining to castes, classes, communities, races and nations, move within the patterns and limits set by the stereotypes. There is an ample scope for their investigation in our country. Although carefully planned experimental investigation in order to prove their existence might appear superfluous as they are so obvious, nevertheless there may be many characters not definitely and clearly known to us which the experiments can bring to light.

### **Effects of the Stereotypes :—**

One of the obvious effect of the stereotypes is that the members of a class or community remain confined within their own group, and the possibility of free and open inter-communal contact is removed, and mutual understanding and sympathy are made difficult. At a further stage, differences get accentuated and class and communal jealousy, ill-feeling and hatred arise. These prepare the ground for an overt expression of such feelings in group conflict and communal riots. In regard to the Hindus and Muslim, the situation gets further complicated and worsened on account of their religious sentiments, which contribute to a large extent towards the formation and crystallization of their respective communal stereotypes.

I cannot help saying a few words on riots which are the most disturbing and deplorable effects of class consciousness. A riot is a pathological form of group behaviour caused by the internal conflict of sub-groups i.e. castes, classes and communities, within a larger group or nation. As in all neurotic outbreaks, we must distinguish here between the pre-disposing and the exciting causes. Among the predisposing causes of riots two groups may be distinguished (1) general and (2) specific. We must admit that at present there is a

widespread state of chronic discontent in our social life, and our social system lies in a state of disorganization. Economic depression, unemployment, a condition of dependence on others and want of self-confidence, general social maladjustment, in a word, a state of frustration and deprivation and the resulting sense of insecurity form the outstanding feature, of our present social and communal life. These comprise the general group among the predisposing causes of social conflict. Such a state of discontent and deprivation naturally arouses the aggressive impulses. But a fit object to serve as the target of attack for these impulses must be found, since the general masses of people are never aware of the real causes of their deprivation and insecurity. It is at this critical point that the class and communal stereotypes play their part as the specific causes of social conflict by showing the way the target lies. If they did not exist, feuds, at least in the sphere of classes and communities, would not occur and the aggression roused by the general state of deprivation and insecurity might discharge itself in some other department of social life. But the pre-existing ill-feeling and prejudice between two classes or communities make one a ready and easy target for the other. The interested agitator need not be accused of sowing any new seeds of conflict into the minds of his people. But by playing upon the differences and the existing prejudice he certainly intensifies the passions and gives a more definite shape to the object of aggression. Thus the Hindus and Muslims come to blame each other, and throw the responsibility for their respective ills and misfortunes upon each other. It is a perversity of human nature, but none the less natural, that aggressive and rebellious behaviour will be directed against what has already, although for entirely different reasons, been at variance with it, since such an object is readily accessible and also acceptable as a fit target. One community thus becomes

the symbol of the *status quo* of discontent and deprivation of the other. The hostility is therefore directed against the symbol of all these complex causes which have led to the deprivation. This process of symbolization is unconscious. That is why it is not only initially irrational, but also imperious to rational checking and rectification by subsequent conscious considerations. "The fact" says La Piere "That the Negroes who are lynched are in no way responsible for the social conditions which generate discontent and dissatisfaction does not alter the fact. The lynched Negro is a symbol of the complex social forces which have led to the social degradation of the members of the lynching mob" (Collective Behaviour P. 538). A riot, like a neurotic symptom, is merely a temporary escape from an intolerable state of social frustration. While such a state of frustration generates and accumulates aggressive impulses, the communal stereotypes readily make the rival community the symbol of the causes responsible for the frustration. In the symbol the hostile impulses find something accessible and tangible against which they can strike. This is an irrational aggression similar to the infantile behaviour of a child, who rebuked by the mother suffers from a sense of deprivation of mother love, and then finds relief by breaking a piece of crockery or landing a blow on the face of his little brother. Since the fear of the Police and the law cannot remove the basic feeling of deprivation and insecurity, the Police and the law cannot prevent nor effectively suppress the occurrence of class and communal feuds.

A word now about the exciting cause of communal feuds. Any incident which lifts the social inhibitions under which the accumulated aggressive impulses are normally kept in check, serves as the trigger to release the hidden explosive forces. A personal insult to an acknowledged leader, the report of violence committed upon a member of the community,

particularly a woman, or any action commonly labelled as interference with religious and social rights, may serve as the exciting cause. Music before mosque and cow sacrifice are merely incidents coming under the category of the exciting cause. By themselves they cannot produce riots. The popular conviction that their abolition would stop such riots and produce communal harmony is psychologically most inadequate if not incorrect. Whether in any given instance they will, in fact, lead to an actual outbreak of violence depends on the state of stress and strain existing from before in the class and communal attitudes.

### **Rumour and its place in Class Conflict.**

But the exciting cause, i. e. the actual incident cannot show the full and combined effects of itself and the predisposing causes unless the report of its occurrence spreads over wide and neutral areas. Rumour is the unfailing social vehicle for the dissemination of all sorts of 'news' particularly those which are of group interest and emotionally exciting. Three main points about the role of rumour in class conflicts should be noted.

Firstly, an incident which is likely to excite class feeling and animosity, does never escape becoming a fit subject of rumour. This is so because a rumour of that type possesses an affective fitness with existing prejudices and stereotypes, and is connected in ways, not easily perceptible, with unconscious factors contained in them. For the same reason they come to be believed in the majority of cases. How all this is so is most interesting, but it need not detain us here. The question of affective fitness, and the analysis of social stereotypes, specially of the unconscious factors involved therein, require a separate treatment. Some observations in this respect will, however, be attempted towards the concluding portion of this paper.

Secondly, rumour serves admirably the social function of freeing the stimulus beyond its local limits and spreading it to neutral and wider areas, thereby provoking a larger collective response. On hearing a rumour one feels an irresistible impulse to pass it on to the next person, until it becomes a common piece of news to a whole group of people. An incident is strictly localized, but rumour spreads it far and wide. Consequently a riot which might have remained confined within the limits of the locality in question soon involves a whole town and even a district.

Thirdly, rumour not only spreads, but also intensifies the strife, because of the exaggerations it always contains—often they are pure fabrications,—and the belief which inspite of the exaggerations it commands. In my paper on Rumour published in the British Journal of Psychology (July 1935) I have dwelt sufficiently at length on these two points. Since the incident is not directly experienced by the majority and has invariably an emotional significance, it makes a direct appeal to the emotionally excited imagination which subjects it to a process of distortion by importing phantastic elements into them. And since it has affective affinity with the pre-existing communal stereotypes and collective prejudices, and draws a predominantly affective response from the auditor, it puts his mind into such a state of receptivity, that the tendency to believe the rumour, however baseless it may be, is not met with any resistance from the critical faculty. Rumour is therefore the fittest instrument for both spreading riotous behaviour, and for intensifying its violence. I may add that it is regrettable that psychologists have not realized the great importance of rumour in social life.

If space permitted I could adduce instances of riots to illustrate all the three main points discussed above, namely, (a) that the general state of deprivation and discontent and the existence of racial, class and communal stereotypes, jointly

form the predisposing causes of group conflicts, and (b) that the occurrence of an unfortunate incident provides the exciting cause, and (c) that rumour plays the chief part in both spreading and intensifying the conflict.

### **Psychological Nature of Social Stereotypes.**

I may now say a few words about the stereotyped social attitudes which have figured so prominently in our discourse as being mainly responsible for class consciousness and class conflict. A good deal has already been said about them in the foregoing pages. They are created in the minds of people by the narrow and sectarian training which they receive since their earliest childhood under the family influence to begin with. The family being but a unit within a particular class, caste, or community, is itself ridden with the prejudices and partialities i. e. the stereotypes which guide and control the mutual social outlook, attitudes and relationships of the sub-groups in regard to one another. The consequence of this for an individual is that his mental and social outlook is made to be as narrow as the caste or community in which he is born. It is virtually made impossible for him mentally to place himself in the position of an impartial and disinterested observer of matters relating to caste and communal life. He develops a mode of thinking and acting which almost invariably proceeds in terms of class or communal consciousness, and reads class and communal significance into matters which have no such bearing. The strong emotional nucleus which stereotypes, particularly the caste and communal variety of them contain, make them impervious to the corrective influence of reason and careful judgment. This indicates also the activity of unconscious forces within the pattern of the stereotypes, otherwise they could not be so frequently blind, insistent and obstinate.

What Levy-Bruhl has called collective representation (after Durkheim) and mystic participation, and which according to him characterize the pre-logical mentality of primitive and uncivilized people, seem to be true also of our social stereotypes. While individually and in regard to the usual natural and physical happenings, we are perhaps sufficiently civilized and rational, it must be admitted that socially and in regard to national, racial, class and communal matters we are still sufficiently primitive, over emotional, impulsive and therefore usually illogical. I have already pointed out that the basic principle of collective life lies in the non-rational and emotional constitution of man. I have also reminded you that when individuals come together in a social situation their thought and behaviour become very different from what they are when freed from the group influence. Whether we ascribe this to a social order imposed '*ab extra*' by some super-individual group-mind upon individuals, or hold with F. H. Allport that individuals contain within their own habits the social order in question, makes no difference to the fact that collective representations are as devoid of logic as they are unyielding in their dominance over the social attitudes of individuals. For instance, a class Hindu or a Brahmin echoes the collective representation of his class when he believes that the *Shudra* must live by servile labour, is taboo and should not be allowed to enter the places of worship. Similarly a Muslim endorses the belief commonly shared by his community that the Hindus are *Kafirs* addicted to idolatry and therefore bound to go to *Dozakh* (hell) while a Hindu with the rest of his coreligionists looks upon a Muslim as a beef-eating *Nastik*, and quite unworthy of heaven. Even though the sense of social decency may inhibit an open assertion of such offensive absurdities they lie hid - on as prejudices in the mind, and come out unmistakably during the periods of strain and tension in group relationship which break away the normal inhibitions of social

etiquette and decency. It must be admitted that in regard to class and communal matters the most civilized people appear to be as savage and as incapable of independent and rational thinking as the primitive tribes are supposed to be. Katz and Schanck aptly remark that "If Levy-Bruhl had devoted as much consideration to social beliefs as to ideas about natural processes, he would have seen little difference in logical thought between primitive and civilized man." (Social Psychology—p. 90)

The psychological causes which keep us so completely under the domination of our social stereotypes and collective representations need most urgently to be investigated, if we seriously think of effecting some improvement in our national and communal life. This question may be put simply thus : why we should so readily and uncritically accept collective representations, our class opinions and beliefs.

Let us discuss the point. Three considerations, namely, (1) that we are normally not aware of any constraint, internal or external, making us accept them, (2) that in spite of our realization of their irrationality we accept them and act in accordance with them, and (3) that they have strong emotional appeal which is often introspectively verifiable and evidenced in other respects also,—all these undoubtedly point towards the existence of unconscious causes responsible for making us accept the collective representations.

According to Levy-Bruhl the collective representations are not only devoid of logical character, but are also characterized by mystic participation. He says, "Pour designer d'un mot cette propriete generale des representations collectives qu'occupent si grande place dans l'activite mentales des societes inferieures je dirais que cette activite mentale est mystique." (Fonctions mentales dans les societes Inferieure p. 30) The expression denotes essentially, a realization,



imperceptible to the senses, of the connectedness and unity of things to the exclusion of their differences. Commenting upon the meaning of the term, Davy points this out when he says that it is "l'habitude de vivre et de sentir les rapports des choses bien plus que de les analyser et de les objectiver." (Journale de Psychologie, 1930-p. 128.) Jung has utilized the conception of "participation mystique" admirably in his Analytical Psychology of the unconscious, and understands by it "a state of identity in a common unconsciousness." (Analytical Psychology-p 125.) The feeling of unity and connection which a son or a daughter has with the parents, and vice versa, is an expression of mystic participation. We might extend this important concept into the realm of social relationships, and say that the law of mystic participation provides the unconscious basis for a feeling of identity which each member of a caste or community has with the rest. This feeling of identity, in its turn, makes us accept the collective representations i. e. ideas, beliefs and opinions of our society and particularly of our caste and community as though they were our own individual judgments. The stereotyped attitudes are but superstructures raised by the incidence of our social life upon this basic psychological fact, namely, the identification by mystic participation with the group. The identification, though a non-rational principle, is nevertheless the basis of close collective living. There is nothing directly wrong with this, but certainly with the stereotypes built on it.

But no less important, if not more, is the sense of security which the attitude of compliance and agreement with the ideas and beliefs of the group brings to the members. A conscious or unconscious need for security is the perennial need of life and its satisfaction is a pre-requisite for all peaceful and progressive activities. Without an appreciable measure of such a feeling no normal life, individual or social is possible. Safety first is the motto not only for motorists along the

highway but of life itself in all its spheres. And since the feeling of security is not a constant quantity nor stable in nature, but is always waxing and waning with the exigencies of life and the numerous and varied problems it offers, there is a perpetual need for its reassurance and replenishment. The feeling of being within and with the group is very reassuring and increases the sense of security. I will therefore try to show that the persistence of the social i. e. class and communal stereotypes is connected with this perpetual need for safety and security.

### **Social Stereotypes and Sense of Security :—**

Why do the social stereotypes persist and why do they resist the rational attempts to change and re-educate them? Perhaps it would be said that they are social habits, and so they persist by the force of habit. But I would like to observe that the resistance put up by them to change is so definite that it may be taken to be analogous to the resistance which repressed mental tendencies offer to the conscious attempts at their modification. I, therefore, submit that the concept of the mere force of habit is not capable of explaining the persistence and the resistance. The old idea that once a habit, individual or social, is established, it keeps automatically going by virtue of some inherent force, must be revised in the light of modern psychology. Let it be noted that a habit has little chance of functioning and continuing unless it satisfies, directly or indirectly, some perennial and fundamental need. This need, as I have stated above, is the need for safety and security.

Now thought and behaviour which are in conformity with our accepted social attitudes and in accordance with the social injunctions enhance the sense of security for the following reasons :—

Conformity brings social approval. Ever since early childhood one has learned to seek such approval by means

of behaviour in conformity with the social attitudes and stereotypes prevailing in one's family, caste or community. The approval brings a satisfying sense of being with and within the group. The herd suggestion behind the collective attitudes and representations give the individual the confidence of being in the right. Mystic participation gives him a feeling of connection and unity with the group, and a sense of being in possession of the power of the whole group. All these naturally combine to produce and maintain in him a sense of security. And this is what happens since early childhood, and is repeated subsequently in active contact with the members of the same group or community. Such are the causes which bring about a close attachment of the social stereotypes with the sense of security. A need for greater security therefore demands a greater unity within the group.

### **Security, Unity, and Class Conflict :—**

While it is natural and necessary to strive for social security by seeking to create and maintain unity within the group, the device by which this is sought to be achieved by many of the so-called reformers and leaders is as suicidal for the group as it is deplorable from the larger and national point of view. This device consists in seeking to intensify the prejudices and to rouse aggression collectively against a rival class or community in order to create that closer internal unity which results from a collectively aroused indignation and a sense of common grievance. No doubt this does have the effect of keeping the members tied together through the collectively aroused aggression against a common object of attack for a time. But our so-called leaders, responsible for this, hardly realize the consequence that there would be unity only so long as there is a common object of attack for the aggressive desires to vent themselves upon, and there would follow an internal

disintegration within the community as soon as the common object of attack is out of sight and there is nothing to keep the collective aggression sufficiently alive. But more than this, the perpetual state of emotional excitement caused by the constant arousal of aggressiveness, hostility and fear, is in itself so tiring, and depletes the energies so quickly, that whatever unity may have been achieved is lost sooner or later. Hatred, however common, cannot keep us united long. There must be something positive towards which, in a common love for it, constructive efforts should be directed.

It, however, remains true that no change or reform in our social life can be peacefully and successfully introduced and maintained unless the measures newly proposed leave the sense of security, at least undisturbed and carry a reassuring value as much as the beliefs, institutions and practices which are sought to be changed or abolished. On account of the general state of discontent and social maladjustment, fear and mutual suspicion has widely arisen, and the need for social security on the part of class and community has grown in intensity. If one community can do something which will ensure a feeling of continued security to the other and the rest, there would be every reason to be confident that social, caste and communal conflict will be cleared of the root cause of its existence, and a new and a wider social order will come into existence. What the shape of that something to come should be, it is for social reformers and statesmen of true insight into the working of human nature, actuated by unselfish and sincere desires for larger and common good, to find out. In that social order classes and communities will not cease to exist but they will exist in peace and harmony. Let us, the students of human nature, do our share of the work towards the achievement of this great task.

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# **Karma and Fatalism.**

By

**S. S. SURYANARAYANAN**

My approach to this problem is that of an Advaitin. The conclusion that appeals to me is, I flatter myself, more in consonance with both common-sense and Advaita than the orthodox position. This latter position seems to be supported even by writers of eminence today; that is the justification, such as it is, for the attempt to state my own.

It has been said that the law of karma is but the application of the law of causation to the moral sphere. Though the notion is repellent to western minds as a rule, there is no doubt that to us in the East it brings a great deal of comfort and consolation. It is our virtues that seem to be more self-stultifying than our vices; and those of us who because of inclination discipline and so on have not the hardihood to kick over the traces and prefer a life of vice, derive much encouragement from the thought that the failure of our virtue is due not to its virtuousness but our earlier viciousness. Such a notion fits in with our attempts at a harmonious understanding of the natural world. In the desire to resolve the elusive problem of change we light upon the dogma of causality, that nothing occurs without a cause, that the same cause has the same effect and that the same effect has the same cause. Quite in conformity with this is the devout belief that virtue triumphs, while vice fails, and that any appearance to the contrary can and should be accounted for by tracing each triumph or failure sufficiently far back to our appropriate virtue or vice.

If we are justified in our acceptance of the causal dogma, there does not seem to be any legitimate way to avoid fatalism. If the present is determined by the past, so as to admit of an accurate prediction of the past (the failure of accuracy being due solely to our ignorance of the data), how can we avoid the conclusion that the future is similarly determined by the past and the present? Here too our failure at wholly successful prediction is due to our ignorance, not to an uncertainty in the scheme of things.

One line of escape points to my self and says that in the shaping of events *I* act and *I* count. The future is determined not mechanically, but also by what *I* do. It may be that on an apparently determinist scheme of things it will be different to make me responsible to a judge, for *I* may plead my past to extenuate, if not to account for, the present; and for that past *I* may indicate a remoter past and so on; so that there may seem little justification for reward and less for punishment. But considerations of reward and punishment, approbation and reprobation are foreign to the truly moral judgment; the only consideration here is whether *I* am responsible *for* my acts or not; and so long as it is *I* that act, not any one or anything else it is impossible to avoid this responsibility *for*.

Now it is true that it is *I* who act; but it is also true that when a stone falls, it is that stone which falls, not any thing or any one other; yet the judgment "the stone is responsible for falling" would be considered figurative if not absurd, while the judgment "I am responsible for pushing the stone" would be considered sound. The reason for distinction is that in certain circumstances the stone cannot but fall, while *I* conceive myself capable of rising superior to circumstances, judging them, shaping them, and choosing from them what will be my motive, instead of being blindly impelled. It is, however, the propriety and accuracy of this

conception of myself that is now in question. My heredity and environment, everything that can be classed as karmic fruit, do they account only for the circumstances or also for my re-action thereto ? If the former, the karmic theory does not differ much from the views of many others who would readily grant that our surroundings are not accidental and that they are adjusted to the selves developing among them, even though they may not admit pre-existence and the deeds therein as determining causes. The advocates of karma hold, however, not merely that I am circumstanced as I am, but that I am what I am, because of my prior karma. It is difficult to admit this and maintain at the same time the possibility of choice and freedom of determination.

It may be and has been maintained that what karma determines are only tendencies and that the fulfilment or frustration of such tendencies depends on me. This is a plausible view, but not in essence different from views which would claim universal validity for the causal law, while at the same time exempting the moral realm therefrom. What is the "I" which is free to play with tendencies ? Not the psychophysical organism, which is just the bundle of such tendencies in relation to environment. If it is some spirit, other than this organism and actuating it, either the actuation is absolutely undetermined (in which case we join hands with the moral indeterminists just mentioned) or that too is determined by karma (in which case we have no right to restrict karmic explanation to tendencies alone). Indeed we do in practice invoke karma for the explanation not of what is purely psycho-physical (i.e., mechanical) but of the interaction of spirit and matter. Once we admit this, it seems necessary to sacrifice either freedom of choice or the rigidity of the causal ( here, the karmic ) law. The reply may be attempted that what are called tendencies are not merely material, but just the interplay of spirit and matter. If these

are determined by karma, the freedom of the spirit has to be pushed back a stage further, in which we have the problem all over again, as to whether determinism or indeterminism prevails there. Or else, we have to admit that determinism prevails in the realms of both matter and spirit. The recognition of two realms does not help so long as inter-action is admitted. To admit two and to deny interaction is to make an irrelevant ghost of the spiritual realm. The only way out seems to be to treat the spiritual as absolutely real, while the material is empirically real; the causal law obtains in the latter, but not in the former. This is the reply of the Advaitin. It goes far, but in the usual way of understanding it, not far enough.

This is why. It seems subject to the same criticism as Kant's conception of freedom—that it consists in telling the prisoner there is freedom outside the prison bars. We live and think in the phenomenal world; it is here that freedom would be meaningful to us; whereas we are told that freedom is noumenal. It is true that freedom can exist only outside the prison bars; it is idle to pretend that it is here even now, unless we recognise the non-reality of the here and now, the non-reality of the imagined prison. This is no doubt what the Advaitin does; but his recognition of two realms lends colour to the view of a discontinuous jump instead of a continuous progression from the empirical to the absolute. The latter may be difficult to understand, but the former is as impossible of achievement as jumping out of one's own skin. The noumenon is meaningful to us because we ourselves are it, while we are also the phenomenal. The phenomenal is such not merely because it is on a lower plane, but because it is not and cannot be a closed system. Causality is no more real than any other relation; its assumptive reality consists in its working up



to a certain stage. If it were throughout practically efficient, there could never be an occasion to suspect or sublimate its reality. It does not in truth obtain, even where it appears to obtain ; its success is not unqualified even in the empirical realm. This aspect of the truth gets little emphasis or recognition from the Advaitin, who is disposed to admit the full sway of dharmic and karmic laws even to the extent of accounting for Jivamukti on the basis of a residue of karma.

This is where modern science seems to come in as a useful auxiliary to Advaita with its principle of indeterminacy or uncertainty conformable alike to the wave and the particle theories of matter, it provides for the rigidity of the past, the uncertainty of the future, and the practical efficiency of the causal law. It does not claim to have proved indeterminacy, in which case we may have just apprehensions about relying on one more illusion of science. It wisely throws the burden of proof on the opponent, since it is he who alleges something positive, the irrefragable and reversible law of causality. The scientist has not proved causality ; the wise philosopher instead of profiting by this, proceeds to solve a problem which the scientist alone can set and has not succeeded in setting. The scientist admits plurality of causes ; "we do not claim any intuition that the same effect may not spring from two alternative causes" (*Nature of the Physical World*, Dent, p. 286). "The scientific world" writes Prof. Davidson "is full of examples of the same effect proceeding from different causes" (*Free Will or Determinism*, Mr. Davidson, p. 44).

Plurality of causes is not a popular superstition resuscitated by unphilosophical scientists. It is a genuine defect of the

causal concept, noticed by Advaitins down from the time of Maṇḍana. Fire is responsible for more than one effect ; it can burn as well as bake. If you ascribe one to the burning capacity and another to the baking capacity, you are only reading the effect into the cause and restating it in words slightly different at all ; your explanation is, as Eddington would put it, an "exercise in tautology." And this is just what happens even when by analysis you try to fix down particular causes for particular effects. Fire, for instance, may be produced by chemical action, as when a match is struck or by physical action, as in striking steel and tinder or in using a burning glass. We have here three alternative causes, belonging to two different classes ; yet, so far as we can see, there is no difference in the product, fire ; the practical efficiency is the same in all three cases. We may seek to distinguish them through their causes, just as we identify the caste of an uninvested dvija boy, through his dvija parenthood ; the son of Brahmin parents is himself a brahmin. In the case of the fire, however, this comes to nothing more than the flagrant tautology "The match-produced fire is match-produced." Possibly, in the case of such a fire, a spent match-stick may be found beside it ; and from this the use of a match may be inferred as extremely probable. But what we have with this is the accounting for a present spent match by the past striking of a match, not the accounting for a supposed difference in the fire through the difference between physical and chemical action or among different types of the one and the other. Scientific laws, says Eddington, are cyclic, they come back to their starting-point, though the cyclical procedure may be hidden by the number of intermediate steps. And Sullivan compares the procedure to that of the lexicographer who defined a violin as a small violoncello and a violoncello as a big violin. It is just this reciprocal dependence which has been clear to all Advaita critics of the

causal notion. How can the notion claim then, even empirical reality, if by empirical reality we mean a closed system? All that we can legitimately assume would appear to be that the causal principle is good enough to work with up to a stage, that our predictions of the past can be and are remarkably accurate, that our predictions of the future can never rise above a high grade of probability and that this last is due not to our ignorance, but to the nature of things.

Thus, therefore, though man left to himself will in all probability stick to the wearying round of seed and fruit, the round is not inevitable. He has the freedom to exert himself and arise above it; whether he goes full circle or not depends on him. If by merit or grace he acquires enlightenment he will, by stages more or less gradual, transcend samsāra. He will realise that transcendently cause is fictitious, since empirically it is not rigid and invariable. The empirical can lead to the transcendental, since the former is not a closed system but is continuous with the latter.

While for the most part Advaita speaks of release as real here and now and points to the Śruti, which declares our being Brahman, not one becoming Brahman in the future, the prejudice against the empirical is so strong that a complete breaking off from it is thought necessary for release. Instead of incarnating the real in the actual, there is a pronounced tendency to flee from the actual. Instead of glorying in Jivanmukti, the Advaitin treats it as a problem to be solved, not itself the solution of all problems. Thus he achieves the strange result of viewing the whole of evolution as an unfortunate error and seeking refuge from life in death. The only corrective for this egregious position is to recognise the continuity of the empirical and the real, of science and metaphysics, of vyavahāra and paramārtha. The brahmavid cannot afford to turn up his nose even at "the freaks within the

atom", for if matter is nothing but a superimposition of Brahman on Brahman, even the atomic physicist cannot but have a glimpse of brahmic freedom in his delvings into the ultimate constitution of matter. And for a vision such as his, the acceptance of karma and the avoidance of fatalism are alike possible, since karma is not rigid any more than other causes.

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# The Empirical and the a Posteriori

By

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It is perhaps a rare occurrence that the review of a book should raise a debate of first rate importance on a fundamental philosophical problem. The publication of 'The Empirical Argument for God in late British thought' by Professor Bertocci has called forth a review by Professor Lamprecht<sup>1</sup> in the course of which many stimulating statements regarding the nature of empiricism and the empirical method in philosophy are made. These statements have provoked vigorous protests from the author of the book and from Professor Pratt.<sup>2</sup> In view of the importance of the problem, it is necessary to survey the whole situation, and to clarify, incidentally, our own views on the nature of philosophical empiricism.

The point at issue in the debate between Professor Lamprecht and his critics would become precise and well defined if the following questions were answered, and a great part of this paper will be concerned with the discovery of suitable answers :

1. Within the limits laid down by empiricism, what is the exact significance of *experience*?
2. What should be the attitude of the philosophical empiricist towards religious experience?

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1. Jr. of Phil. Vol XXXVI, pp 73—76.

2. Ibid, pp 263—74.

Professor Lamprecht, while denying the claims of Dr. Bertocci and Professors Tenant and Brightman to be recognised as empiricists says,<sup>3</sup> "Empiricism is a method in which experience is taken as that by reference to which all our ideas are to be explained (as well as proved false or true). It is negatively expressed as a method which takes experience itself as needing no explanation." The position sketched here is *not at all* clear, and the further development attempted by Professor Lamprecht throws no light whatever on the disputed point. But, if we read the professor's notes with patience, we shall soon discover that he is labouring under the dead weight of the two kinds of positivism, scientific and logical which are now in fashion. Experience for the scientific positivist is nothing but sense experience of the crudest type, because it is the claim of the mathematical physicist that the objective data in his field may be demonstrated to a person who has lost all his sense organs except that for vision, and this reduced to a single colour-blind eye. Nothing that falls outside this type of experience can be considered to be existent. This is the type of experience that Professor Lamprecht is contemplating in his note. For he says, "...When one begins to assume even the minimum' requisite to make experience intelligible, one is assuming what will make experience intelligible to some one who wants more than experience itself furnishes. And that I submit is *not* empiricism at all."<sup>4</sup> Hence, the brute facts of sense experience, unorganised and unrelated, are to constitute the material for analysis by the empiricist. Professor Pratt, in the course of his comment on this point, remarks, "The kind of empiricism Professor Lamprecht has in mind is philosophical empiricism arrested mainly at the sensory level or aspect of human experience."

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3. Ibid, pp 73—76.

4. Ibid.

At this stage a serious doubt is bound to arise in our minds as to the very possibility of the kind of 'experience' contemplated by the professor. Modern psychology has demonstrated beyond the shadow of any doubt the existence of organising and universal elements even at the lowest levels of perception. Mere givenness is a myth. One would have considered it rather late in the day to remind oneself, as well as others, of the Kantian *a'prioristic* elements in experience, but such a reminder does seem to be necessary. To define experience as something with reference to which everything else is to be explained, and which needs no explanation is highly perplexing. Not only does experience need and demand explanation, but it contains elements which go beyond itself for their source.

Professor Lamprecht's extreme and surprising view may, perhaps, be made intelligible if we take it as a possible protest against the implications of the scientific positivism from which he seems to have drawn his inspiration. I have pointed out in a previous paper the indefensibility of the objectivistic dogma which pervades scientific generalisations.<sup>5</sup> 'The hard objective facts of physics have turned out to be merely subjective conceptual hypotheses... Its objects are merely so many hypotheses in the construction of which there enters a very appreciable subjective element.'

The tendency has been growing stronger and stronger in science to ignore the subjectivity of the elements, to project them into the external world, and then to claim objectivity for them. 'These conceptual elements can never become objects of sense experience. Yet, the scientist cannot resist the temptation to assert that they can. 'The electron can be seen, just as this book on the table can be seen,' said an enthusiastic

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5. 'On the objectivistic dogma etc.' Jr. of Ann. Univ. Vol. VI,

student of spectroscopy. Professor Lamprecht would be perfectly right if, by his definition, he intends to protest against this unjustifiable 'objectification.'

But, there is another significant point to be considered at this stage. Does scientific empiricism fit into the definition of experience formulated by Professor Lamprecht? Let us examine a typical case. From the lines in the negative to the electron which generated those lines it is a far cry. What falls within the field of *experience* as understood by Professor Lamprecht is the group of discrete lines on the glass plate. Starting from these lines, and passing through a series of deductions, at each stage of which a *a priori* element functions significantly, the physicist finally arrives at his conceptual structure of the nucleus of matter. An unbiassed analysis of this process reveals the fact that empiricism, as understood and practised by the scientists, involves a considerable degree of *a priori*ism. It is, therefore, plain that either science is non-empirical or the professor's definition of empiricism is unscientific; and both alternatives are equally repugnant to Professor Lamprecht.

Mr. Russell himself has admitted recently that it is more than doubtful whether any form of empiricism can wholly dispense with the *a priori*. The only acceptable type of empiricism is the one that adopts the inductive-deductive procedure of modern science. And in such procedure provisional hypotheses, which go beyond perceptual data, play the most important part. Professor Lamprecht can raise no valid objection against the *a priori*ism inherent in such procedure. He himself seems to admit the validity of this view in his final reply to the debate. He accepts the validity of 'hypotheses which seek to define possible correlations and orders among empirical existences.'



Our conclusion, then, is that philosophical empiricism is certainly justified in making use of principles for the systematic and coherent organisation of the data of experience, and of hypotheses in the interests of such organisation. 'Empiricism denotes primarily the scientific investigation of the world which we experience through our senses ...the main principle of empiricism being that through sense experience we come to apprehend the *universal laws* which express the nature of the apprehensible world'.<sup>7</sup>

We have now to deal with the second question bearing on the limits of the field of experience. Are we justified in confining the term experience to sense experience? Do the sense organs exhaust all the possible channels of contact with the real world? We have no hesitation in answering these questions most emphatically in the negative. Let us consider in the first instance, the world of radiations which has no direct means of stimulating our sense organs. The magnetic waves, the ultra-violet and the infra-red rays, and the 'wireless' waves, to mention only a few instances, would be non-existent to one who has no access to the devices for converting them into visible or audible forms of vibrations. Are we to deny them their claim to existence? In the second place no one can ignore, now that telepathy has become an established fact, the reality of the possibility of communication between persons without physical media. We may interpret this phenomenon either by holding that, biological evolution, being an endless process, is labouring to bring into existence a new sense organ, or that a supra-sensuous faculty, latent in the mental structure of all human beings is being developed by a few and made to function. In either case the result is damaging to the convictions of an empiricist of the type of Professor Lamprecht.

7. E. R. E. Article on 'Empiricism.' (Italics ours).

But, what is of greater importance to us is a vital defect in the argument of the radical empiricist. Experience, he holds, is self evident and self-explanatory. You have only to open your eyes and LO ! experience enters into you. Anything that does not enter into you in this way belongs to a realm which is non-empirical and may, therefore, be ignored. God and the facts relating to the divine realm do not and cannot enter into you in this manner. Hence they are non-existent.

Let us ask the radical empiricist in return—Do science and the 'hard objective facts of science' enter into you in this way ? Can a visitor to the Cavendish laboratory expect to see the 'whirling electrons' perform 'their mad incalculable gyrations' before him ? What the visitor sees is only a set of lines on a photographic plate. A long course of rigorous training is needed before one can appreciate the reality of the electron, proton, neutron etc. An untrained person—and a vast majority of the world's population is untrained in this sense—can never have the *experience* on which scientific empiricism builds. In exactly the same manner, those who have had the necessary training can *experience* the facts belonging to the super-sensible realm of religious facts. Mysticism is less mystifying than certain aspects of scientific empiricism. Hindu mysticism, at any rate, offers a strictly scientific and standardised course of training for *experiencing* these facts, which are as *hard and objective* as any scientific facts. There is as little justification for rejecting such experience as non-empirical as there is for rejecting the experience of the research worker in the Cavendish laboratory. He who stands outside the laboratory and scoffs can never 'see' the electron. He who stands outside the laboratory of religion and scoffs can never see religious facts. Both scoffers are made of the same stuff. Facts of science and facts of religion are on the same level so far as their experiencibility goes. In the words of Sir. S. Radhakrishnan, 'When we talk

of intuitional truths, we are not getting into any void beyond existence. It is the highest kind of experience where the intellectual conscience of the philosopher and the soaring imagination of the poet are combined'.<sup>8</sup>

Professors Burgh and Bertocci have emphasised the real cause for the failure of empiricism. 'The real source of the failure,' says the former, '...is the ruling out of the evidence of religious experience'. If we are to take into account 'the various realms of human experience,' why is this particular realm regarded as irrelevant. It is as though in arguing to the value of art we are to exclude aesthetic experience from consideration, pending the establishment of our case on evidence drawn from non-aesthetic sources.<sup>9</sup> The last sentence is very significant. What would be the fate of science if the public were to judge of the truth of scientific conclusions on evidence drawn from the realms of astrology and alchemy?

'The real difference between us,' says Doctor Bertocci, 'seems to be that Professor Lamprecht would not allow me as an empiricist to consider among the data, among the given, the conative and emotional life of man, for to do so would be to become a romantic rather than an empiricist...I too reject any definition of experience which, before investigation, lays down specifications of what experience must be, but I also object to limiting myself in philosophical procedure to a method which by definition excludes the relevance of either the rationalistic, or the romantic (or any other possible kinds of entities given in the course of human experience), to the search for the truth about existence as a whole'.<sup>10</sup>

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8. *Reign of Religion*, chapt. XIII, p. 440.

9. *Philosophy*, Vol. XIV.

10. *Jr. of Phil* : Vol. XXXVI, 1939, p. 268.

Our conclusions may be stated in two significant propositions which may, at the same time, serve as answers to the questions raised at the commencement of this paper :

(1) Professor Lamprecht's empiricism which insists on confining experience to the 'facts' of sense experience to the utter exclusion of the synthetic a priori elements therein is a myth.

(2) Philosophical empiricism must take into account supra-sensuous experience belonging to the religious realm.

The discussion has brought to light a very serious ambiguity in the significance of the term *empiricism*. The word embraces two types, one true and the other false. The true type is philosophical and takes into account the necessary apriori synthetic elements in experience, sensuous and non-sensuous, and the false type is the negation of this attitude, excluding as it does, the super sensible realm, and within the sensible realm the principles of coherence and systematisation. In the interests of clarity of thought we ought to give different names to the two types. May we not confine 'empiricism' to the philosophical type, and call the Lamprechtian type 'a'posterorologism'. Perhaps Professor Lamprecht would object even to this term, for does not 'logism' imply the synthetic a priori? Then 'a'posterorism' is the only term that may be found to be most suitable.

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# **Religion and Religious Approximations**

By

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The comparative study of Religions presupposes, for aught we know, a standard of comparison the standard Religion—which is expected, through its definition, to ensure the success of such study. But, strictly speaking Religion is indefinable. Accordingly, the student of Comparative Religion has to draw upon the availing characteristics of the historical religions in order to frame the central theme of Religion. This explains the significance of the somewhat paradoxical statement that “the inspiration of religion lies in the history of religion”, i. e. of expressions of the intuitions of the finest types of religious lives. Thus the Comparative Study of Religions serves as a half-way house, mediating the transition from the History of Religions to the Philosophy of Religion.

In his *Lowell Lectures* for 1926 entitled 'Religion in the Making' Prof. Whitehead makes the rather startling announcement as the result of his own reading of religion in history that 'religion is the last refuge of human savagery' ! No more severe indictment of religion could be pronounced, and that in the name of historical scholarship or scientific accuracy. Any way it must give us pause to consider, perchance to challenge, the verdict. A thoroughbred rationalist with a Cambridge training in scientific researches, he brings to the execution of his task a rare specimen of rigorous thinking and judicial neutrality which the average writer on Religion sadly lacks. Looking habitually through the haze of emotions the latter forfeits the historian's claim to assessment of facts in the dry light of reason. Truly, in respect of marshalling of facts and their evaluation, Prof. Whitehead's is a signal achievement that stands out as a typical example which might well be emulated with advantage in other quarters. But even Homer nods sometimes ! And we shall be well advised to suspend our judgment on this verdict until we shall have finished our own survey. One criticism, however, we shall allow ourselves to make at this stage. Believing, as he clearly does, that 'religion is solitariness' and that 'religion in its decay sinks back into sociability', it is difficult to see how he can square this belief of his with the stricture he has passed on religion—making the decadent form of religion the peg for this stricture to rest upon. One signal service, however, he has rendered by this piece of criticism. With remarkable incisiveness and force he has laid bare the tribal basis of every positive religion and traced all the aberrations and abuses of historical religions to the acceptance of dogmas that are static, and are not dynamically interwoven with the growing religious life of the community. Here religion is cognate with our moral codes which, as all enlightened opinion would have it, are the products of the gregarious or group-instinct in man. All progress in

matters religious or ethical, therefore, consists in the dissociation from their immediate social or communal surroundings and their presentation from the standpoint of human unity until religion, in particular, becomes, in Whitehead's words, a synonym for 'world-loyalty'. Edifying as this religious universalism is,—and in this it makes the nearest approach to Royce's conception of Religion as loyalty to 'the Spirit of Universal and Beloved Community"—it has its own dangers; and this will be apparent as we proceed. Suffice it to note at this stage that the historicization of the supreme object of faith in every religion is no less important than its universalisation. In his assessment of the contribution of Religion to Metaphysics, (*loc.cit*) Prof. Whitehead himself has been forced to acknowledge that 'the individuality of entities is just as important as their community. The topic of Religion is individuality in community'. Cryptic as it is, this utterance has far-reaching implications beyond its immediate context.

According to Whitehead, "Religion so far as it receives external expression in human history, exhibits four factors or sides of itself. These factors are ritual, emotion, belief, rationalization," and "the order or emergence of these factors was in the inverse order of the depth of their religious importance: first ritual, then emotion, then belief, then rationalization." Now this quaternion may have the merit of simplicity to recommend itself; but it fails to do adequate justice to the infinite variety of historical details. What appears to meet the needs of the situation is a six-fold scheme which has been found to be so successful in classifying the stages of Culture History. A careful reading of Religious History will also reveal a "Spiral of Progress" of which the second half recapitulates the first half on a higher plane. The first in the original (first) half is the Magic Stage which invariably takes the form of Rituals and Sacraments embodying social instincts e. g. of continued existence and of race-preservation. The second is

the Myth Stage in which the ingrained mythopœic activity of the race bursts forth in the form of myth, folklore, beast-fables etc. The third is the Symbol stage which evinces a growing maturity of religious consciousness in symbolization and sublimation of myth and rituals. The fourth stage in the series (which is but the reproduction of the first on a higher plane in this 'spiral of progress') is the stage of Dogma manifesting itself in varying degrees of conceptual abstraction—in pictorial imagination, in *vorstellung* and in creeds. The fifth is the stage of Rationalisation proper with its elaboration and perfection of the conceptual apparatus. The sixth and final stage in the series is the stage not of (theoria) merely but of *praxis* of self-realisation and redemption, of Ultimate values, the *bonum supremum* or the *bonum consummatum*.

Comparative Religion must never be confounded with the History of Religions, a science which can no longer be allowed to usurp an academic position to which it has hardly any claim. The History of Religions confines itself to the study of a *single* faith, which it traces to its sources; Comparative Religion, on the other hand, is bound to study *all* faiths and to evaluate them in the light of their verifiable relationships with one another. The History of Religions concerns itself with facts, arranged in orderly sequence; while Comparative Religion is in search after those laws (discernible behind the activities of all religions), which tend invariably to produce specific results under certain given conditions. The History of Religions, again, lays stress upon such factors, in a tribal or national faith, as serve to distinguish it from others; Comparative Religion, on the other hand, seeking to lay bare the connexion which links all religions together, and which brings them within the purview of a comprehensive synthesis lays stress upon those influences and aspirations which *unite* rather than differentiate and divide. The real aim of Comparative Religion is thus to



investigate and expound through careful sifting of data collected from diverse sources, the meaning and value of the several faiths of mankind. It seeks to give a coherent and consistent account of the result of the operation of those laws which underlie man's religious development,—that development being studied *as a whole* and not merely as a series of unrelated and detached spurts of power. It is hardly calculated to prove a universal solvent of differences in religion, but it has at least demonstrated the wonderful solidarity of the race in its religious needs and aspirations. It detects, and seeks to interpret, the resemblances which are characteristic of the whole array of human faiths; but it recognizes, also, the existence of divergences for which it has no explanation to offer. It is strongly of opinion that these divergences which apparently set religions more or less widely apart, rest upon a foundation of universally diffused constituents which unite all faiths indissolubly together; yet it does not presume to frame or pronounce any verdict on the premises. It is convinced that the soundest basis for justification of the claims made by *any* faith is to be found in a scientific examination of the facts and principles which it defends and which account for its (more or less progressive) vitality.

The Comparative Study of Religions leads, by virtue of its immanent logic, to the acknowledgment of some basic integral experience as the very soul of Religion in relative independence of its diverse expressions in history. Comparative Religion thus shades off into, and consummates itself in, the Philosophy of Religion, which is concerned, *not* with the antiquity and origin of religious expressions but with their value and validity. In short, the Philosophy of Religion is nothing but the religious life of man brought to the focus of self-consciousness. As thus focalised the religious life reveals itself as the integrative life, as the reaction of the whole man to the whole

Reality, in marked contrast to the partial reactions that come about in art, science etc. This explains the 'transcendent importance' of religion which, on Prof. Whitehead's own showing, 'is abundantly made evident by the appeal to history.' When, however, this integrity of religious experience breaks asunder into the exclusive preponderance of the constitutive elements, we have what may be called 'Near-Religions' or Religious approximations. They are thus segregated into a class distinct from religion, with a ban superimposed—not because they are inimical or antagonistic to the ends of a religious life, but because they masquerade as Religion itself when they are really at the penultimate stage before Religion. As things of arrested development they miss the inward 'drive' of religion; and as trying to balance themselves on an inclined plane—of neither accepting nor rejecting the ministration of religion—they somehow carry on a precarious existence. But these substitutes for Religion can never officiate for Religion. They are the meteorites that shoot forth from Religion's heaven but as they touch the *terra firma*, they become things of earth, earthy. They may even then generate heat, but they give no light. As they become matters of daily concern, they cease to inspire their votaries with the native warmth of a living faith, and are eventually stowed as geological specimens in a museum of antiquities.

Disengaged from the centripetal influence of the central orb of religious experience, these dependent satellites pursue a centrifugal course, thus disturbing the harmony and equilibrium of the religious life of the community. These distracting varieties of religious substitutes need not be followed in their aberrations. It is enough for us to know that Religion is all these and *ever so much more*. Without religion, they are mere ciphers; with religion, they acquire a local value. Their adjectival existence is proved to demonstration, when, for

example, the Worship of the *Grand Etre* of Humanity is termed the 'Religion of Humanity'.

Without attempting here anything like a detailed examination of Humanism, both old and new, one may justly observe that Humanism is but Religion secularised. Our charge against it is not that it discovers in the highest conditions of human life the supreme revelation of the Divine—and is thus guilty of anthropomorphism—but that it is human, all-too-human. Its anthropomorphism is what we regard indispensable; its secularism is what we consider indefensible. If the Religion of Humanity professes to be the worship of Humanity and nothing more, it becomes a mere travesty of what mankind has hitherto meant by religious worship. If this worship is a fact, 'humanity' is a misnomer; it is only another name for 'deiformity'. Abolishing, as it does, all reference to 'a transcendent Beyond' (*Jenseits*), an aspect of 'other-worldliness' which must ever abide in the heart of every religion, worth the name, the Religion of Humanity borders on Naturalism of the crudest type. This other-worldly element of Religion, however, is no mythical noumenon, standing in an exclusive or antagonistic relation to this world and all its interests. On the contrary, as it has been wisely observed, the 'other world is only this world rightly understood'. This may well serve as the very text of the "Natural Supernaturalism" of Religion.

Another such substitute for religion was discovered in Agnosticism with its prescription of Worship of the Unknowable. It is indeed undeniable that a 'learned ignorance' due to 'the divine Darkness', to which the mystics in all ages have testified, is the inalienable partner of all the considerable religions of the world. To barter away this much-prized agnosticism for a cheap gnosticism is to sell the very birth-right of religion for a mess of pottage. As Dr. L. P. Jacks once wrote "what discredits religion is not the unknowableness of God, but the knowableness of Mumbo-Jumbo". There must

needs ever be 'the cloud of unknowing' on the face of the Highest that we know and worship. Admittedly, there is much force in Jacobi's warning 'a comprehended God is no God'—particularly, in its pointed reference to the Kantian 'Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason'. But it is equally undeniable that the worship of the Unknowable, drawing its inspiration from a faulty metaphysics of relativism or phenomenalism, must stultify itself sooner or later with its veritable doom of a *reductio ad absurdum*.

Again, a passing reference must be made to the substitute for historical religion that has been found in Ethical Religion and the Ethical Movement in Great Britain and America and the select appeal it has scored during the last fifty years. Its worship at the altar of the eternal values of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness has no doubt a sentimental appeal, but we miss herein what Alexander called in another reference the genuine 'flavour of worship'. Moreover the Ethical worship betraying, as it does, a family resemblance with the worship of 'ideals' is amenable to that forceful anathema uttered by Martineau in the Introduction to his "Study of Religion".

Modernism is the next important movement, and calls for something more than a passing notice. It is interesting to note that the Modernist movement had been long in existence within the fold of the Christian Church before it acquired a technical signification. Its origin and antiquity may advantageously be explored in this connection and the contributions of George Tyrell and A. Loisy and such other illustrious figures are to be taken into consideration.

Without initiating an academic discussion in this regard, we may conveniently start with a working definition of Modernism. It may thus be defined as the tendency to dispense with the historical element in Religion. One fails to see, however what is peculiarly modern about the movement in the carrying out of its programme of religious reform. Any way its mean-

ing has come to be settled, as it were by a convention. But somehow or other, uncanonical associations have sprung up round the word itself. Instead of keeping to the canonised sense of the term, it has acquired, through the medium of its original elasticity of meaning, an indefinite potentiality and thrives upon this ambiguity of signification. What may be regarded as a generally accepted rendering of the term is its description as the cult of the Irrational. The cult in question proceeds on the assumption that whatever is paradoxical, irrational or incomprehensible is more likely to be true than its opposite. Here it seems to be hearkening back to the Mediaeval doctrine of *credo quia absurdum*. Indeed, Modernism, which refuses to keep within the restricted limits of religious belief, and has invaded all spheres of thought and practice, ushers itself into existence by administering a shock to all established canons of criticism, all approved codes of morals, all cherished creeds of the human heart,—otherwise it has no ostensible case to make out. Hitherto poetry has respected at least the rules of grammar and logic but, Modern Poetry prides itself upon throwing overboard rules of grammar and logic. In Art the same tendency is in evidence. The eyes in their normal functioning see things around. Hence Modern Art must teach us to see things in cubes—whence the much-talked-of Cubism of Modern Art. Under this Modernist dispensation Philosophy fares no better. Here we are confronted with a Becoming in which there is nothing that becomes, a world in which there are only actions, but no things. Nor has Philosophy of Religion escaped the contagious fervour of Modernism. From the very dawn of civilization man has consistently thought of God as the Creator and Maker of the world, but there seems to have been at present an interchange of functions, and in the name of Modernism we are enjoined to worship at the altar not of the 'Unknown God' but a 'god that is always becoming'. All

these diverse tendencies may indeed be symptomatic of what Bergson, Croce, Alexander and Whitehead alike express as the Philosophic need of 'taking time seriously'. But will Time return the compliment? Would it not prefer to remain, as in the scheme of the ancient masters, in the background than choose to come to the forefront only to suffer under the pressure of an embarrassing charity? Forsooth, to keep abreast of time has nothing objectionable about it, and if we are to be real at all, we must needs express the spirit of our own times. But we so often forget that we do that best when we are least conscious of doing it. Accordingly, the feverish anxiety to conform to the ideas of one's time, irrespective of other considerations, has neither sanity nor seemliness about it. It is too late in the day to learn that neither antiquity nor modernity can either detract or add to the truth-value of our ideas. In spite of the modernist ambition, one would urge that we have not as yet outgrown the Platonic wisdom in this context. If the vocation of the Philosopher, as he taught, is to be 'a spectator of all time and all existence' he must have the eye to discern in time 'the moving image of eternity'. Indeed, all the extravagances of Modernism spring from a misplaced emphasis on time. A doctrine or belief is true not because it is modern but it is modern, as also for all times, because it is true. In point of fact, the Modernist's worship of the 'unhistorical' is a typical instance of the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness' with which Whitehead has charged the traditional Philosophy of Nature.

Leaving aside these extra-religious associations of Modernism, we may conveniently concentrate on its religious implications. Dr. L. P. Jacks furnished sometime ago in the page of *The Hibbert Journal* (1922-23) an admirable description of Modernism. According to him, the credo of Modernism may be summed up under six heads thus :— (1) Religion is a matter of experience rather than of dogma. (2) Belief in the

kinship of Christianity with other historical religions rather than their radical divergence. (3) A re-orientation of Christianity as being Christo-centric in *method* but Theocentric in *goal*. (4) A Humanisation of the Bible in place of orthodox Bibliolatry—replacing mechanical dictation by illuminating inspiration, a static by a progressive revelation of the Divine. (5) A Concordat between Religion and Science. (6) A Humanisation of Institutions—resulting in the belief that the Church and the Sacraments exist for man and not man for these.

To the discerning mind it will at once be apparent that Modernism thrives upon this verisimilitude that exists between the modernist and a historic faith, such as the Christian. But shallowness or superficiality is writ large across the face of this imitation Religion as described herein. The infallible tests of a religious faith, be it noted consist in earnestness, self-dedication and a growing spiritual life, rather than in intellectual clarity.

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# Are Mathematical Propositions Analytic ?

By

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While it must be admitted on all hands, and the present-day positivists also admit that the truths of Pure Mathematics as well as of Formal Logic are universal and necessary, these thinkers go further in holding that those truths are analytic or tautologous. This view presupposes not merely that all analytic propositions are universal and necessary but the reverse of this, viz, that all universal and necessary propositions are analytic. The former presupposition is unquestionably true; but the latter, which is, in fact, the very foundation of the present positivistic view, may be shown to be unwarranted as follows.

In holding that propositions such as '7 plus 5 is 12', like propositions such as 'an eye-doctor is an oculist', are analytic or tautologous, the positivist should be sure that as in the case of the latter propositions the thought of the subject necessarily involves the thought of the predicate, so in the case of the former the same thing holds good. But, on the positivist's own admission,\* this is not so. He does not, however, treat the difficulty arising therefrom as very serious, and, in fact, seeks to avoid it by stating that the fact that in the case of propositions such as '7 plus 5 is 12' the thought of the subject does not involve the thought of the predicate means merely that the subject and the predicate in them have not the same

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\* A. J. Ayer—*Language, Truth and Logic*, P. 102.



intensional meaning for any one; so that these propositions, if they are to be called synthetic at all, may be so called only in a psychological sense but not in a logical sense, they being, on his view, analytic in the latter sense. In this the positivist takes a consideration to be purely psychological, which is strictly logical. For, that the subject and the predicate in the propositions in question do not have the same intensional meaning for any one, has not only the sense of a fact but is really a matter of logical necessity—that they can not have such meaning being here the reason why they do not actually have it

When Kant stated that a proposition is analytic or synthetic according as the thought of its subject does or does not involve the thought of its predicate, he, thereby drew a logical distinction between the two kinds of propositions. And there seems to be no reason why the present distinction should not be as strictly logical as another distinction the logical nature of which can not and, as a matter of fact, has not been doubted even by the positivists, viz., between a proposition the contradictory of which can not be conceived and another the contradictory of which can be conceived. To characterise a proposition as one in which the thought of the subject necessarily involves the thought of the predicate, in fact, is essentially the same thing as to characterise it as one the contradictory of which can not be conceived,—the proposition characterised being, in either case, analytic, based on the principle of identity, and the two characterisations differing only in form, the former being positive and the latter negative. Similarly, to characterise a proposition as one in which the thought of the subject can not involve the thought of the predicate and to characterise it as one the contradictory of which can be conceived are ultimately one and the same thing,—the proposition characterised being, in either case, synthetic, based on a principle other than that of identity, and the two

characterisations differing only in form, the former being negative and the latter positive.

Kant, therefore, was perfectly right in holding that propositions such as '7 plus 5 is 12', while they, like propositions such as 'an eye-doctor is an oculist', are universal and necessary, are, unlike them, synthetic and not, as the present-day positivists hold, analytic. In this he was fully conscious of a truth which has generally escaped the notice of philosophers, viz., that there is not one but two separate principles either of which, as the case may be, serves as the logical ground for the universality and necessity of a proposition. His only shortcoming here however was that he could not tell us what exactly the logical principle was that we should in this connection treat as co-ordinate with the principle of identity. But this can no more be a reason for ignoring the distinction between the two kinds of *a priori* propositions, analytic and synthetic, and for reducing the latter to the former than the inability of philosophers before Leibniz to find out the logical principle that was co-ordinate with the principle of identity and could serve as the basis of empirical judgments, could be for ignoring the distinction between *a priori* and empirical propositions and for reducing the latter to the former. The truth is that just as Leibniz did a signal service to philosophy by adding the law of sufficient reason to the list of the fundamental principles of judgment handed down by tradition, so Kant did a similar service by finding out the necessity of the addition of another logical principle on which synthetic judgments *a priori* could be based. And although Kant himself did not name the principle in question, his own notion of *a priori* synthesis may be utilised for the present purpose, and that principle may accordingly be called the law of *a priori* synthesis. The admission of this new principle would, in effect, be the rejection of the positivists' mistaken view that inconceivability of the contradictory of a proposition is

the sole criterion of its universality and necessity, and bring out the truth that while some propositions, for example, 'an eye-doctor is an oculist' are universal and necessary because their contradictory is inconceivable, others, for example, '7 plus 5 is 12' are also such merely because any exception to them, if available at all, may be had within the field of experience, and, however else it may bear upon them, can not really be contradictory to them, because, that is to say, their contradictory is only incapable of being experienced but not, as the positivists hold, incapable of being conceived.

Why in the absence of any plausible reason the present-day positivists have held that the truths of Pure Mathematics as well as of Formal logic are analytic or tautologous may, however, be answered by stating that they found this view to be essential to the realisation of a deeper philosophical motive, viz., to dismiss the possibility of metaphysics. The possibility of metaphysics, it is needless to mention, demands the admission of a certain kind of super-empirical synthetic judgments. And one of the means, rather too simple a means of denying this possibility would be to assert, as some of the older empiricists asserted, that there can not be any such thing as an *a priori* judgment, analytic or synthetic. But this means, in as much as it, besides undermining metaphysics, renders Pure Mathematics as well as Formal Logic impossible, has generally been abandoned. Those who still wished to deny the possibility of metaphysics, had, therefore, to devise their means of doing this so as to safeguard the position of these two branches of knowledge. The contemporary positivists have accordingly found in the pre-ent view of the truths of Pure Mathematics and Formal Logic the means in demand. Since, so these thinkers seem to have argued, an *a priori* science, as is implied by this view, must deal exclusively with symbols without reference to any content whatsoever, metaphysics, in so far as

it claims to be *a priori* and yet to deal with contents of a certain kind, can not be possible.

Let us, however, ignore for the present the consequence of this conception of an *a priori* science on the fate of metaphysics and ask whether at all, and if so, how this conception affects Mathematics as well as Formal Logic. The positivist's reply is that all that can happen in this regard is that there arises the problem how the propositions of these sciences can be true, useful and surprising.<sup>1</sup> Now in this he obviously fails to realise that this problem, apart from the fact that it relates not to these sciences as such but to the bearing of the truths provided by them, upon our knowledge of the world, has special concern with the positivist's view that these sciences are purely analytic, but arises in connection with a more general view of these sciences, viz., as *a priori*, no matter whether they are held to deal with analytic or synthetic propositions.

The problem that really arises here is whether Pure Mathematics and also Formal Logic, if they are, as on the positivist's view they actually are concerned exclusively with analytic propositions, can be sciences in the true sense of the term, viz., as separate and distinct bodies of knowledge. This problem was solved by Kant in terms of the view that analytic propositions alone can not constitute a science and that a science should necessarily deal with synthetic judgments. And in holding that the truths of Mathematics are not only *a priori* but synthetic also, Kant was quite sure that there are certain *a priori* contents which must specially be dealt with by Mathematics.<sup>2</sup>

1. A. J. Ayer—*Language, and Logic, Truth* pp. 99 – 92.

2. Kant's admission of 'pure intuitions' of Geometry, although it prevented him from recognising the truly abstract character of Geometry and, for the matter of that, of Mathematics in general, and led him to hold erroneously that Mathe-

So in order to justify the view that Pure Mathematics as well as Formal Logic deal exclusively with analytic propositions, the positivist should make a special attempt to show that there can not be as on Kant's view there are, such things as a *priori* contents which these sciences could be said to deal with. But instead of doing this he holds, obviously without reason, that these sciences, in as much as they are empty of factual contents, are empty of contents of every kind, a view which, it is needless to point out, is exactly that which is required for denying the possibility of synthetic judgments *a priori* and, consequently, of metaphysics.

In declaring Pure Mathematics and Formal Logic to be purely symbolic the positivist really misses an important truth, viz., that the notions with which these sciences deal, notwithstanding the fact that they are expressible in terms of symbols, are in themselves abstract entities, their symbolisation being consequent upon the nature of our thinking of them as well as upon their own nature and so conditional. Since our thought is predominantly linguistic, the contents of all our judgments are subject to symbolisation, the kind and degree of the symbolisation of a content of thought varying from one case to another, and depending on the peculiarity of the content thought. So the mere fact that the terms in mathematical as well as logical judgments are expressed in symbols, can provide no reason for holding that Pure Mathematics and Formal Logic alone are *purely* symbolic.

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matics is an intuitional science, is indeed very valuable, its value really consisting in that it enabled him to realise the truth that Mathematics deals with *a priori* contents of a certain kind and not with mere symbols.

# Pascal and the Problems of Existence

BY

S. VAHIDUDDIN

The awakening of reflective thought is the beginning of philosophy. Aristotle, no doubt the supreme manifestation of the Greek speculative genius, took it to be a science of being *qua* being. The Aristotelian formulation clearly shows that the ontological problem cannot be neglected in any system worth its name. The Middle Ages remained true to the spirit of the master and allowed ontological problems an all important place in their great system. Unhappily the later development of philosophical thought in Europe, during the Renaissance and after, took a turn which though fruitful for experimental sciences, was disastrous in its consequences to philosophy. Psychology began to play a decisive role in human thought and psychological problems freely usurped the field. But from the early struggles of human thought there have been thinkers whose interest in philosophy was of a peculiar character. They strove for knowledge not for its own sake but for the sake of salvation. Their interest was limited to a partial form of being, existence in time. Existence now means, therefore, not being as such but only its temporal expression, especially with reference to human life and its experiences. Man finds himself launched in a time-process, stormed by misery and disease, threatened by death and annihilation. The Philosophy of Existence interests itself in our being in time, its origin and upshot. Augustine, Pascal and Kierkegaard were thinkers of existence *par excellence*. For them philosophy was primarily an investigation into the mysteries and agonies of existence. The same spirit

can be discerned throughout the old Indian thought, which aimed at the salvation not only of a single life but of lives and deaths.

Blaise Pascal, whose thoughts on human existence have a freshness and vitality unimpaired by the passing away of generations, is a thinker who stands apart. His was a versatile genius. His contributions to mathematics and the natural sciences are safe in the history of scientific thought. A bigoted Christian, and advocate of the theology of Jansen, his views on theology and the philosophy of religion will not be welcomed to most of us. But that is no reason why we should not pick out all that is living in his thought and leave the dead to care for the dead.

Pascal interests himself in the different types of human mind. There is a Geometrical mind (*l'esprit de la geometrie*) which proceeds from a premise to a premise. Given axioms it deduces undeniable conclusions. The intuitive mind (*l'esprit de la finesse*) looks on totality and wholeness. At a glance it finds out what it is all about. It does not go hand in hand with the logical mind. Each has a sphere of its own. The moment they go beyond their sphere, treat geometrically all the fineness of life and intuitively all that is capable of being brought into definitions expose themselves to ridicule. "There are therefore, two types of mind (*esprit*): one penetrating sharply and deeply the consequences of the principles, this is the spirit of justice (*justesse*); the other comprehending a great number of principles without confusing them, and this is the spirit of geometry. The one is the vigour and the rightness of the spirit; the other its amplitude. One can well be without the other, the spirit can be strong and narrow and also broad and feeble."

The psychological division of human types corresponds to a parallel division of the human mind into sentiment and

reason. Reason is simply a faculty of principles and definitions. The supra-sensual realities and the fineness of life are both inaccessible to it. Sentiment is no less reasonable; only its reasons are not intelligible to reason. "The heart (sentiment) has its reasons which reason cannot understand." Pascal is here on a safer way than many a modern psychologist. Reason is generally taken to be a capacity which alone can give knowledge. The feelings are presumed not to point to anything beyond themselves. Kant falls into the same error. He thinks that knowledge can be conceptual only; everything else is enthusiasm. This is simply rationalism running amock. We may well maintain on the other hand that conceptual knowledge is not the only form of knowledge. God cannot be conceived but he can be felt. Even dreams sometimes give us premonitions. It is again a Cartesian error which placed the criterion of truth in the clearness and vividness of ideas. It holds good only so far as we are plying on the surface of life. The deeper we go the darker the reality becomes and our conceptual faculty fails us. Sentiment for Pascal in contra-distinction to reason takes us into extra-logical spheres. "We must learn to doubt where it is proper, be certain where we must, and resign ourselves where we must. He who does not act upto this principle does not understand the force of reason. There are persons who act against these three principles, either taking everything capable of demonstration while failing to understand what demonstration is; or doubting everything yet not knowing when to resign; or resigning themselves in each and everything and ignorant where one to judge."

Pascal has in his own way tried to delimit the frontiers of rational knowledge. He comes to almost the same conclusion as Kant. For Kant reason contradicts itself when brought to face the ultimate problem. For Pascal "it is incomprehensible that God is, incomprehensible that He is not; that there be



soul within the body, that we have no soul; that the world should be created, that it should not; that there be original sin; that there be none." Pascal's emphatic denunciation of rationalism has given rise to the interesting question : was Pascal a sceptic ? That scepticism need not be irreconcilable with religion, is clear. Scepticism in the power of rational thought is sometimes the presupposition of a religious outlook. Pascal's scepticism is an attitude which has been for him indispensable in overcoming scientific errors. Reason, Pascal thinks, has a function of its own ; in fact it gives glory to man ; but it becomes itself irrational when it lays claim to exclusive validity. Pascal says again and again that thought (*pensée*) gives man supreme place in creation. "Reason commands us more imperiously than a master; for in disobeying the one we are unfortunate and in disobeying the other we become fools." What is man against the immensity of space but what is space against the infinity of thought ? "I shall not gain in possessing the earth; in space the Universe comprehends me and swallows me like a point; by thought I embrace it." Scepticism which doubts itself, Pascal emphatically rejects. "We have an idea of truth which no scepticism can deny ; we are helpless to prove everything which no dogmaticism can ignore."

This Man whose thought embraces the universe and who is in his turn engulfed in its immensity, what then is his place in it? The world where man's insignificance is all too evident is itself lost in the infinity of space. What is it but a tiny spark in the Cosmos ? On the other side of man things become smaller and smaller till they are lost in nothingness. "What then is man at last in Nature ? A nothingness as regards the infinite, a whole as regards nothingness, a middle between nothingness and all. Infinitely far from comprehending the extremes, the end of things and their principles are invincibly hidden for him in an impenetrable secret, equally incapable

of seeing the nothing from which he is drawn and the infinite in which he is engulfed." He is placed within two infinities, the infinitely small and the infinitely great. All our faculties are likewise placed between the extremes." Our senses do not perceive anything of the extremes, too much of noise stuns us, too much of light dazzles us, too long a distance and extreme proximity hinder the view." This is alas the condition of man. He is driven from one extreme to the other, ignorant of the body, ignorant of mind, and completely in the dark about his own person, which is a combination of irreconcilables.

Man's indifference to the great things of life and beyond, and his sensitiveness to the least important shows unmistakably how warped his nature has become. The duration of his life is but an instant and its course must hang on whether this life itself is the last word or is simply meaningless without any reference to something higher. Look at the world without you and within you and see what momentous questions arise. "When I consider the small duration of my life absorbed in an eternity following and an eternity preceding, this small space which I occupy swallowed up in the infinite immensity of spaces that I ignore, I become frightened and astonished in finding myself here rather than elsewhere ; for there is no reason for my being here rather than anywhere else, for my being in the present rather than at any other time. Who has thrown me here ? By whose order and direction have this place and time been assigned to me ?" Tremendous questions, no doubt, but woe to him whose absorption in the workaday monotony of life does not allow him to think of his own destiny.

What is man that Thou shouldst be mindful of him ? His condition is misery and ennui. It is interesting to note that the psychological state of man which speaks so decidedly of human insignificance is boredom. We bore ourselves and the

emptiness of our existence dawns on us. Ennui means complete dissatisfaction with all that is around us and an yearning for something higher. "Nothing is so unbearable to man as being in complete rest, without passions, without work, without amusement and without engagement. He therefore feels his nothingness, his deserted state, his emptiness, Unceasingly there flows from his mind ennui, wistfulness, darkness, chagrin, vexation and despair." Ennui is a fact of capital importance for Pascal. It shows what we are without God, shades and shadows Pitiable is the human state which presents itself to the sick soul of Pascal. "Imagine a number of men in chains, and all condemned to death, some of whom are butchered before the eyes of others, the others seeing their own condition in them and regarding the one and the other with pain and despair and waiting for their own turn." Thus no good in human history is recognised; no human values are given their due. All is suffering and misery or as the Preacher said, *Vanity, Vanity, all is Vanity*.

No wonder human suffering is of such metaphysical importance for Pascal. What is Christianity without the sufferings and humiliation of Christ? It is by the sufferings of a God-man, that painters have been inspired. Suffering embraces in its very notion the idea of greatness. That something great should be subject to degradation is truly pathetic. Pascal is true to his Christian traditions when he brings human misery into the foreground. A sure sign of this undeniable suffering is the way man tries to forget himself in amusements. Diversions, says Pascal, are primarily intended to divert us from the miserable conditions we are in to something external. "If man were really happy, the less diverted he were, the happier he would be, as the saints of God." Human education is all based on the unconscious effort to divert man from his own condition. Women and wealth, fame and popularity all serve the purpose of letting oneself go

in things external. Take care ! What is it to be a Superintendent, chancellor, premier, president but to be in a condition where one has from the early hours a number of people coming from all sides and not allowing one a single hour to think on oneself ? And when such people fall into disgrace and retire to their homes in the country, where they have plenty of goods and a number of servants to assist them in their needs, they are still miserable and forlorn ; for now they are free to think on themselves. This attitude, we must say, is really the negation of life and its values. All is vanity ; human suffering is the only fact. Pascal's way to God leads through suffering and ennui. However opposed this philosophy of pain and suffering may be to the another view which says *Yea* both to this world and the world beyond, fully conscious of the ephemeral character of the world, and at the same time realising that the world, though no better than a shadow, is a shadow of something eternal, the fact remains that such an attitude as that of Pascal is also possible and in moments of luxury and worldliness it may well serve as an antidote.

We now come to the heart of the Pascalian thought, his religion. Pascal, like Kant and unlike the school-men, is emphatic in the rejection of any proofs of God's existence. God is accessible to sentiment and inaccessible to reason. Against atheists he argues that God is not the only mystery. "What reason have they in maintaining that one cannot be brought to life again ? Which is more difficult, to be born or to come to life again ? That what has never been at any time should now come into existence, or that what has already been should be there again ? Is it more difficult to come into being or to return to life ? Custom makes one easy and the absence of custom make the other look impossible ; a popular way of judging. Why cannot a virgin bear children ? A hen does not lay eggs without a cock. Who

has told us that the hen cannot form these germs as well as the cock ?”

Pascal places himself in the world of atheists and their interests and argues with them from their own principles. A choice cannot be avoided. From the point of view of pragmatism, choice which is that of the atheists, he concludes for the validity of religion. If we gain we gain eternal life; if we lose, we lose only the vanity of the world. “For it is of no purpose telling us that it is uncertain that we shall win and it is certain that we hazard, and the infinite distance which is between the certitude to which one is exposed and the incertitude of our winning reduces to equal value the finite good to which one is exposed and the infinite which is uncertain. Such is not the case. Every player risks certainty for the uncertainty of winning; and nevertheless he certainly hazards the finite against the uncertain winning of the finite without offending reason. Our proposition is therefore of an immense force when there is something finite to risk on play where the hazards of loss and gain are equal and there is something infinite to win.” This is the famous argument, Pascal’s wager. We have noted above that Pascal here combats these sceptics from their own logic. It must be said however that this pragmatic approach to religion is not free from danger. Religion can never be a risk. A scientific hypothesis can be a risk: the events can confirm it or repudiate it. Religion is based on certainty of feeling and sentiment. The religious consciousness of God is the consciousness of existence without any moment of vacillation.

However fallacious be the application, Pascal hints at the dialectical character of truth, which was later made the pivot of the Hegelian system. He thinks that there is a system of truth where the seemingly opposed verities subsist in a state of harmony and reconciliation. The importance

of dialectics for his religious thought cannot be exaggerated. "The source of all the errors is the exclusion of some verities ; and the source of all the objections which the heretics raise against us is the ignorance of some of our verities. Usually it happens that, unable to see the *rapport* of the two verities opposed to each other and believing that the assertion of the one means the exclusion of the other, they affirm the one and exclude the other. The exclusion is the cause of their heresy ; and ignorance the cause of their objections."

What is man but a paradox ? The fall of man from his pristine glory of innocence to his corruption in sin plays a great role in determining the solutions which Pascal offers for the problems of human existence. Viewed in his original glory man takes part in divinity ; viewed as he is here and now he is a miserable worm, more of a beast than a God. Suffering is a fact, and to explain this fact the Hindu doctrine of Karma and the Christian doctrine of the original sin have been ingenious solutions. Pascal freely admits that the suffering of man for the deeds of another is beyond understanding ; but wonder of wonders that this very irrationality is necessary to make us understand the otherwise unintelligible character of human suffering.

"Strange it is that the mystery most remote from our knowledge, the transmission of sin, is a thing without which we cannot have any knowledge of ourselves. Because it is without doubt that there is nothing which so much shocks our reason as the assertion that the sin of the first man has made culpable those who being so far from the source seem incapable of participating therein.....Certainly nothing repels us so rudely as this doctrine, and still, without this mystery, the most incomprehensible of all, we are incomprehensible to ourselves." Man is therefore suspended between Nature and Grace. By Grace he participates in God ; by

nature he is subject to corruption. The purely Christian doctrine of the fall of man, his primitive glory and innocence and his corruption through sin, has greatly impressed Pascal. Christianity is the only religion, says Pascal, which gives justice both to the dignity and the lowliness of man. He is neither a God nor a beast, but a God who has fallen to the state of a beast. Pascal's enthusiastic advocacy of the doctrine of original sin may be called the mystical moment of his thought. But it must be observed that we may well agree to the doctrine of fall of man without giving ourselves to the Christian eschatology. A spiritual metaphysics may freely maintain the fall of the soul from its eternal bliss to a state of temporal bondage. This emergence of a soul in a time-process need not be ascribed to sin. Indeed to speak of sin on a super-sensual sphere is a misnomer. It is not original sin which is a mystery of mysteries but this temporal manifestation of something which is eternal.

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# **On a Significant aspect of the Role of Abnormal Psychology**

**By**

**P. S. NAIDU**

The symposium on Abnormal Psychology held under the auspices of the Jubilee Session of the Indian Science Congress brought to light a striking variety of views on the nature and scope of Abnormal Psychology. The main object of the symposium was to assess the value of the contribution made by Abnormal Psychology towards the elucidation of the difficult problems relating to normal Psychology. Incidentally other questions such as, does Psycho-analysis exhaust the entire field of Abnormal Psychology ?, is the method of Psycho-analysis strictly scientific ?, should we maintain the distinction between the normal and the abnormal in Psychology ?, what is the crucial test for normality ?, were considered and answered in an illuminating manner. But a very important aspect of the relationship between Abnormal and General Psychology was passed over in that discussion. In this paper we propose to consider the neglected aspect of the role of Abnormal Psychology.

Before we deal with the main topic of the paper, it is necessary to raise a few significant questions. If Psychology it to attain the status of a pure positive science, should it not banish all questions of value from its field ? Is the concept of normality permissible in a pure science ? Do we have Abnormal Physics or Abnormal Chemistry ? Two of the leaders of the Symposium mentioned above appear to have appreciated the attitude implied in the questions we have raised. "I am quite prepared to agree" says Dr, Mitra 'that



taken in a very broad and general way there is no distinction between normal and abnormal psychology, because whatever happens mentally either in the sphere of what is regarded as normal or in the sphere of what is distinguished as abnormal is perfectly 'normal' in the sense of 'natural' ... as under the circumstances nothing else could have happened."<sup>1</sup> Professor Jones says; "I must confess, parenthetically, to being one of those who feel a prejudice against the term 'Abnormal Psychology'. Few workers have been willing to reconcile themselves to the admission that their psychology is abnormal and still less to the risk of being themselves designated as abnormal psychologists."<sup>2</sup> The learned professor's observation is a striking one. Authors of text books on Abnormal Psychology seem to prefer the title 'Psychology of Abnormal people' for their treatises. But this observation apart, we have to consider why it is that in this pure science alone a very important section is devoted to the study of abnormal phenomena. Are there no abnormal phenomena in physics and chemistry? There are. Consider the behaviour of water below 4°C. The change in the density of this fluid at and below the temperature indicated is abnormal. There are scores of phenomena which could be easily designated as abnormal in the pure sciences, but the physical scientist has a way of getting over the difficulty by speaking of 'exceptions' to his law. Until recent times these sciences were dominated by a belief in the possibility of securing absolute standards. So, deviations from and exceptions to the 'law' were either explained away, ignored, or frankly admitted to be exceptions. But with the advent of the principle of relativity, and of the

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(1) Proc. of the 21st Ind. Sc. Congress, Calcutta, 1938, p. 61.

(2) Proc. of the Ind. Sc. Congress, 21st sessn, Calcutta, 1938, P. 63.

statistical average as the standard, due to the discovery of the 'law of Indeterminacy' and the 'quantum theory', it is now realised that absolute standards are mythical entities. There is yet another and a more fundamental reason why Abnormal phenomena are not treated as such in the physical sciences. Science is rigorously mechanistic, ruling out as it does teleology completely. The idea of purpose does not enter into scientific explanations. Consequently the study of facts takes the form of a purely phenomenalist description of the 'events' in the physical field. Under these conditions facts which do not fit into the rigid laws have to be ignored. It is open to question whether this attitude is the wisest or the most useful. If the ultimate purpose of facts be taken into consideration, then it will be easy to find a rational explanation for such abnormal physical phenomena as the expansion of water below  $4^{\circ}\text{C}$ . It would then be possible for us to point out the utility of such 'abnormal' behaviour of physical facts. If aquatic life is to be preserved, and the supply of water for the maintenance of all kinds of life is to be conserved in the many regions of the temperate zone and all regions of the frigid zone, then water must expand below  $4^{\circ}\text{C}$ .

Again physical objects are non-social things. Whether as individuals or group, the study of their behaviour is entirely devoid of any implication of social organisation. In the physical we do not speak of individuals, but only of specimens or types.

Psychology on the other hand stresses the purposive nature of the behaviour of organisms which are looked upon as social beings. One of the leading schools of psychology, the Hormic school, makes 'purpose' the basic category of the science; and the individual studied by psychology is essentially a social creature. Therefore the question of normality arises quite spontaneously in our science. 'At bottom' says Professor Bhattacharya, 'the question of normality is intimately bound

up with the question of social existence.' 'The discovery of the individual has been accompanied by the finding that without reference to the social milieu the growth of individuality cannot be understood at all. Abnormal Psychology has been mainly instrumental in drawing attention to the great part played by society in moulding the development of the individual minds. To the lasting credit of abnormal psychology be it said that it has shown most effectively the result of conflict between personal desires and social requirements.....' Commenting on this observation the leader of the symposium says, 'I am glad to find myself in a position to accept all that has been said by Professor H. D. Bhattacharya, and would like to draw attention to the special emphasis that he has laid on the influence of the social environment on the development of individual behaviour, normal and abnormal.'<sup>3</sup> In drawing the distinction between normal and abnormal, he recognises the social standard. Fisher in his 'Introduction to Abnormal Psychology' also stresses the social norm. He says, 'For always, in the final analysis, the basic measure of normality is the individual's degree of adjustability to the society in which he lives.....' The essentially social nature of the norm is brought out by Professor Leary who says ...we can reasonably claim that a normal individuality will give balanced and overt expression to all the major drives and natural interests...will seek the friendship and company of others of both sexes...will respect age and authority without becoming subsidiary to it, will be independent and yet not arrogant or tyrannical, will see others as co-operators, neither use nor be used by others as a tool...'. With this social norm in view we may now answer the question, what is the role of Abnormal Psychology?

One of the main requisites of an experiment in the physical

(3) Proc. of the 21st Ind. Sc. Congress, Calcutta, 1938, p. 54.

sciences is the complete, rigorous and objective control of the conditions of experiment. Refinement of the technique and the frantic attempts that are being made to carry the accuracy of measurement to the fourth and the fifth decimal places are only so many means towards this end. But sometimes it does happen that the conditions are entirely beyond human control. For the verification of certain aspects of the theory of relativity it is necessary to take photographs of light rays emanating from the stars during a total eclipse of the sun. But the sun cannot be covered at the will of the experimenter in astronomy or physics. Luckily for the latter, nature produces those conditions occasionally which he cannot produce for himself. Taking advantage of this 'abnormality' the experimenter goes to the place and waits for the time when the phenomenon will occur in order to make his observations. This is what is known as a 'natural experiment'. Such natural experiments have aided greatly in the advancement of the physical sciences.

The psychologist is also severely handicapped in his researches, because the range of his experimental field is limited. Fain would he probe into the hidden recesses of human nature, but that he is prevented, by law and custom, from exploring the mind of his fellow beings. But nature sympathising with him in his aspirations lifts the veil now and then and lets him gaze at the frightening scenes being enacted inside the human mind. She performs the experiment which he is forbidden from conducting. The phenomena studied by Abnormal Psychology are the results of experiments which nature makes on the human mind. The field of Abnormal Psychology is analogous to that of the 'natural experiment' in the Physical sciences.

The view that we are putting forward is not a novel one. Psychologists all alone have studied certain phenomena that are on the borderland between the normal and the abnormal.

Illusions, hallucinations and delusions have always been pressed into service to throw light on the nature of normal perception, and the phenomena of inattention and distraction to throw light on attention. Normal Psychology has been mildly interested in lapses of memory, double personalities, dreams etc. The more pronounced and extreme forms of mental abnormalities were, no doubt, studied by medical men with a view to discovering a cure for those diseases. And the psychologist had to wait for the work of Freud before he witnessed a synthesis of the normal with the abnormal. It is Freud who demonstrated that the apparently normal, and the approximately normal acts of behaviour are motivated by deep seated and completely hidden abnormal urges. Now that the great work has been thoroughly done, we contend that it is misleading to speak of Normal and Abnormal Psychologies. They should be synthesised into a single science which should be studied by all students of human nature.

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# **The Vedantic Doctrine of Intuition**

**By**

**M. YAMUNACHARYA**

Brahma Jignāsa or inquiry into the nature of ultimate Reality is the task of philosophy. The inquiry is rational inquiry and the method is the method of Logic. But to what purpose is all this enquiry to be undertaken ? Is it to satisfy an intellectual curiosity ? The goal of this enquiry, say the Vedantins, is the realisation of ultimate reality. That is to say, the intellectual or theoretical understanding of reality, the mediate knowledge that one has attained to must become a matter of one's own immediate experience. One must manage to get an inside knowledge of this Reality, in other words an intuition of reality. This is the Sākshātkāra that the vedantins speak about. Sankaracharya remarks that "Intuition is the final result of the enquiry into Brahman." Ramanuja speaks of this as "a mental energy different in character from the mere cognition of the sense of texts, and more specifically denoted by such terms as Dhyāna and Upāsana i. e. meditation which is of the nature of remembrance ( i. e. representative thought ) but in intuitive clearness is not inferior to the clearest representative thought ( Pratyaksha ) which by constant daily practice becomes ever more perfect." ( Srihashya III-4-26, page 699 ). Further he says : "It is only in the state of perfect conciliation or endearment, that is, in meditation bearing the character of devotion, that an intuition of Brahman takes place, not in any other state."

It is Henri Bergson who drew the attention of philosophers in Europe to intuition as the mode of attaining the inside knowledge of reality. He contrasted the method of science

and the method of philosophy. The method of science is the method of intellect and philosophy must have its own distinctive subject matter and its own method to pursue. This method he found in intuition. He gives a clear exposition of his view in his 'Introduction to Metaphysics.' He writes: "A comparison of the definitions of metaphysics and the various conceptions of the Absolute leads to the discovery that philosophers, in spite of their apparent divergencies, agree in distinguishing two profoundly different ways of knowing a thing. The first implies that we move round the object: the second that we enter into it". The second way is the way of intuition. Bergson defines 'intuition' as "*the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible*". He also states that "an absolute could only be given in an intuition". Ramana's 'state of perfect conciliation or endearment, that is, meditation bearing the character of devotion' is on all fours with Bergson's 'intellectual sympathy' by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it". Here is the point of contact between Bergson's doctrine of intuition and the Vedantic doctrine.

But when Bergson radically opposes intellect and intuition and relates the latter to instinct he parts company with the Vedantic philosophers. Sankara's statement that "Intuition is the final result of the enquiry into Brahman" undermines the ground of this opposition. Far from intellectual enquiry being a hindrance to the intuition of the Absolute, it prepares one for it. According to Bergson, intellect is analytical and is incapable of synthesis but according to Vedanta intellect analyses with a view to synthesis. In fact *Samanvaya* or synthesis is the work of intellect. Bergson's view is also misleading in this that it savours of faculty psychology which is exploded. The departmentalization of human mind based on

a false psychology is yielding to the view of the integration of the human mind. If we really speak of intellect, feeling and will and so on it is out of the full consciousness that we are dealing in abstractions. We do so for purposes of convenience and preliminary analysis.

As John Caird points out in his "Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion" the question about which so much has been made as to what special faculty or division of human consciousness it is to which religion distinctively belongs—whether, in other words, religion is characteristically a thing of knowledge, or of feeling, or of volition and action—is one which rests on a false and defective psychology. The spiritual life and consciousness of man cannot be broken up, as this inquiry implies, into independent divisions or departments existing side by side, or into separate powers and faculties having a common substratum in something which is called the mind; nor is it possible to assert with respect to any of the concrete manifestations of man's spiritual nature, that it is confined to any one form of activity to the exclusion of other and cognate forms. There is no feeling or volition which does not contain in it implicitly an element of knowledge nor any kind of knowledge which does not presuppose feeling, or in which the mind is in attitude simply passive and receptive, without any element of activity".

Brahma Sutras which afford the material for these Vedantic thinkers to build their systems upon posit that Brahman is cognisable only through revelation. They maintain that neither sense-perception nor inference is capable of giving us an integral knowledge of ultimate reality. The awareness of Brahman is given to us by revelation verified by the religious intuition of each individual aspirant. This view is liable to be misconstrued as a form of dogmatism renouncing reason as an instrument of knowledge and attaching more importance to



the written word, the books of religion. This necessitates an enquiry as to what exactly these thinkers meant by regarding Scripture as their source in matters pertaining to Brahman. The two sutras *Tarkūprathishtanath* and *Sūtra Yonitvāt* strike the keynote of their teaching.

Sankara remarks in his commentary on the Sutra *Janmādyasya Yatah* that inference also being an instrument of right knowledge in so far as it does not contradict the Vedānta texts is not to be excluded as a means of confirming the meaning ascertained. Human understanding must assist scripture. The comprehension of Brahman is effected by the ascertainment, consequent on discussion, of the sense of the Vedānta Texts. This makes it obvious that argumentation and discussion are not opposed to intuition, as intuition is understood by Vedāntic thinkers. It is this that makes Sankara say "Intuition is the final result of the enquiry into Brahman". Scriptural texts are not the only means of knowledge but scriptural texts on the one hand and intuition on the other, are to be had recourse to according to the occasion. The reasons are firstly, intuition is the final result of the enquiry and secondly the object of the enquiry is an existing substance. If the object of the knowledge of Brahman were something to be accomplished there would be no reference to intuition and text would be the only means of knowledge. Such is the view of Sankara.

The place of Sabda Pramāṇa or verbal testimony in knowledge of ultimate Reality is to be determined. The two tests of testimony viz., trustworthiness of the witness and agreement with knowledge have to be applied to this also. As for the first test, as scripture consists of the deliverances of the individual Seers who by living a particular mode of life unanimously recognised as the holiest life of which man is capable, they could be relied upon absolutely as trustworthy. They are

therefore regarded as 'āptas' and their deliverances are *Aptavākya*. But how are we sure that they are not self-deluded ? In order to be sure of this we have to apply these objective tests ; one is general agreement among the seers so far as their experiences are concerned and the second objective test which is also a subjective test is personal verification. The scripture is the map of an unknown country. Whether it is a true map or not is to be found in the agreement of the Seers between themselves and in the possibility of personal verification. As professor S. Radha Krishnan remarks "the truths revealed in the Vedas are capable of being re-experienced on compliance with ascertained conditions. We can discriminate between the genuine and the spurious in religious experience, not only by means of Logic, but also through life. By experimenting with different religious conceptions and relating them with the rest of our life, we can know the sound from the unsound". (*The Hindu view of life*). Intuition of the perfected Saint has its verbal expressions in the genuine scripture. This is the intuition that is the final goal of all spiritual endeavour. If this is so, then the whole edifice of Vedantic thought has an intuitive basis. Reliance on intuition to start with at the very commencement of spiritual life is nothing but delusion. Intuition is the final result and not the primitive beginning. The confusion of intuition with any kind of immediate knowledge or knowledge of axiomatic or self-evident truths of geometry, for instance or with instincts that are innate endowments of animals aiding them in their adaptation to environment is absolutely not warranted by the Vedantic doctrine of intuition.

Man's reaction to Ultimate Reality is not merely logical but it is the reaction of the entire human personality. It is this wholeness of reaction that is characteristic of intuition. Identification of intuition with mere emotion ~~or feeling is not~~

therefore justified. Mere feeling does not exist any more than mere thinking.

According to the Vedantic view the perfected Saint, having known Brahman in its nature, as established by philosophical speculation wishes to enter into the very heart of reality or become one with it as it were. *Jñāna* to Vedanta is not merely the intellectual comprehension of a concept but the realisation of the significance or meaning of the concept by personal experience i. e. *Sakshātkāra*. Until this is achieved the aspirant is not satisfied. He always looks forward, if not in this life, at least in the lives to come, to an intuitive experience which is the culmination of the spiritual mode of life. The experience of ultimate reality will invest everything with a new significance. Once we get this knowledge, everything else becomes known. This sets at rest the restless questionings of the human mind, says one of the Upanishads.

In order to prepare the human spirit to receive the highest experience known to man's consciousness a certain course of spiritual discipline is prescribed. It involves a thorough overhauling of the whole human personality, body, mind and spirit.

Physical purity becomes no less important than the purification of mind and spirit connoted by the term '*Satva Suddhi*'. Without these, man will attempt in vain to attain the heights to which he may aspire but lack the strength of will to pursue undaunted the rigorous path of spiritual discipline. '*Nāyamatma balahinena labhyah*': the weak and the faint hearted never will win this spiritual victory. The path that is thus chosen is not easy and it is not for the idle. Spiritual life is a life of strenuous endeavour and not a life of ease and sloth. This is the lesson that is borne in on us by the teachings of these Seers of India.

Prof. S. Radhakrishnan sums up the Vedantic doctrine of the relation of reason to intuition in this wise "In order to be

able to say that religious experience reveals reality, in order to be able to transform religious certitude into logical certainty, we are obliged to give an intellectual account of the experience. Hindu thought has no mistrust of reason. There can be no final breach between the two powers of the human mind, reason and intuition".

According to Prof. A. N. Whitehead. religion in its truer and deeper sense is "the vision of something which stands beyond, behind and within the passing flux of immediate things : something which is real, and yet waiting to be realised : something which is a remote possibility, and yet the greatest of present facts : something that gives meaning to all that passes and yet eludes apprehension". This is the clearest presentation by a modern philosopher of what is implied by the Vedantic doctrine of *Sākshātkāra*.

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# **Refutation of the Buddhist Doctrine of Aggregates**

BY

T. R. SUNDARARAMAN .

It was Thomas Hobbes who wrote "we can conceive no activity whatsoever, apart from its subject, e.g. we cannot think of leaping apart from that which leaps, of knowing apart from a knower, or of thinking without a thinker." And no argument is needed to convince most men that in fact a basic substance does exist at the heart of things. When they perceive a colour, movement etc., they take it for granted that a separate substance exists exhibiting these qualities. This is indeed what commonsense tells us.

But it must be admitted that though this may seem obvious it is not based on direct perception of a substance-in-itself. For our senses, on which we have to rely entirely for our knowledge pertaining to the objects of the outer world, show us only the colour, hardness, or other properties which things possess. They never directly point to a substance lying at the back of the qualities. It follows that our belief in a substance apart from its qualities must be based on inference. This belief that the external world is composed of substances owning diverse qualities and engaging in various activities may be logical or only a psychological necessity.

In this paper, the endeavour has been to show that the necessity felt for believing in a substance apart from its qualities is logical rather than merely psychological. Restricting our inquiry to the field of Indian thought (early) Buddhism, which flourished at a period when anything like systematic philosophy was almost unknown to the rest of the

world, presents a closely reasoned doctrine maintaining that there is no substance apart from the sensible qualities. Any object, physical or spiritual, is just a bundle (*Samghāta*) of qualities. It denies "a self-sustaining substance apart from the qualities, and dismisses the belief in a substrate for the qualities, as a "superstition, there being no means of knowing it, as there are in the case of the attributes themselves viz., the sense of sight etc" <sup>1</sup> The logical consequence of this argument is the denial of the self. "Material things, then, like the self, are aggregates with no underlying unity whatever" <sup>2</sup> Like Hume they would ask philosophers "whether the idea of substance be derived from the impressions of sensation or reflection." If it be conveyed to us by our senses, which of them; and after what manner? If it be perceived by the eyes, it must be a colour; if by the ears, a sound; if by the palate a taste; and so of the other senses. But none will assert that substance is either a colour, or a sound or a taste. Reflection cannot get at substance, since its field is restricted to emotions none of which can be called a substance. We have, therefore, no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities". There is for him nothing like a "King Ego holding a levee of presentation". <sup>3</sup> To suppose that each one of the objects of experience stands for an entity apart from the constituent parts is for him to accept an assumption which leads to an endless tangle of contradictions and difficulties".

Venkaṭanātha, the famous exponent of Viśiṣṭādvaitic thought, in the opening pages of his brilliant and closely reasoned work "Nyāya-Siddhānta" subjects the Buddhistic

1. Hiriyanna : Outlines of Indian Philosophy. P. 140.

2. *Ibid.* p. 140.

3. Mrs. Rhys Davids : Buddhist Philosophy. P. 98.

doctrine of unsubstantiality to a rigorous scrutiny, and concludes that the notion of a substance as the bearer of qualities cannot be abolished.

Against the Buddhistic position, he first points out that commonsense treats a substance and its qualities as being distinct. The colour, for example, is not confused with the coloured object. This knowledge of the distinction between a substance and its qualities is neither contradicted by subsequent experience nor explainable on any basis other than substance-attribute relation.<sup>4</sup> Unlike the illusory cognition of the moon as being double which is later falsified, the belief in a substance distinct from its attributes is never contradicted.

Next, Venkaṭanātha shows that unless a substance which is at once the seat of colour and touch is posited, it would not be possible to explain cognitive experiences like "I touch what I see". Should this cognition refer to touch (*sparsa*) only, it cannot be apprehended by the eye; again should it refer to colour only, it cannot be grasped by the sense of touch; for each sense-organ has the power to perceive only a specific quality. But as it is grasped by both the senses, there must necessarily be a substrate for both colour and contact.

The Buddhist might contend that though ordinarily each sense-organ has only the power to grasp a specific quality, still when these qualities co-exist any one sense-organ may apprehend all these, and there would be no need to posit a substrate for these qualities. Venkaṭanātha dismisses this contention as being futile; for the mere fact of the entities perceived, being present simultaneously, will not make any difference to the specific capacities of the senses. The senses

4. "Rūparūpi prabṛtināmabhādhitānānyathāsiddhāvhedavyavahārāt". Venkaṭanātha : *Nyāyasiddhānta*. P. 3.

will always retain their special capacities. Besides, the very concept of coexistence implies limiting conditions (*upā lhis*) like space and time ; but the Buddhist does not accept Space and Time as distinct realities. Further, even if the Buddhist were to admit Space and Time as *Upā hdis*, as the logical outcome of his *position*, he would have to identify different entities existing at the same place but on different occasions, or mix up entities existing at the same time but in different places.

That the substance ( *Dharmīn* ) is not a bundle of qualities ( *Dharma* ) is established in another way. Compare the perception of a jar at close quarters and in broad daylight with the perception of the same jar from a distance and in uncertain light. Of these two different cognitions ( *jñānas* ), the former is clear and distinct and the latter hazy and indistinct. The distinction between these two perceptions cannot be intelligibly explained on the Buddhistic hypothesis. But on the basis of substance-attribute relation it may be stated that while both the cognitions have grasped the aspect of substance ( i. e. the same jar ), they differ in respect of clearness and distinctness in so far as one has apprehended more of the qualities of the jar, and the other less of them.

Further, perceptual experience reveals that one and the same substance assumes at different times different states. For example, what was once a lump of clay assumes a different shape and colour and becomes a jar ; but the jar is, in its essentials, clay. Sometime later, when the jar breaks, it becomes pot-sherds. Thus the identical substance has at different times diverse shapes ( *avasthās* ), such as that of being a lump of clay, of being a jar and of being pot-sherds.

Throughout these changes of state there is identity in respect of substance, but difference with regard to shapes etc. This is explainable only on the basis of substance-attribute



relation. It is hence impossible to equate the changing *Dharmas* with the unchanging *dharmin*.

Again, the same substance at any given moment possesses a number of qualities. A person, for example, may be at once young, fair in complexion, stout and so forth. These qualities are distinct from one another. Clearly, it is not possible to equate the one *Dharmin* with its many and manifold *dharma*s. The *dharmin* must, therefore, be different from *dharma*.

Illusory cognitions (*bhrama*), Venkatanātha points out, necessitate belief in a *dharmin* distinct from the *dharma*s. Taking the familiar example of the white conch appearing yellow, he draws attention to the absurdity of the Buddhist hypothesis. If the Buddhist explanation were correct, the conch known ( substance ) would have to be identified with the whiteness ( quality ) which is not apprehended. Besides, at the time when the jaundiced person perceives the conch as yellow, others, however, take it to be white. To account for this the Buddhist has to maintain that when the jaundiced person cognises the conch, the *white* conch perishes giving place to a *yellow* conch. This explanation is valueless, because the doctrine of momentariness (*Kṣāṇika*) on which it is based is rejected by the Viśiṣṭādvaitin.

In the very nature of the case, the illusory cognition does not involve an apprehension of the specific qualities of the thing, although there is an awareness of the substrate. Further, the moment the specific qualities are perceived, the illusion vanishes. This involves a distinction between *dharma* and *dharmin*.

On the ground that the *guṇa* and the *guṇin* are always perceived simultaneously, the Buddhist may contend that they are not separate, but identical. This contention, says Venkatanātha, is valueless; for, if they are always apprehended together simultaneously, it is not because they are identical,

but because they are known by the same means of knowledge. He further urges that the very expressions "being together" "being together invariably" do really imply difference, and strengthen the view that the entities which coexist are disparate. Thus when co-existence is found to imply difference, the attempt on the part of the Buddhist to employ "*Sahopalambhaniyama*" as the '*hetu*' for establishing identity is liable to be charged with '*Viruddhadosa*'.

Venkatanātha goes on to point out that there can be no universal concomitance between 'being apprehended together' and 'being identical'. For, this *vyapti* is either '*sama*' or '*visama*'. It cannot be the first; because, in that event, whenever an object, say a conch, is perceived, its quality (in the present instance, whiteness), must also be cognised. But obviously, this is not always the case. Nor can it be the second; because it is possible to apprehend a quality without at the same time perceiving its substrato. Likewise, cognition of the substrate apart from a cognition of its qualities is possible. For example, we perceive by means of our nose the odour carried on to us by the wind without there being a knowledge of its substrate, '*Pṛthvi*.' Again, without grasping odour, *pṛthvi*, its substrate is apprehended by the eye.

Next Venkatanātha exposes the absurdity of the Buddhistic hypothesis: 'whatsoever entities are always apprehended together, must be identical'. On the basis of the Buddhistic view, we would have to identify *bhāsvavararūpa* and *abhāsvavararūpa* existing in entities other than darkness (*Dvānta*), since they are always apprehended together. *Bhāsvavararūpa* resides in entities which are capable of illuminating objects other than themselves, and *abhāsvavararūpa* denotes the incapacity to illumine other objects. An example will make this point clear. The *abhāsvavararūpa* present in the jar is always cognised along with the *bhāsvavararūpa* residing in light (*ālōka*). But none would ever dream of identifying these two.

The Buddhist may still argue that even though the perceived entity is single, it is taken to be manifold on account of the diversity of the sense organs (*indriyās*) employed. But this argument is liable to be charged with the defects of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*). For the plurality of the senses is said to establish that the objects perceived are manifold. And the plurality of the objects cognised is, in its turn, made to prove the multiplicity of the sense organs. Again, the Buddhistic argument that 'wherever the sense organs are manifold the objects apprehended by them should also be manifold,' suffers from *Vyabhicāra* doṣa. In disproof of this statement, it is possible to cite instances of perception where, even though many sense-organs have been employed, the object has been apprehended as being single. The example considered already, namely 'I touch what I see', is an instance in point. Against the Buddhistic hypothesis it may also be urged that even where a single sense organ is involved, diverse entities may be grasped. The eye, for example, apprehends many colours. Obviously, awareness of different colours is not dependent on the difference in the sense organs. Likewise, the distinction between the several qualities of an identical object, for example, colour, touch and so forth, cannot be said to be based on the diversity in the sense organs. The argument that *dharma* and *dharmin* are not separate but identical, and that if they are commonly taken to be distinct, it is on the basis of the manifoldness of the senses employed in perception, stands refuted by the mere fact that *dharmin* and *dharma* are perceived independent of one another. Just as *dharma* and *dharmin* are known to exist, the *Viśeṣya* (that which owns qualities or *Viśeṣaṇas*) also does exist.

Next Venkaṭanātha points out that the very statement of the Buddhist that 'substance does not exist' implies the substance-attribute relation which he denies.

The Buddhist may finally resort to this argument ; ' the common experience that substance is distinct from qualities must be condemned as illusory, because it is *savikalpakajñāna*. Against this contention, Venkatanātha urges that it is liable to be charged with the doṣas of Bhāda, Asiddha or Vyabhiçāra.

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# How do we see Objects as we do ?

By

G. HANUMANTHA RAO

## I. The problem.

It is common experience that we see objects as existing outside of ourselves and as being erect. But the image of the object that is thrown on the retina is inverted and inside the eye. The problem is how the inverted image that is thrown on the retina and inside the eye gives rise to the experience that we see objects as being erect and outside our head.

## II. Current Answers.

(a) It is said by way of answer to this question that the inversion will not matter as everything seen is inverted. One writer goes to the length of saying that "it is very foolish to make much of the fact, as people often do, for there is no reason why we should not become accustomed to the order of things we have always known and grow to regard the opposite relation as an inversion. One of the first lessons learned by a baby is to reach in a certain direction when an object makes a certain retinal impression. If the image is higher on the retina he must reach down, while if it is low he must reach up. Without knowing at all about the retina he soon learns to reach unerringly."<sup>1</sup>

(b) It is also said by way of explanation that the object that we see is the result of the interpretative activity of the mind, the world is a mental construction of reality. Though the image is inverted and inside the eye, the mind interprets it as being erect and outside the eye.

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1. W. B. Saunders : Human Physiology, p. 49.

### III. Criticism of Current Answers.

(a) The first answer assumes that we derive our experience of the top and bottom of things from the downward and upward movements made by the hands. We see things high because we reach low and low because we reach high ; reaching high is the cause of seeing low and reaching low is the cause of seeing high. This is putting the cart before the horse. Nobody denies that the tactile sensations supplement visual sensations but what is difficult to understand and accept is that the experience of objects as seen is derived from our experience of objects as touched. Besides, if it is true that every one has learnt to correct the inversion and respond unerringly, no one should feel any difficulty in scoring the maximum in the mirror-drawing experiment. But it is found that a subject makes mistakes not only at the start, but throughout the period of practice and long after it.

(b) There is a sense in which the world that we know is a mental construction ; it is the result of our intellectual efforts. Physics is the mental construction of the facts of our experience and the construction does not consist in creating or transforming the facts of experience, but in deducing the relations underlying them and systematising them. What science constructs is a rational system of experiences that are available to it. The systems that we construct may change but the visual experiences we start with do not change. The Ptolemaic system of astronomy may give place to the Copernican system and this may yield place to the Einsteinian, but the illusion of the sun rising in the East and setting in the West has remained and will remain. Even if one is accustomed to interpret this phenomenon after Copernicus, the interpretation cannot change the visual experience. To attribute the adjustments involved in visual perception which are unconscious and non-volitional to the

conscious activity of the mind is to commit the psychologists' fallacy. The experiments of Götz with young chicks give the lie to the interpretative theory.<sup>2</sup> Since this theory has been sufficiently exploded, no useful purpose will be served in elaborating its refutation here.

#### **IV. Dualism between mind and matter—the principal impediment in the way of the solution of these problems.**

Modern physiological psychology has not put forward any hypothesis to answer these questions. It traced the different processes involved in visual perception from the time the light rays leave the visual object until the forces released by them in the organism reach the occipital cortex. Rays of light, whether they start directly from the visual object or are reflected by it, enter the eye and are refracted through the lens and an inverted image is thrown on the retina, which stimulates the optic nerve and sets up nerve currents which are carried through the other nerve centres to the cortex, and then perception of the object results. How the retinal image is referred to the object or how the inversion is corrected or how the object is experienced as being external to the perceiving organism are unexplained. No attempt has been made to connect the psychological configuration with the physiological or physical. Psychologists, physiologists and physicists alike were precluded from attempting this as they laboured under the assumption that the mind was totally unlike and discontinuous with the physical and physiological forces. The dualism that was started by Descartes and adopted by Newton continued to infect scientific thinking until our own time. Physicists, physiologists and psychologists were working in isolation from and not infrequently, in opposition to one another. The fallacy of bifurcation of nature clouded

2. Koffka : Principles of Gestalt Psychology, pp. 88-89.

the minds of scientists and they forgot that the principal aim of science was to establish continuity between the facts of experience.

## V. The new Scientific Orientation.

A new scientific orientation is necessary to explain psychological phenomena in relation to the physical and physiological and this has become possible since the scientific development initiated by Einstein. Contemporary scientists, particularly, those of the Gestalt school, have discarded the Newtonian assumption of action at a distance and without time. "Empty space has given place to a definitely distributed system of strains and stresses. It is the distribution of strains and stresses in a given environment that determines what a body of a given constitution will do in that particular environment. Conversely, when we know the body and observe what it does in a certain environment, we can deduce the properties of the field in the environment. Thus the field and the behaviour of the body are correlative"<sup>3</sup>. The Gestalt psychologists have among their aims, the study of the Ego as one of the main field parts, and the demonstration of the forces which connect the Ego with other field parts as being of the same nature as those between different parts of environmental field and how they produce behaviour in all forms. In short, it is their aim to show that the psychological field exists within a real organism which in its turn exists in a geographical environment.<sup>4</sup> The psychological field is distinct but continuous with the physiological and physical.<sup>5</sup>

3. Koffka : Principles of Gestalt psychology p. 42.

4. Ibid p. 67.

5. M. Hiriyanna : Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 342.

"The explanation that all these organs are bhautika is



## **VI. The Hypothesis put forward by way of solution to the problem.**

In the light of this new scientific orientation a hypothesis is here put forward by way of a solution of the problem of this paper. According to it, like all experience, perception is dipolar; it involves two poles—the geographical, physical or objective pole and the psychological or subjective pole. Perceptual experience is the field that lies between the two poles. This experience implies a circular movement from the objective pole to the subjective pole and from the subjective pole to the objective pole. The rays of light that start from the object pass through the lens and throw an inverted image on the fovea centralis and stimulate the optic nerve and release the energy in it. The energy that is thus liberated stimulates and releases other energies till at last the central energy is released which flows back to the optic nerve and projects the image along the track of light to the object. When the ground of the projected image is identical with that of the physical object, perception arises.<sup>6</sup> Perception is thus not an one-way process; it is a circular process. Not only does the object reach out to the subject through several media—physical and physiological, the subject also reaches out to the object through the same media.

important on account of the recognition it implies of the indispensableness of physical aids for the manifestation of consciousness. Though indispensable, their distinction from the psychic element is not in the least ignored”.

6. Prof. M. Hiriyanna : *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* ;  
p 345 46.

## VII. Deduction and verification of the hypothesis

Apart from the general ideas of contemporary science which render the hypothesis conceivable, could any deductions be drawn which may be verified with reference to facts? Are there any facts which necessitate the hypothesis? Unless deductions could be drawn from the hypothesis and unless the deductions square with facts, the hypothesis cannot be said to have been proved.

If it is true that the central energy streams out to the retina and throws back the retinal image on to the object along the rays of light,

1. we should experience the object as being external to the subject ;
2. that what we experience is not the image that is thrown on the retina, but the object ;
3. the projected image should undergo the same refraction that light passing through a lens undergoes ; and
4. when isolated, the image should contract or expand accordingly as the background against which it is thrown is nearer or farther away from the eye. Its shape also should undergo modifications, accordingly as it is thrown against a horizontal, vertical or inclined plane.

1. That we experience the object as being out there and not as inside the eye is a fact which is admitted by all. Common experience squares with our deduction. We could not have experienced the object as being out there, if the content of our experience had not been referred to a point outside our own body. This reference is a felt experience—unconscious and involuntary. We refer the content to a point outside of us not because we choose to do so, but because we are obliged to do so. This is possible because the field of our experience is much wider than the field occupied by our body and is con-

tinuous with it. When we say that the object is external, all that is meant is that the object is outside the body and not that the object is outside the mind. The field of the mind is wider than the field of the body ; while what goes on in the body is confined to the body, what goes on in the mind has no such limitation. In fact, the very development of a mind in a body is to enable the body to overcome its limitation and enable it to participate in a larger universe. But it should not be thought that the mind liberates only by becoming disembodied as primitive people thought. Mind as known to scientists presupposes body but is not identical with it. Mind is a spatio-temporal, physiologico-psychological continuum, not a disembodied spiritual vacuum ; it moves in three planes spatial, physical and vital ; it belongs to all these but is not confined to anyone of these. Belonging to all these it can move from one to the other. We can, therefore, speak of the mind flowing out to the object ; it can pass from the purely introspective, to the behavioural and from the behavioural to the mechanical.

2. That we do not see the image on the retina is proved by the experiments of Gotz with chicks. If it was the image on the retina that we saw, then a bigger object which is comparatively more distant should be experienced as being smaller than a smaller object situated nearby ; for, the distant object, though bigger, throws a smaller image on the retina than the smaller and nearer object. But the young chicks with which Gotz experimented, experienced the bigger object as bigger rather than as smaller. The size of the object does not depend upon the size of the image that is thrown on the retina ; it depends upon the ratio which the image bears to the object ; it depends upon the relation of the retinal image to the object, the distance from the object to the lens, the contraction the lens must undergo in order to throw a clear image on the retina. In other words, the size of the object depends upon

the accommodation of the eye ; accommodation consists of the changes in the lens relatively to the distance, depth and brightness. Recent studies of the process of accommodation have revealed that the process of accommodation is not merely relative to the figure against a background, but also relative to the background also. But for that, the bigger photograph of a smaller object should have made us feel that the object revealed by the photograph was really bigger than the object revealed by a smaller photograph of a bigger object. Really each figure is viewed in relation to the background and it is the ratio of the figure to the background that determines the perception of size. Dr. Luckish in his book on the 'Science of Seeing' has shown that there is accommodation when our eye moves from one portion of a landscape picture to another, in spite of the fact that the whole picture is in the same focus.<sup>7</sup>

3. If the image on the retina is projected on to the object, it should undergo refraction and the inversion should be corrected. That this is what actually happens is borne out by our experience of objects as erect and not, as inverted.

4. But the most conclusive proof of the fact of projection is the phenomenon of after-images. In actual perception we cannot differentiate between the object and the image that is projected by the mind on the object. But in the phenomenon

7. M. Luckish : Science of Seeing p. 108. " When an observer looks at a two dimensional picture of a three dimensional scene, such as a landscape, changes of accommodation not infrequently take place as different parts of the picture are viewed, notwithstanding the fact that all the parts of the picture would be in the same focus for the same accommodation."

of after images the projected image could be isolated and observed. The size and shape of the after-image are exactly the same as those of the object. The projected image behaves in the same manner as a light projected through an aperture behaves when thrown on a horizontal, vertical or inclined plane. If the screen is taken farther away, the image grows bigger, if it is brought nearer it grows smaller ; its shape also changes accordingly as the plane against which it is thrown is vertical or horizontal or inclined.

5. The projective function of the brain also accounts for the phenomenon of error. Error is often due to the imposition of a subjective image on the object. The mistaking of the rope for a snake is due to the imposition of a snake image on the rope ; the mistaking of shell for silver is due to the imposition of the image of silver on the shell.

6. The projective function of the brain is coming to be recognized by western physiological psychologists. L. D. Lickley in his *Nervous System*, makes use of the hypothesis of the projective function of the brain to account for the inverted image on the retina giving rise to the perception of an erect object. "The image on the retina," he says, "is, of course inverted, but the brain takes no cognizance of this fact ; in other words, the brain does not realise the image, but projects it back to the object from which it is derived".<sup>8</sup> Though the development of the hypothesis of this paper is mostly in relation to western science, the principal source of inspiration is the Vedantic theory of perception, according to which the internal organ (anthahkarana) goes out to the object and takes the form of the object in perceiving it. It should not, however,

8. J. D. Lickley : *The Nervous system*, p. 95

be thought that what is said here is identical with the Vedantic theory of perception : it is only in the light of it. How the present exposition is a development of the Vedantic theory is subject matter for a separate article.

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# **The Moral War in the Markandeya Chandi.**

**By**

**Subha Brata Roy Chowdhury.**

The eternal conflict between the powers of Light and the powers of Darkness forms the subject-matter of the story in the *Mārkaṇḍeya Chandi* which runs, in short, as follows :

King Suratha, bereft of his kingdom and exiled from his capital by his alien enemies and intriguing officers, came to the hermitage of the great sage Medhā in the heart of a dense forest. During his sojourn there, the dethroned king while wandering about in the woods—painfully worrying about his lost realm and all its splendour—came across, one day, a melancholy Vaisya—Samādhi by name whose unscrupulous and conspiring wives and sons had dispossessed him of vast fortune and had then driven him out of his own house into the jungle. Samādhi enquired of the king if he could enlighten him as to why his mind was still being drawn irresistibly towards those treacherous relations of his and his heart still aching with the tenderest thoughts about them. The king, who was being troubled in the depth of his own mind with similar poignant thoughts about his lost kingdom, could hardly offer any explanation to this peculiar trend of the mind.

Sunk deep in despondence they both approached the great sage Medhā for enlightenment. They explained to him how deplorably they were out of all mental harmony in view of their uncontrollable attraction towards things irredeemably lost and the dearest ones hopelessly estranged. The sage

explained to them the profound significance of knowledge and told them how human intellect had always been struggling beneath the heavy weight of the super-incumbent Illusion—perpetually emanating from Mahāmāyā. Man, the sage went on, was to fight his way to the infinite and ever-lasting radiance of self-realization through the obscuring cloud cast on his intellect by Mahāmāyā whose hold over the world was unfathomable. Even the Supreme Ruler of the Universe, said the sage, was not immune from the incomprehensible powers of Mahāmāyā.

The sage then related to them how, when the deluge came after the destruction of the creation, the ever-mysterious and the ever-unseen Mahāmāyā manifested herself in all her divine glory at the invocation of Brahmā, the creator, to save him from the onslaughts of the two ferocious demons—Madhu and Kaitava who had sprung forth from the ethereal body of Vishnu—the Supreme Lord of the Universe—while floating about in His Eternal Bed in a state of sublime stupor under the benumbing influence of Mahāmāyā.

Maharshi Medhā then told the king and the Vaisya how, on different other occasions, being invoked by Indra, king of Heaven, Mahāmāyā arose in wrath against the demons and destroyed Mahishāsura, their mighty monarch who had played havoc in Heaven, and killed Sumbha, another triumphant king of the demons and his powerful brother Nisumbha, to save the gods and their heavenly kingdom from their devastating attacks.

The sage then advised the exiled king and the despondent Vaisya to worship Mahāmāyā with whole-hearted devotion who, when propitiated, would liberate them from all illusions and grant them salvation in the end.

Suratha and Samādhi did so and after years of devotional



worship rationalizing all their discordant and wayward impulses—they reached their goal at last and were blessed with the benedictions of Mahāmāyā.

This, in short, is the story in the Mārkaṇḍeya Chandi. It is not, however, the story but it is its quintessential core that matters here as therein has been enshrined the highest achievement of man—the triumph of his Soul (Atman) in the eternal wrangle with his Ego (Aham).

To grasp the profound significance of the symbolism of the Chandi—to have an insight into its inner spiritual meaning, we must, first of all, disperse the concealing cloud of its deep allegory. As that cloud will roll back, we shall find that Suratha and Samādhi represent but men whose minds are darkened by the vicissitudes of life—men, whose vision has been coloured by the colour of misfortune—men, striving to fight their way through the evils of life to the eternal light of knowledge. To these vast multitudes of struggling humanity, Chandi will preach for ever the cult of 'Sakti' and to the dying fire of their flickering faith, Chandi will bring the irradiance of absolute conviction. The battle of life may be bloody and cruel—the deep of despondence may seem without its limit—the darkness and ungraciousness may appear impenetrable, but the voice of Chandi will ever be ringing like a clarion-call to courage. It will tell the struggling humanity that in them lies the power to conquer and prevail—that victory shall be theirs if they have only the enduring courage to fight the battle of life—that their devotion to 'Sakti' will harmonise all the warring elements in them and will make them supreme over the world.

We have now to see from the psycho-analytic standpoint what exactly are these warring elements in humanity. If we penetrate deep into the human mind, we shall find that two opposing psychic tendencies have been working there in per-

petual antagonism creating a constant disharmony which acts as a subconscious fetter on man's attaining that spiritual communion with the Divine which is the ultimate object of his life. This is the conflict between the powers of Light and the powers of Darkness—between the Ego and the Soul, the Aham and the Atman. Aham tempts him towards earthly pleasures and materialistic enjoyments and Atman shows him the way to self-sacrifice and eternal peace. One lets loose all his wayward impulses and extravagant emotions and the other disciplines them and demands an absolute sacrifice of all that is selfish on his part and harmful in the end. This perpetual struggle between the Ego and the Soul—this fundamental antagonism of the two permeates through the entire course of human evolution, and the supreme object of human life lies in fusing these conflicting tendencies into a delicious harmony by the process of self-purification transforming the soul-obscuring impulses of the human heart into the noblest virtues of mankind.

The harmonization of these two discordant tendencies signifies that all that is materialistic in mankind will become as ethereal as the 'Spirit' and Aham or Ego will get attuned to and finally merged into the Atman or Soul. The hold of illusion over humanity is however so tremendously powerful that man can never penetrate through it and see things in their real colour without the dynamization of his psychic power which he can acquire only by his whole hearted devotion to 'Sakti'. Once liberated from all illusions by the grace of 'Mahāmāyā', he will find that both his Ego and Soul spring from the same source just as the creator-Brahmā as well as the devastating demons sprang from the ethereal body of the Supreme Lord-Vishnu, and are at one with each other.

This is the most sublime message that the Mārkandeya Chandi imparts and this is the most noble mission that the Mārkandeya Chandi fulfils.

# The Theory of Adhyāsa.

By

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Reality, according to Advaita Vedānta, is the self (Ātman), the Pure Intelligence, which is 'one without the second. The many that we perceive are the not-self,'—an illusion. The not-self seems to be real simply because it is superimposed upon the self which is the Reality. Its substrate upon which it appears is real. This *superimposition* is known, in Vedānta as *Adhyāsa*.

Adhyāsa is the mal-observation, due to ignorance, of something and the extension of a false idea to an actual appearance. It is simply the misjudgment of the given, presented to the senses, by a preconceived idea. It has a temporary value so long as the subject is under the delusion. The main character of Adhyāsa is not to reveal the full truth as it is, but a partial aspect of it. It reveals partial aspects of both reality and unreality. It is neither absolute ignorance nor absolute knowledge of the thing. Ajñān (Ignorance) which is the cause of Adhyāsa, covers up the reality of an object and shows what it is not. It cannot shut up from our view the fact in toto ; but it can do so partially so that there can be no difficulty in understanding that the fact exists. It is just like the condition of the cloudy sky which prevents the sun from our sight, but nevertheless we feel the presence of the sun. Had adhyāsa been a case of absolute ignorance, the question of reality would not have arisen in that case, and it would not have been called Adhyāsa even. The common illustration of सर्परज्जुभ्रम, i.e., the illusory perception of a snake in

place of a rope may be given here. Here also the substratum — rope, is real in the empirical world. It is only the attribution of the snake-hood upon the substratum **अधिष्ठान** which is false. Not that the reality of the object in Adhyāsa is unknown to us ; *it is known but wrongly known*. Interpretation of its nature is false. Another characteristic of adhyāsa, the mistaken notion is not to be supposed as existing in the mind ; it becomes identified with the thing observed. The sense of externality is there, inasmuch as consciousness, according to Vedānta, while perceiving takes the form of the external object, either real or unreal. Nor this adhyāsa is to be taken as memory-image which is revived by the laws of similarity and association. Hence avidyā (nescience) or ajnān, is the cause of this adhyāsa. It not only conceals the real nature of the thing, but also holds up before us a false appearance which, as appearance, has a meaning to the perceiver only—though it is characterised by localisation and objectification. This is what Samkara means by adhyāsa **स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः** (B. S. Adhyāsa Bhāṣya) i.e. ‘the apparent presentation, in the form of remembrance,\* to consciousness of something previously observed, in some other thing.’ Samkara had defined adhyāsa as **अतस्मिंस्तद्वद्भिः** (B.S. Adhyāsa Bhāṣya) i.e., the notion of something in some other thing.

\*The literal translation of **परत्र** is ‘in some other place’. Here we should not confound the theory of adhyāsa as memory-image, with Samkara’s view, as we have already mentioned. The word **स्मृतिरूपः** (in the form of remembrance) is added, Bhāmati remarks, ‘in order to exclude those cases where something previously observed is recognised in some other thing or place.’

Vedānta maintains that the bondage of the self is due to the mutual superimposition, i.e. the erroneous identification of the *self* and the *not-self*. But we may ask : how is it possible ? How can the *self* and the *not-self* through *adhyāsa* be identified with each other ? The *self* and the *not-self*, according to the Vedānta, are of opposite nature—they are of contradictory characters. One falls within the sphere of the idea “I” (अहम्) and the other “thou” (युष्मत्). How can these two contradictory ideas remain in the same mind ? It is not the one thinks himself as “I” and his opponent takes him to be “thou” in which case the identity might be possible. But for one and the same mind it is impossible to take both the ideas for one thing at the same time. Further, it may be asked : in what sense can the *self* and *not-self* be understood, so that they may stand identical ?

Taking one of them as the object of both ideas i.e. of ‘I’ and ‘thou’, we commit the fallacy स्वरूपासिद्धि i.e. the fallacy of employing a reason which is not present in the subject of the inference. Nor can it be maintained as the alternative suggestion that the *self* is the object of the ‘I-idea’ and the *not-self*, the object of the ‘thou-idea’ in that case it involves the fallacy called भागासिद्धि: i.e. the reason employed is not present in the subject of the inference in its whole extent for some non-selves viz., the body, the sense-organs, the vital airs etc. are not the object of ‘thou-idea’ i.e. nobody calls them as ‘thou’. Moreover the *self* of Vedānta also cannot be the object of the ‘I-idea’. Hence in no sense of the *self* and the *non-self* can *adhyāsa* be possible.

Similar is the difficulty with the स'सर्गाध्यास—*adhyāsa* of connection i.e. the superimposition of the attributes of the one upon those of the other. How can there be *adhyāsa* of the

attributes independently of their substrates? Even in the case of seeing the redness in the crystal owing to the nearness of the red Japa (Hibiscus) flower what we perceive in the crystal is not redness by itself but redness belonging to the flower which is reflected in the crystal. Attributes are quite unthinkable without having any reference to the substance to which they belong. Hence no adhyāsa of the attributes by themselves is even possible. And evidently ज्ञानाध्यास i.e. the cognitional adhyāsa is out of question inasmuch as it can not take place without the adhyāsa of things.

Now, all such objections have been elaborately discussed and dealt with by Vidyāranya (Madhavāchārya) in the first chapter of his illustrious book, "Vivaranaprāmeyasamgraha". Some of his main considerations may be put in brief :—Strictly speaking he maintains, the self is not the object of 'I-idea' but still it can be said that as we are most clearly aware of it in the organ of egoity, it may itself, in a secondary or metaphysical sense be designated as the object of the 'I-idea.' Though the ideas 'I' and 'thou' are contradictory, since one is the subject (विषयी) and the other is object (विषय,) yet this contradiction will not be in conflict with immediate experience. For, what Vedānta means by the contrariety of nature here, is 'the incapability on the part of two things, of either being the self of (i.e. becoming identical with) the other, such as, the relation is between the 'being' and 'not-being' (भावाभाववत् परस्परालम्बना सामर्थ्याभावसङ्गणस्य विरोधस्यैव विवक्षितत्वात् ), Ibid P.10). And it is in this sense that light and darkness can reside in the same room, just as heat and coldness can abide together. It is a matter of experience that in a faintly lighted room darkness does abide with light. Hence the iden-

tification of the not-self with the self is quite possible. In the case of erroneous cognition 'this is silver' where in fact shell is there, the two distinct things shell and silver, although really quite incapable of identity, are nevertheless cognised as identical. We may thus urge that the whole of our empirical knowledge is also a kind of error. Further, we can not give a rational explanation of *Adhyāsa*. The Vedantic doctrine of *Anirvacanivavāda* proves that no sufficient logic can be applied in this mysterious effect of the mysterious cause—*nescience*. The phenomenal world is a mass of non-rationality, and is thus throughout inexplicable and indefinable. Vedānta does not accept it as absolutely real, since it contradicts reason. Nevertheless, it asserts by reason a definite causal factor of this *Adhyāsa*. With all its inexplicable character the existence of the principle of illusion is a fact. It is somehow or other associated with what constitutes the reality of the world. The similarity between the self and the *not-self* may be established on the basis of the self possessing the attribute of being a thing just as we identify an attribute, for instance, the smell of an object with that of another. Moreover, it is not necessary that similarity is always to be present for the occurrence of *adhyāsa*. Illusion is possible without similarity; and the illustration of *काचकामलादिदोष*, i.e. the perception of a man suffering from jaundice etc is obvious in this respect.

Another important factor to be noted in this connection is that Vedānta emphatically asserts the possibility of a subjective superimposition. In the erroneous perception of the snake we have the experience of *adhyāsa* which is the identity between the real rope and the unreal snake. In this case one *has become the other in the sense of complete oneness*—

**ईतरितरत्वमत्यन्तैकत्वमापादयैवाध्यासस्वीकारात्** (*ibid* P. 14).

Next, on the basis of the fact of our experiences, Vedānta

ascertains the positive existence of its cause. There must be some cause of such an appearance which is an action inasmuch as every action or appearance must have a cause or agent to make it appear so and not otherwise. We may explain the reason for this demand in reference to the *Law of Causation*, *Law of Sufficient Reason*. And this cause must be *Ajñān* and why? Because, Vedānta argues, on the analysis of an illusory piece of knowledge we find that the true knowledge of the thing under perception removes adhyāsa, so we can legitimately assert that *ajñān* or ignorance is the cause of this illusion and not otherwise. We can not think of anything else as the cause. And *ajñān* must be the material cause of adhyāsa. Such a cause has been assumed on the ground that the effect adhyāsa and its material cause must have one and the same substratum.

Now then, what must be the nature of this *Ajñān*? The whole of the endeavour of Vedānta lies in meeting the various objections of the opponent schools against establishing *ajñān* as a *positive entity*. The notion of darkness for Vedānta is not to be understood in the sense of the *negation of light*. Darkness is a positive entity having a positive character of its own. If we mean it as something negative then the question will arise whether it is the absence of light as such (अलोकमवभावात्) or of some one light or of all lights. But in the first two alternative vedānta holds, we cannot distinguish whether darkness is the previous non-existence or reciprocal non-existence or an emergent non-existence. For in a 'sun-lit place if a lamp is lighted and extinguished after a moment we can not have the perception of darkness either before the lamp was lighted or after the lamp has been extinguished. And the third alternative implies that darkness does not depart unless all lights be brought to bear on it. Hence, we may conclude that darkness is neither an absence



of light nor a non-existent entity—it is a positive substance. So also is the case with Ajnān which is a positive *entity* and not a mere negation of knowledge.

Further according to the Vedāntic theory of knowledge the negation of knowledge as such i.e. the positive ajnan, is known by an act of immediate apprehension through *Sākshi* or the witnessing consciousness, while the absence of knowledge of particular object e.g. absence of the jar on the table, is known by the individual percipient through अनुपलब्धि । And this is possible because the 'I-Consciousness' which is the substrate for cognition, *its object* and *ajnan* all these three according to this theory, are the objects of *Sākshi*. This *Sākshi* proves ajnan as it does the substrate and the object, and does not put an end to it. What it does is simply a '*cognitional energy of the internal organ*. तच्चित्तकं त्वन्तः-करणवृत्तिज्ञानमेव ।

But such a cognition of the latter kind never exists when we are conscious of not knowing of a particular judgment—'I know not the jar'. The jar by itself cannot be the object of *sākshi*, but in so far as it possesses the attribute of 'not-being-known', it enters into the relation of *Sākshi*. Hence Velānta maintains that all things are objects of *Sākshi*—either as known or as unknown. But this must not be misunderstood and maintained that there is no difference between the objects known and the objects unknown. Vidyāranya says यदज्ञातत्वधर्मं स्वविषये संपादय तस्य साक्षिणा सम्बन्धं घटयति, तद्वत् प्रमाणमपि ज्ञातत्वं धर्मं स्वविषये संपादय तस्य साक्षिणा सम्बन्धवृत्तकमित्यङ्गीकारेणोक्त दोषनिवृत्तेः (*ibid* P. 17) i.e. in the same way as ajnan imparts to its object (i.e. the thing-not-known) the attribute of known-being-known and thereby

mediates the connection of the object with the Sakshi, so a means of knowledge imparts to its object the attribute of being known, and in this way puts it in connection with the Sakshi. This view entirely discards such a misunderstanding.

Sūsūpti or the state of deep dreamless sleep is a favourite illustration of the proof of this positive character of ajnān. After getting up from such a sleep we very often hear a man say—**सुखमहम् साधुम् एतावन्तं कालं नाहं किञ्चिदवेदिषम्**, 'I had a good sleep, so long I knew nothing'. Now this is a case of remembrance. Because the man who says this, is not sleeping now, simply he is saying from the remembrance of what he perceived in sleep. So it proves that there is an object for this remembrance. Remembrance without any object of which it is the remembrance, is meaningless. Thus remembrance is always a remembrance of something previously experienced. Hence it follows that the object of which it is the remembrance and the remembrance itself must be of the one and the something. Here the object of this remembrance—'I know nothing', is surely a positive ajnan and not **ज्ञानाभाव** ! Had it been so i. e. if it were the negation of knowledge, the Vedāntin argues, then this negation (**ज्ञानाभाव**) would have been experienced in susupti. But in that case the speaker could not speak out as 'I know nothing'. The version 'I know nothing' is a negative one of which he has a positive knowledge. Further, in order to have the knowledge of **अभाव** of anything the knowledge of the counter-entity (**प्रतियोगी**) of the something and the knowledge of its substrate (**अधिकरण**) are necessary, but there can not be any such knowledge in Susupti. Had there been such, then it would not have remained a state of sleep. The knowledge of such counter-entity and substrate means that the man is in the waking

state. Moreover how can a man know both presence and absence of a thing at the same time ?

Now, this ajnan has two characteristics—one is *āvarana* by which it obscures the reality of the object and the other is *vikṣepa* by which it shows a thing opposite to its character. It is also to be noted that ajnān does not cover the not-self. Firstly, because, if ajnān is to obscure the not-self then the latter is to exist before ajnān ; but as a matter of fact the not-self itself is an effect produced by ajnān. How can it be previous to ajnān ? Secondly the term 'obscured' in the proper sense of the term can be meant only that which has its nature as light. Such is the nature of the self but not the not-self. Hence ajnān has its locus **आश्रय** and object **विषय** the self. But here the objection can be raised as to how ajnān can rest in the self which is Pure Consciousness ? Here there is difference of opinion among the Vedāntins also as to the seat and object of ajnān. According to Vācaspatiṁsira Jiva is the seat of ajnān and Brahman the object, whereas according to others of whom the author of Vivarana, is one, Jiva being the effect of Ajnān, cannot be the seat of the cause. Hence Brahman is both seat and object of ajnān. However, in accepting Brahman, the pure consciousness as its seat also, we do not find any difficulty. Because Brahman is the substrate of all things. Brahman is not the **विरोधी** of ajnān. Our **वृत्तिज्ञान** is the **विरोधी** of ajnān. Pure consciousness (**शुद्धचेतनम्**) by itself does not stand in the way of ajnān. There are two kinds of ajnān **मुला**, and **तुला** i.e. (primary and secondary). In the primary ajnān all other secondary ones rest. When ajnān of some part of the not-self is removed by its real knowledge e.g. as the erroneous perception of snake is by the knowledge of the rope, the special illusory projection concerned is refunded in its causal substance—the

primary and general ajnān. And this ajnān can be removed by the supreme cognition of the ब्रह्माकारवृत्ति ।

The supposition of ajnān as the cause of adhyāsa also logically follows from the very nature of adhyāsa. Adhyāsa, being itself an unreal effect presupposes its cause as equally unreal. Otherwise had its cause been any real entity then adhyāsa as its effect would be real. The body, the sense organs, the internal organ and the so called entire external world are all mere fictitious superimpositions upon the Reality—the Universal consciousness.

Thus our discussion may be concluded giving a full definition of Adhyasa in its two aspects—one consists in one thing presenting itself as another and the other as something false.

‘Adhyāsa has a double aspect ; it is a thing (वस्तु) particularised by a cognition (ज्ञान) and a cognition particularised by thing. Of adhyāsa viewed as thing the definition is as follows : Adhyāsa is a thing similar to some thing remembered, which presents itself to consciousness as constituting the self (reality) of another thing ; and the ज्ञानाध्यास is the presentation to consciousness of one thing as another—such presentation being similar to remembrance”.

Thus the theory suggests that it is the main adhyāsa of the identity of the Self and the Not-Self which is the cause of our empirical existences. So all the means of proof are also rooted in adhyāsa. They are valid within the empirical sphere but not beyond it. This Vedāntic theory of adhyāsa which is based upon Scriptures and reasoning is also another adhyāsa since it is other than Brahman. But still it, Vedānta emphasises, has the power of conveying a knowledge of Brahman—the Reality. Just as an insubstantial dream vision foro-

tells something real so also Vedānta which is unreal can give us the glimpse of the Reality. वेदान्तानां चात्यन्तावध्वविषयत्वात्तत्त्वावेदकप्रमास्यमुचितं । (स्वयं मिथ्याभूता अपि अवोधं बोधयन्तेव सप्रकामिनीसन्दर्शनादौ मिथ्याभूते पि वास्तव्येयः सुचकत्वदर्शनात् । ) [ Ibid : p. 87 ]

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# **The Relation of Knower to Known.**

**By**

**S. C. CHATTERJEE.**

In this paper we propose to discuss some modern realistic theories of the relation between knowledge and its object. Modern realists are united in their opposition to idealism, though they differ among themselves as to their theory of knowledge. With regard to the specific question of the relation between knowledge and its object, different realists give different answers. The American neo-realists adhere to the old theory of natural realism in so far as they hold that knowledge is directly related to its object and that all objects of knowledge are independent of the knowing mind. But in their anxiety to ensure the independence of objects they reduce knowledge or consciousness to a collection of objects defined by the specific response of the nervous system. Even the objects of erroneous experience like illusion are held to be as objective as real things, although they do not, like the latter, exist but only subsist. The distinction between the existent and the subsistent is the neo realist's special contribution to old realism, which is calculated to meet the objections brought against it. If all that is experienced is objective and belongs to real things, we have to explain how contrary characters like red and green, or contradictory ones like the real and the unreal can belong to the same thing as they seem to do when we consider the different experiences that different individuals may have of it. The neo-realist explanation is that contrary or contradictory characters belong to the same thing in the same way in which opposite forces are held in equilibrium or mirrored objects are in the same space with other

real objects. But it is doubtful if the neo-realist theory is really more satisfactory than the old theory of natural realism. In its attempt to overcome the difficulties of the old theory it makes certain assumptions which in effect entangles it in the same or perhaps greater difficulties. If 'everything that is, is and is as it is', we have to admit that the same thing is both red and green at the same time, since it may be perceived to be such by different perceivers. That a thing may be red and green at different parts of it we can easily understand. And that the same part of it may be *seen* as red and green by different persons in different bodily conditions is also intelligible to us only if we grant that the perceived colours are relative to the sensibility of the perceivers. But that such contrary characters belong to the thing itself independently of the perceiving minds is something which we can hardly understand. The instances of objective contradiction cited by the neo realist do not really prove the co-presence of opposite characters in the same thing. When two equally strong forces act on a body from opposite directions and keep it at rest, we cannot say that it actually moves up and down at the same time. What happens is that the opposed forces neutralise each other and leave the body in a state of rest. We do not see how under such circumstances the same thing may be said to have two contradictory or even contrary characters. The neo-realist's invention of the world of subsistents to secure the independence of illusory objects appears to be a makeshift which does not really serve its purpose. What we have to explain in sensory illusion is the perception of an unreal character in a thing, which appears as an *existent physical* character of it. This however cannot be explained by the fabrication of any *subsistent* characters which are non-existent and *non-physical*. The example of mirrored objects, which are said to occupy the same spatial positions with other real objects behind the mirror, does not really support the neo-

realist's case. Mirrored objects are none other than the physical objects reflected in the mirror. They are not separate entities which occupy the space of the mirror. If they were really so, they must be physical and not etherial like the neo-realist's subsistents. Further, if all the characters perceived be any knower really belong to the things known, there can be no reason for our treating any knowledge as erroneous. Rather, we will have to admit that illusion is as good as any true perception and that we are wrong in supposing illusion to be illusory. Finally, the neo-realist's attempt to explain consciousness as a cross-section of the universe is as futile as it is absurd. If consciousness be but a collection of objects made by the specific response of the nervous system, it should appear as 'out there' in the external world and not as within the organism. In truth, however, consciousness cannot be such a collection of objects. The organism may specifically respond to different objects at different times. But to become *conscious* of any of these objects or of a collection of them all, it must be either endowed with mental qualities or intimately connected with the mind. Instead of saying that consciousness is a collection of objects, we should say that any collection of objects requires a conscious mind. The craze for objectivity in all matters, which is so characteristic of American neo-realism, has perhaps laid it open to more serious charges than the common-sense realism of old<sup>1</sup>.

In critical Realism, which is another important school of modern realism, the problem of the relation between knowledge and its object is approached neither from the objective standpoint of natural realism nor from the subjective standpoint of dualistic realism. According to it, the data of knowledge, or what are directly given in experience, are not the objects or the qualities of objects as is held by the natural and the new

1. For an account of neo-realism, *vide The New Realism*.



realists. Nor are they ideas or other states of the mind as the dualistic realist suppose. Critical realism differs from neo-realism on certain fundamental points.<sup>2</sup> Unlike the latter, it holds that knowledge is a relation between mind and external objects mediated through certain data or given appearances. It is not, as some neo-realists hold, a relation between the brain or the nervous system and some independent object. It holds also that knowledge is not directly related to the thing known in the sense that the data of knowledge are actual portions or qualities of the thing itself. The data, or what we directly get when we know anything, are certain character-complexes or logical essences which are not identical with, but may also be, the characters of the thing known. In the case of secondary qualities, however, the data of knowledge cannot be the characters of things. But the hypothesis of character-complexes interposed between the knowing mind and the known thing constitutes at once the strength and the weakness of critical realism. This makes it allied to the position of epistemological dualism with its concomitant doctrine of representationism or the 'copy theory of ideas'. While it may help the critical realist to explain the facts of error and illusion, it seriously handicaps him in the attempt to explain true knowledge of things. The character-complexes are logical universals, while the things are spatio-temporal particulars. If this be so, we do not see how any character-complex can also be a character of the thing. If the character-complexes are to be also the characters of things, they must somehow be spatio-temporal entities which, *ex-hypothesi*, they are not. Hence our knowledge of things cannot but be indirect and representative in character. What things are we can never directly know. We must always know them through the data or character-complexes which appear immediately before our

2. *Vide Essays in critical Realism.*

mind. But in the absence of a direct knowledge of things at some point, we cannot even be sure that any knowledge truly represents any thing or that there is any independent world of things at all. In fact, the critical realist also admits that the existence of the independent world of objects is only pragmatically justifiable, but not logically deducible from the character-complexes given in experience. He, however, makes an inconsistent compromise with realism and leaves the world of things on an insecure basis of instinctive faith. It would have been perhaps more consistent for him to say that the world of objects is a construction of the mind from certain given experiences and with a view to meet the needs of our practical life. He virtually admits the basic principles of such a view of the world when he says that the data of knowledge (which do not exist) appear 'out there' in space because they are so *imagined* by the mind and that the truth of knowledge is to be tested by the harmony of different experiences, and finally refuses to risk any theory with regard to the ultimate nature of reality.

Among British neo-realists Samuel Alexander formulated a theory of knowledge which occupies an intermediate position between American neo-realism on the one hand, and critical realism on the other. It agrees with the former in holding that knowledge is directly related to its object, but differs from it in according distinct reality to mind or consciousness. And while it agrees with critical realism with regard to the reality of mind, it does not accept the critical realist's hypothesis of character-complexes as the necessary data of all knowledge. For Alexander, knowledge or cognition is not a unique relation, but an instance of the simplest and most universal of all relations. Knowledge is just the compresence between mind and an external object. Any knowledge may be analysed into two terms and their relation to one another. The terms are

the act of mind or the awareness and the object of which it is aware ; and the relation between them is that they are together or compresent in the world of experience.<sup>3</sup> The object of knowledge is independent of the mind. It is true that the object cannot be known without a mind to know it. But from this we should not conclude that objects are dependent on the mind for their existence. What objects owe to mind is their being known, and not their being existent facts. The colour, pressure and other qualities of a thing are so many objects which exist in their native character in the thing itself independently of their being known by us. A thing is a synthesis of all the objects or appearances which it presents to the experiencing mind. But neither the objects nor their synthesis is made by the mind ; rather they are found in the thing itself. A thing is in itself a portion of Space-Time with a certain configuration and a plan of combination of its constituent motions. But for our experience it is a synthesis of appearances or a whole of presentations to the mind. There are real appearances, mere appearances as well as illusory appearances. Real appearances are parts or partial revelations of the thing to the mind, and they belong to the thing itself. These may vary according to the different positions of the same or different observers. Mere appearances are those which do not belong to the thing itself, but arise from its connection with other things. Illusory appearances are due neither to the thing nor to its relation to other things, but to the mind which introduces new objects into thing. All kinds of appearances are, as appearance, on the same level ; but while real and mere appearances belong to the things apprehended, illusory appearances do not so belong to them<sup>4</sup>. Hence

3. *Vide, Space, Time, and Deity*. Vol. I, p. 11 ; Vol. II, p. 82.

4. *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 105-6, 183f., 211f.

it is that we have error and illusion. One idea or belief is true when it is confirmed by the coherent body of standard beliefs and ideas established by social intercourse, while ideas which are incoherent with true ideas are false or erroneous. But the distinction between coherence and incoherence is ultimately determined by reality itself. It is by experience of reality and experiment on it that we distinguish between one group of ideas as true and the other as false. Thus truth and error are products of the social mind under the guidance of reality.<sup>5</sup>

Alexander's theory of the relation between knowledge and its object seems to combine two incompatible lines of thought. Sometimes he would frankly believe with the natural realist that knowledge is directly related to the thing known and apprehends its real characters. But in the actual working out of his theory he lapses at certain points into a sort of representationism which brings it nearer to critical realism. A thing, he tells us, is in itself a complexity of motions occupying a portion of Space-Time. The colour, pressure and other qualities of a thing are its appearances to the mind. These are called *real appearances* as distinguished from others which appear through its relation to other things and are therefore described as mere appearances. In addition to these too, there is a third kind of appearance which is said to be due to the mind and is therefore branded as illusory. But if knowledge be simply the compresence of the mind with the thing known and an awareness of it in its real characters, we do not see how anything but motions should have been perceived. The compresence of my face with a mirror (held before it) would give just an image of the face as it is. If there be any difference between the face and its image, then that must be

5. *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 251f.

accounted for by the mirror. Similarly, if the complexity of motions puts on such appearances as colour, touch, etc., in its relation to the mind, we are to say that the mind is not passively compresent with, but makes certain contributions to, the complexity of motions in order to constitute the concrete object of knowledge. Alexander concedes this point partially when he says that even the real appearance of a thing may vary relatively to the position of the observer. If it be held that the varying real appearances belong to the thing independently of the mind, we have to admit that a thing may have contrary and even contradictory characters, which we have already seen to be logically indefensible. Further, when Alexander speaks of a thing as a *synthesis* of all its appearances to the mind, it is implied that the thing is a construction of the mind on the basis of certain given presentations. A synthesis of different experiences so as to constitute one thing can hardly be explained by anything but the synthetic activity of the experiencing mind. In the case of illusory appearances it is explicitly admitted by Alexander that they are due to the introduction of foreign characters into a thing by the mind. This however does not accord very well with his other view that a thing is a synthesis of *all* its appearances and that the synthesis is not made but discovered by the mind. To be consistent with his general position in philosophy one should say that the objects of knowledge are constructed by the mind out of certain sensations produced by different kinds of motions in Space and Time. This will be more in harmony with his account of truth and error as products of the social mind. If all objects of knowledge are regarded as synthesis of experiences brought about by the mind, we can understand how knowledge will be true when it coheres with established social ideas and beliefs, and how otherwise it will become erroneous. If, however, objects are as they appear independently of our mind, it must be correspondence to the object and not the

coherence of experiences that is to determine the truth or falsity of knowledge.

We are thus led to a view of the relation between knowledge and its objects, which is different from the realistic theories discussed above. For us knowledge is not constituted by its objects in the sense that one object like the table is known when it is related to another object like the brain or the nervous system. Knowledge implies the relation of an object to some mind which is distinct from it. The relation between the two is not mediated by any data like the critical realist's character-complexes which may or may not be the characters of the thing known. There is actually no evidence for the appearance of such logical essences in between the knowing mind and the known thing. Rather, we should say that the data which appear before the mind are the constituents of the thing as known. Knowledge may thus be said to be directly related to its object. This however does not mean that in knowledge the mind is passively compresent with and aware of objects which possess the presented data independently of their relation to mind. On the other hand, we maintain that the data or appearances owe it to the mind that they are parts or constituents of the known object. An object like the orange is constituted by certain visual, tactual and other data, so related among themselves as to make a definite whole. We may also say that the orange is a synthesis, in a particular form, of certain visual, tactual and other qualities. But apart from relation to some mind like ours there would be no synthesis of these sensible qualities so as to constitute one object called orange. Visual, tactual or other qualities, taken in isolation, are unmeaning and inarticulate sensations which stand for no actual object of knowledge. The objects we know are not such blind sensations, taken severally or collectively. On the other hand, they are definite wholes of parts or significant syntheses of certain presentations. Hence we say that

an object is a construction of the mind conditioned by certain sense impressions. The objects of knowledge are not mere sensations, but what the mind *means* by its sensations. Some times we see faces on a distant wall where there are a few irregular pencil marks. All of us enjoy the beauty of the landscape exhibited by the cinematograph. These cases fairly illustrate the way in which the mind can construct objects out of given presentations by imputing certain meanings to them. But the distinction between real objects on the one hand, and unreal or illusory objects on the other, is that while in the former the meanings are, for reasons we cannot discuss here, universal and necessary, in the latter they are peculiar to the individual himself or to the society in which he lives. Thus knowledge will be true or false according as its objects are real or unreal in this sense. All objects of knowledge however are constructed by the mind in some sense or other. We conclude, therefore, that knowledge is not, as the neo-realist would say, constituted by its object, but that the object is constituted by the knowing of it.

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# **What a Thing is In Itself**

By

**K. R. SREENIVASA IYENGAR**

Before trying to answer this question, it may be said, a prior question which is more insistent needs to be considered in this connection, viz., whether things have an intrinsic nature of their own at all. The logic of substance and attributes and of primary and secondary qualities in the empiricist school, the epistemology of sense-data and of essences in the realist schools, the metaphysics of event and occasion in Whitehead's system, and various other similar doctrines in the history of philosophy, no less than the theory of the radiation and electronic constitution of matter in recent science, may all seem to render otiose or impossible the very conception of a "thing" or an "object" as a persistent entity having an identical nature of its own. But this is a large question into which it is not possible to enter in this connection. My present task is the humbler one of assuming on an empirical basis some sort of a substantial, persisting or "enduring object" and then asking, with



reference to such an object, what, if anything, constitutes its intrinsic nature, and how this intrinsic nature is to be distinguished from its extrinsic characters.

The *locus classicus* for the distinction of intrinsic and extrinsic characters is Moore's discussion of the subject in his *Philosophical Studies*. (Ch. VIII, pp. 261-275.) He begins by saying that the phrase "having a different intrinsic nature" is not equivalent to the phrase "intrinsically different" or "having different intrinsic properties." For he thinks that two things may be exactly alike and still they may be intrinsically different and have different intrinsic properties, merely because they are two. Their numerical difference itself constitutes an intrinsic difference between them and each will have at least one intrinsic property which the other has not got, viz., that of being identical with itself. To say therefore that two things have different intrinsic natures should imply not only that they are numerically different but also that they are *not exactly alike*.

Moore is evidently distinguishing here between the intrinsic properties which are intrinsic in the sense that they depend solely on the intrinsic nature of what possesses them and that intrinsic nature of the thing itself. We shall have to revert to this distinction in a subsequent connection.

Next Moore tells us that intrinsic difference is not the same as qualitative difference either. He admits that all qualitative difference is difference in intrinsic nature, but contends that all intrinsic difference is not qualitative. For two things may possess the same quality in different degrees and yet or consequently be intrinsically different; for instance, a loud sound and a soft one, or two things of different sizes, or a yellow circle with a red centre and a yellow circle with a blue centre, although not these wholes but only single elements of it are qualitatively different—a case, says Moore, which can

only loosely be called a difference in quality. Now in regard to these examples, it must be observed that if a loud sound and a soft one, or a big stone and a small one, cannot be said to be qualitatively different, i.e., if loudness and size are not qualities, much less can two circles with differently coloured spots in the middle be said to be identical in quality. To avoid this absurdity, we should have to say that if as is admitted, two such patches differ in intrinsic nature, this is because they differ in quality, *any* difference in quality—not necessarily qualitative difference throughout constituting difference in intrinsic nature <sup>1</sup> And if, as Moore contends, it is true that the difference between a big and a small stone is a difference in intrinsic nature but still not in quality, then we should have to say that the intrinsic nature of a thing includes quantity also in addition to its quality. Quality of course includes colour as well.

Moore seems to be satisfied with distinguishing intrinsic difference from numerical and qualitative differences in order to determine the intrinsic nature of a thing. What about form and shape? Consider, *e.g.*, two coins one made of copper round in shape, the other made of bronze square in shape. It is evident that so far as shape is concerned there is a difference in the intrinsic nature of the two coins in the sense that any coin which was round in precisely the same manner as the given coin would *necessarily* or *must* always, under all circumstances, possess in virtue of its roundness certain properties which another coin, which was square in precisely the same manner as the other given coin was round, could not in virtue of its squareness possess. Likewise differences in form refer to the internal structural constitution of the two coins, the arrangement of their particles which makes the one a copper coin and the other a coin in bronze and these differences of

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1. *Vide, The Right and the Good*; Ross, p. 117.

form are certainly differences in intrinsic nature in the sense that any coin made of copper would *necessarily* or *must* always possess certain properties (chemical and mechanical) which a coin made of bronze could not possess. Not that formal differences are not always identical with qualitative differences. Bronze differs from copper in quality in-as-much as it is an alloy of copper and tin ; but the difference in form consists in that the internal or objective structure of its particles is necessarily different from that of the particles of copper. Ice and water again are qualitatively identical but formally different.

We have so far said then that the intrinsic nature of an object is to be determined by its quality (including colour), quantity (including both volume and weight), form and shape. An objection might be raised in this connection that we are taking the whole object the quantity, quality, form and shape included—as representing its intrinsic nature. If the object whole and entire is thus to be viewed, it might be said, what is left to form the extrinsic nature of an object ? Should we not look to something ulterior or more ultimate in the object which might give us its intrinsic nature ? The objection appears to be legitimate and that brings us to consider the question of relations. Have relations no place in the determination of the intrinsic nature of an object ? Relations are of three kinds : the relation of an object to objects other than it and its elements, the relation of the object as a whole to its own parts, and the relation of the parts to one another. I should at once hasten to explain that the mention of relations in this connection need not arouse any anxiety in the reader's mind that we are plunging into a discussion either of Whitehead's theory of prehensions or of the time-honoured distinction of substance and qualities. For our purpose we may, as I said, assume on an empirical basis the reality of given particular things each unique after its kind : I can make nothing out of the doctrine that a

particular thing has no being of its own, but is merely a unity of the aspects of other things having no definite spatial and temporal location of its own, that the world consists of nothing else but relations which are not relations between things.

The relation of an object to objects other than it and its elements is, I think, pre-empted, by the very conception of the *intrinsic* nature of an object which we are investigating, from finding a place in that nature. However important and unique such a relation may be, it yet is not part of what an object is "in itself". Cook Wilson who discusses this relationship in connection with the problem of substance and attribute, says 'that while an orange was in itself yellow and round' its being on the table we should not call "what it is in itself".<sup>2</sup> But in the case of a reality whose being is entirely constituted by relation to something else, say, the movement of a body we have to say that its relation to the body is part of what it is in itself, though its relation to another movement of the same body, or to the movement of another body, would again be excluded from what it is in itself.

The relation of the parts of a thing to one another need not be brought into our account of what a thing is in itself over and above its quantity, quality, form etc., for such a relation is but the internal structure of the parts, the objective arrangement of its particles etc., whereby the thing is determined to have such and such properties (both chemical and mechanical) and so it falls under the category of form.

The relation of the whole to its parts or elements, however, stands on a different footing. There are of course wholes of different kinds—physical such as a table, a violin etc., organic such as a human body, a plant etc., aesthetic (under which I include the intellectual also) such as a poem, a scenery an argument or a system of thought etc., and moral or spiritual

such as a community, an association, a life as a whole etc. The analysis so far given of what a thing is in itself applies pre-eminently to physical wholes though mental and moral wholes are not excluded from it. The argument that I shall now present in regard to the question whether the relation of a whole to its parts (which involves also the correlative relation of the parts to the whole) enters into the determination of what a thing is in itself, applies more particularly to organic, aesthetic and moral wholes than to physical. Nevertheless it does apply to the physical also.

Every object in the universe has a certain end, a purpose, or function set before it whose realisation is "according to nature" and constitutes the destiny of that object. But every object is a complex entity, a whole in which we may distinguish some part or parts which alone are fitted to express the characteristic function of that object from other parts which are more or less accessory to such fulfilment of function by the former parts. The primary purpose of a knife is to cut, and while the blade is the part which expresses this characteristic function, the handle, the fissure in the handle, the ring attached to it, etc., are only accessory to the proper fulfilment of function by the blade. If rational activity is the unique function of man, then mind alone is capable of expressing that function, but for its proper functioning a material organism with the senses etc., is doubtless a necessity. A musical mode (*rāga*) has certain characteristic notes called *jīvaswaras* (in Indian music), and while these express the soul of the tune, the other notes serve as its vestment. A painting is intended to express a certain sentiment (*rasa*) which is its life, but it can be expressed only through a certain disposition of line and colour, light and shade etc., which serve as its body. Likewise we can distinguish between a thesis and its supporting considerations in the development of an

argument. The goal of social life is self-realisation, let us say ; and while liberty is the constitutive element in society which achieves that destiny, law is the accessory element which provides the necessary atmosphere in which liberty can function fruitfully and more effectively.

It is unnecessary to multiply examples. The subordinate parts of a whole are no doubt equally essential with the constitutive parts to the making of the whole and both co-operate to achieve the destiny of the whole ; but the nature, the essence, of the whole is expressed chiefly by the constitutive parts. The knife is the blade primarily, a man is his mind essentially, social and moral life are largely the life of freedom. In all these and similar cases the constitutive part or parts may be said to stand for what a thing is "in itself." What a thing is in itself is what it is in its *existence*, in its constitutive nature, that without which a knife would not be knife, man would not be man etc. This is its intrinsic nature. The subsidiary parts are those which help to make the thing what it is as it appears, in its *existence*. When we talk of the relation of the whole to its parts, we mean or ought to mean this relation of the constitutive to the subsidiary parts for otherwise there is no whole, over and above the unity of the parts, which can be said to stand in relation to the parts. This relation of the whole to the parts is what may be called ontological involvement. Likewise there is no relation of the parts to the whole, but only of some parts to the rest of the whole, and this relation in this case of the subsidiary to the constitutive parts, may be called dependence.

I should hasten to correct one possible misunderstanding of my position. The unity of the parts certainly engenders a life of the whole which is richer, and in every sense higher, than the life of the parts individually as shown by the fact

that while the thing as such—i. e., as a whole—is relatively independent of other things, any part i. e., an attribute-element, say, the point of a needle, e. g.,—can exist only as an element in a thing, and is not conceivable otherwise. But to say that this stands in a relation to the parts is incorrect, for it is nothing apart from the unity of the parts *qua* unity, and this unity is inconceivable apart from the parts. The unity and the parts which make up the unity do not exist as two separate facts, and though the unity has a life richer than the life of the parts individually, the case is not similar to the formation of water out of hydrogen and oxygen, for in this latter the constituents do not exist as parts of a whole, but have disappeared entirely giving rise to a novel existent altogether. If however, it be insisted that the unity *qua* unity is different from the parts and as such must stand in some cognisable relation to the parts, we can say that the whole *embraces* the parts or ‘informs’ them or that it intrigues them to enter into a union. But these are only metaphors. Moreover, what we are in search of, it must be remembered, is what the thing is “in itself” and the thing in itself is certainly not the thing as it is in its unity, i. e., in all its developed complexity of relations both internal and external. If the full-fledged self-realised thing were in question, we need not have asked at all what the thing was “in itself.” The thing in itself is the constitutive part which is the thing’s intrinsic nature ; the thing as it appears i. e., exists is the fully developed unity of the constitutive and the subordinate parts, their determinate existence, so to say.

It follows therefore that what a thing is in itself is neither the ideal, nor the average of the thing ; it is not the substance, the support of the attributes ; it is not the subject as the bearer of the attribute elements (for the substance or the subject as at present understood, is simply the unity of the diverse

parts). It is rather the constitutive part or parts of a thing which alone though in conjunction with the accessory parts, are capable of truly expressing the inner meaning of the thing. From this standpoint, the form of the thing acquires a new significance, for the objective structure of a thing, philosophically speaking, is the objective meaning, the soul-significance, the intelligible essence, which it bears, and this is what it is *in itself*. It may also be described as the idea or the universal of the thing, and such a conception of the universal would afford an excellent explanation of the relation of the universal to the particular. It may as well be called substance or subject whose relation to qualities or attributes would thereby get illumined. But these are separate problems which do not call for discussion in this connection.

If the essence of an object, as determined by its constitutive parts, is its intrinsic nature, how is this conclusion to be reconciled with the one previously reached, viz., that the object whole and entire represents, its intrinsic nature? The intrinsic nature as represented by the object in its entirety is to be distinguished from its extrinsic characters acquired by it in relation to other such objects; relational properties in this sense do not form part of the intrinsic nature of an object. This is undoubtedly an important sense of the concept "intrinsic character". But when we are thinking of the object by itself out of relation to any other external object, surely the question of what constitutes the intrinsic or inner nature of the object is also important, and it is from this point of view that it is suggested here that the constitutive, as distinguished from the subsidiary, part or parts of a whole should be taken as representing its intrinsic character. Doubtless it would often be very difficult to determine what in this sense forms the constitutive element of a given object, but difficulties of empirical investigation ought not to stand in the way of



a logical distinction if it is found to be of help for a cleaner understanding of the nature of things.

If what a thing is in itself is what it is in its *essence* only, which is obviously different from what it is in its *existence*, a question arises as to whether this essence exists or not. In reply, it must be stated that logically speaking, it could exist by itself, but factually it always exists in conjunction with the subsidiary part. The subsidiary parts, while having an essence of their own, cannot exist at all, either logically or factually, except in unison with the constitutive,

It may be recalled that according to Moore, the intrinsic property of a thing needs to be distinguished from the intrinsic character of the thing upon which the property solely depends. But he does not point out how in any given case we have to distinguish the property from the intrinsic character. We have tried to analyse the intrinsic character of things. And this intrinsic character may have its own qualities which may be called the intrinsic *attributes* of the object, e.g., the sharpness of a blade, the qualities of a mind etc. The intrinsic *property* of an object is the property which it acquires in virtue of the union of the constitutive with the subordinate parts, e.g., the health and vitality of an organism, its alertness, the length, topical distribution and qualities of style of an essay, the elaboration (*ālāpanam*) of a musical note or melody-mould, the disposition of line and colour, light and shade, mass etc., in a painting, the social and moral institutions of a society etc. When two or more relatively independent objects as they exist enter into relation with one another, the properties which emerge out of the relation may be called emergent or consequential properties such as the properties of a molecule emerging out of the relatedness of atoms, the values of truth, beauty and goodness etc.

And finally a word about the kinds of necessity operative in the formation of the different kinds of whole. Moore is of opinion that the necessity by which, if one patch of colour is yellow or beautiful, another having the same intrinsic nature must be yellow or beautiful is neither a necessity of material implication, nor one of logical implication, nor one of causality even. It is a peculiar kind of necessity different from all the three sorts mentioned. I should suggest that the necessity by virtue of which if one coin is red or round another having the same intrinsic nature must be red or round is nothing but a logical necessity, for it refers to the attributes constituting the intrinsic nature of the object. The necessity which generates consequential properties out of the interrelation of two or more independent things is plainly a causal or empiric necessity whether it be of the natural or of the teleological order. But the necessity by virtue of which the constitutive part is joined to the subsidiary parts and thereby the thing in itself is converted into the thing as it appears, is truly neither causal merely nor logical solely, but partakes of the nature of both. That an organism is a union of body and mind, that a painting is an embodiment of a dominant sentiment (emotional tone, zest) in a particular combination of form and colour, that a given moral institution is the incarnation of a people's cultural soul-universal in their sociological space-time particular, are neither analytic nor synthetic propositions. The limits of this paper prohibit my discussing this question further, but I shall here content myself with observing that we have here a sense of "must" different from the causal or the logical. We can see neither a causal nor a logical necessity about such unions or syntheses.

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# The Elimination of Metaphysics

## Part II

By

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Let us now examine carefully the nature of metaphysical questions and assertions. We must distinguish here between what Carnap has called *object-questions* and *logical questions*.<sup>1</sup> Object-questions relate to objects (facts), their properties and relations in a particular domain, while logical questions do not refer (at any rate) directly to the objects but to sentences, terms, designations, theories etc., which themselves refer to object. For instance, in the domain of Botany the object questions are concerned with the characteristics and properties of the various plants and relations among them, the place of their abode, their habits etc., the logical questions, on the other hand, deal with the sentences which express the above facts, the logical character of the hypotheses which are relevant to it and so on. The logical questions are formal, whereas the object-questions express the proposition in the material mode.

It is difficult to keep these questions separate and in Philosophy they are invariably confused. What ought to be looked upon as logical questions or logical sentences are treated as object-questions and object-sentences and *vice versa*. As the sciences deal for the most part with object-sentences, there is less danger of confusion there; but Philosophy which pretends to deal with both kinds of questions is particularly exposed to it. The object questions with which Philosophy

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1. Carnap, Rudolf: Logical Syntax of Language P. 277.

deals are not to be found in the object domain of sciences ; this is particularly so in metaphysics whose problems and assertions turn out to be pseudo-problems and pseudo-object-sentences. For instance, metaphysics proceeds to deal with the thing-in-itself, the Absolute, the transcendental self, the ultimate cause, the Immortality of the Soul, etc, as if they were object-questions. It formulates them in the same way as the Physicist formulates his problems, say, about the analysis of light or sound or the constitution of atoms, or the pressure of air etc. Since the formulation takes on the same grammatical form, the metaphysician is not aware of any absurdity in it. He forgets that while the Physicist knows definitely the principles of the verification of his object-sentences, the metaphysician has no such legitimate device open to him. The logical analysis of the metaphysical problems shows that they have no proper object domain corresponding to them at all. On the contrary, the suppositional sentences of metaphysics are pseudo-sentences without any logical content. They seek to express certain feelings which in their turn are calculated to stimulate similar feelings and attitudes in the mind of the hearer. They have an emotive value but as statements aiming at logical precision they are singularly misleading and completely devoid of meaning. This is hidden from us by the ambiguity of words used in the formulation of the metaphysical sentences and by the inherent imperfection of the common language. Almost every word of the language as it is written or spoken has more than one meaning and quite a number of them have no definite meaning at all. Once this ambiguity is exposed and the words are adequately formulated and properly arranged from the syntactical point of view, it will not be difficult to realise the absurdity of the metaphysical assertions. It will then appear that the so-called object-sentences of metaphysics which pretend to refer to some transcendental domain

of their own are hypostatisations and cumbrous modes of linguistic expression, a mere 'word series' without significance.

For this purpose the most important principle of the logic of science (or scientific philosophy or Positive philosophy) is translatability of all object-sentences into their proper logical mode. 'Translatability of the material mode into the formal mode of speech is the criterion which distinguishes the logic of science from the speculations of metaphysics. In this way the logic of science would take the place, as Carnap puts it, 'of inextricable tangle of problems which is known as philosophy.'<sup>2</sup> By a *material mode of speech* is meant an expression which asserts a property of an object which has parallel to it another syntactical property, that is to say, 'when there is a syntactical property which belongs to a designation of an object if, and only if, the original property belongs to the object.'<sup>3</sup> The character of philosophical problems becomes clear when we learn to recognise a material mode of speech and to find its corresponding formal translation. The obscurity with regard to these problems is chiefly due to the failure to detect these material modes. 'The true situation is revealed by the translation of the sentences of the material mode of speech into the correlated syntactical sentences and thus into the formal mode.'<sup>4</sup> A material mode, however, is not always to be eliminated, for very often it is more easily expressed and is easier to understand. And, for this reason it may be expedient to retain it. But it is useful to be conscious of it so as to avoid pseudo-problems which otherwise result from it.

The material mode of speech is indicated in the occurrence

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2. Op Cit. p. 279

3. " " p. 287

4. " " p. 288

in an expression of designations of meaning, such as the use of words like : 'treats of,' 'speaks about,' 'means,' 'signifies,' 'names,' 'designates,' 'is a name for,' 'is known as etc.'<sup>5</sup>\* Such words foster the illusion that a genuine object-sentence is present in the expression and this illusion yields only on translation of the proposition into the formal mode. Let us consider a few examples given by Carnap.<sup>6</sup>

5. Op. Cit. p. 289

\* Or, in the use of what are called '*universal words*' such as 'thing,' 'object,' 'relation,' 'fact,' 'condition,' 'process,' 'event,' 'action,' 'spatial point,' 'space,' 'time,' 'member,' 'class,' 'function,' 'expression' etc. [A word is called a universal word if it expresses a property (or relation) which belongs analytically to all the objects of a genus, any two objects being assigned to the same genus if their designations belong to the same syntactical genus.] For example, thing is a universal word provided that the designations of things constitute a genus. In the word series "dog, animal, living creature, thing," every word is a more comprehensive predicate than the previous one, but only the last is a universal predicate.]

6. Op. Cit. p. 289.

	Material mode of Speech	Formal mode of Speech
1. Sentences with meaning-words.	1. Yesterday's lecture treated of Babylon.	1. In yesterday's lecture the word 'Babylon' (or a synonymous designation occurred.)
	2. The sentence S, means (asserts, has the content) that the moon is spherical.	2. S, is equipollent to the sentence "The moon is spherical."
	3. The particular sentence of Physics <i>states</i> the condition of a spatial point at a given time.	3. A particular sentence of Physics consists of a descriptive predicate and spatio-temporal coordinates as arguments.
	4. Charles said a sentence which means that Peter is coming tomorrow.	4. Charles said the sentence 'Peter is coming tomorrow' (or a sentence of which this is the consequence).
	5. Charles said a sentence which states where Peter is.	5. Charles said a sentence of the form 'Peter is—' in which a spatial designation takes the place of the dash.

Material mode of Speech	Formal mode of Speech
2. Sentences with <i>universal</i> words	6. 'Moon' is a thing- word (thing-name) five is not a thing- word but a number- word.
6. The moon is a <i>thing</i> ; five is not a thing, but a <i>number</i> .	7. An adjective (pro- perty word) is not a thing-word.
7. A property is not a thing.	8. 'Friendship' is a relation-word.
8. Friendship is a relation.	3. Philosophical sentences.
9. Numbers are classes of classes of things.	9. Numerical expres- sions are class- expressions of the second level.
10. A <i>thing</i> is a com- plex of sense data.	10. Every sentence in which a thing- designation occurs is equipollent to a class of sentences in which no thing- designation but sense-data designa- tion occurs.
11. A thing is complex of atoms.	11. Every sentence in which a thing-desig- nation occurs is equipollent to a sentence in which space time coordi- nates and certain descriptive function (of physics) occur.



Material mode of Speech	Formal mode of Speech
12. The world is the totality of facts, not of things.	12. Science is a system of sentences, not of names.
13. If I know an object then I also know all the possibilities of its occurrence in facts.	13. If the genus of a symbol is given, then all the possibilities of its occurrence in a sentence are also given.
14. This circumstance (or fact, process, condition) is logically necessary ; logically impossible (or inconceivable) ; logically possible (or conceivable).	14. This sentence is analytic ; contradictory ; not contradictory.
15. This circumstance (or fact, process, condition) is really (or physically in accordance with natural laws) necessary really impossible ; really possible.	15. This sentence is valid ; contravalid ; not contravalid.
16. The sense-qualities such as colours, smells, etc. belong to the primitive data.	16. Symbols of sense-qualities, such as colour-symbols, smell-symbols, etc. belong to the descriptive primitive symbols.

Material mode of  
Speech

Formal mode of  
Speech

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| <p>17. Every colour is at a place.</p>                           | <p>17. A colour expression is always accompanied in a sentence by a place-designation.</p>                  |
| <p>18. Every tone has a certain pitch.</p>                       | <p>18. Every tone-expression contains an expression of pitch.</p>   |
| <p>4. Sentences of natural philosophy :</p>                      | <p>19. Time is continuous.</p>  |
|  | <p>19. The real-number expressions are used as time co-ordinates.</p>                                       |
| <p>20. Time is one dimensional ; space is three-dimensional.</p> | <p>20. A time-designation contains one co-ordinate ; a space-designation consists of three coordinates.</p> |

Let us now discuss some of the above propositions. The first instance appears to say something about the term *Babylon*, since that name occurs in it. We, therefore, expect *Babylon* to be something 'real' about which the lecture was delivered, otherwise we feel that the sentence would have no substance or meaning. But when we examine the sentence closely we find, that in reality it says nothing about the town *Babylon*, 'but really something about yesterday's lecture and the word *Babylon*'. This becomes obvious when we see that 'for our knowledge of the properties of the town of *Babylon* it does not matter whether the sentence in question is true or false.' The fact that a lecture was or was not delivered yesterday does not make the slightest difference

to Babylon. Whether Babylon existed in fact or in imagination is wholly irrelevant to the truth or falsehood of the proposition. This is concealed from us by our habit of not paying attention to the grammatical structure of the sentence but only to what we believe to be its 'real' or factual content or its objective reference. We seem to have a prejudice in favour of the 'real'. Once, however, we have translated the sentence into its formal or logical mode attention is soon focussed on its linguistic or syntactical structure. For this reason the formal mode introduces the expression 'word Babylon'.

The material mode of speech has disastrous consequences where philosophical sentences are concerned. The propositions (10) 'A thing is a complex of sense-data' and (11) 'A thing is a complex of atoms' as expressed in the material mode contain two radically irreconcilable theses. This leads to endless dispute between, say, a positivist or phenomenalist who may hold proposition (10) and a realist who may defend thesis (11), and there is apparently no means of settling the matter, for the discussion at once centres round the pseudo-question as to what a thing really is in such a way as to effectively and conclusively rule out all other possible statements? This is impossible not through any incapacity of our intellect or reason but because of the inherently defective and ambiguous nature of the language which is employed. If it was an innate imperfection of the constitution of our reason as Kant held, it could not obviously be discovered by reason itself. And, an appeal to extra-empirical sources like the so-called intuition on the score of the alleged incompetence of reason is, therefore, entirely unjustified.

The material mode of speech is strictly a transposed mode of speech, a kind of metaphor or figure of speech. A transposed mode of speech is one in which in order to assert something about an object *a*, something corresponding is asserted about

an object *b* which stands in a certain relation to the object *a*.<sup>7</sup> 'In using it, in order to say something about a word (or a sentence) we say instead something parallel about the object designated by the word.'<sup>8</sup> And, in saying some thing about the *object* designated by the word we believe we are saying the same thing about the word or sentence or vice-versa. The two are taken to be the same, or, at any rate, the difference between them is not perceived, or, when perceived, is looked upon as unimportant. This, however, is a great mistake. But it originates in the primitive superstition that corresponding to every word or sentence there must be some objective fact or 'reality' which is referred to in every case. It is not realised that in many forms of words the only *thing* (if it can be called a thing) that may correspond to them would be their sound (or colored shape when written) or the reverberations of organic feeling or spasmodic twitches in the viscera or certain more or less defined attitudes and tendencies towards the furtherance or maintenance of a certain action, pattern or behavior, or all these, but nothing more 'substantial' or 'objective' at all. It is this sense-content that is referred to in these words (or sentences) and any other reference to the so-called objective reality is properly speaking only a reference to pseudo-object domain. As reference to such a domain is no part of their meaning these words and sentences become violent metaphors. The transposed method of speech is easier and more impressive because the image of a word (table) is much less vivid and striking than the object which the word designates (table). Consequently, it is more difficult to direct attention to the word instead of the fact. The fact' (real or imaginary) dominates the mind and prevents it from realising that it is the symbol for that fact that is really meant.

(7) Carnap : Op. Cit. p. 308.

(8) " " " p. 309.

Metaphysical assertions are expressed in the material mode, for the metaphysician is ordinarily not concerned with the *form* of what he states but with its content or its so-called *referent*. He believes that he is investigating certain objects and facts whereas in reality he is investigating their designations, i.e., words or sentences. He believes that he is dealing with genuine object-sentences while in fact they are all pseudo-objects. The difficulty is, however, overcome, when the metaphysical sentences are translated with their corresponding formal mode when most of the problems which have puzzled philosophers turn out to be pseudo-problems, mere battle of words. Take for instance, the problem or rather pseudo-problem connected with the universal word 'number' and space-time. The problem of number has led philosophers from antiquity to the present day to the most abstruse speculations and interminable controversies. It has been asked, for example, whether numbers are real or ideal objects, whether they are extra-mental or only exist in the mind, whether they are the creation of thought or independent of it, whether they are potential or actual, whether real or fictitious. The question of the origin of numbers has been raised, and has been found to be due to a division of the self, to an original primitive intuition of duality in unity, and so forth.<sup>9</sup> Similarly, with the problem of the nature of *space-time*, the nature of physical and psychical properties and relations, the controversy regarding the nature and 'status' of the universal and almost all other pseudo-problems which are the stock-in-trade of the metaphysician. The way in which these problems are formulated by the metaphysician lead to a welter of hopeless confusion and controversy which cannot possibly be resolved. And then, he lays the blame at the door of the intellect. Having himself raised the dust, he complains that he cannot see! A proper

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9. Carnap : Op. cit. p. 110

formulation of questions, as Kant saw but could not achieve, is the first requisite before entering upon any philosophical investigation. Thus, translatability into the formal mode of speech constitutes the touchstone for all philosophical sentences or, more generally, for all sentences which do not belong to the language of any of the empirical sciences.<sup>10</sup> In other words, when the metaphysical questions are properly formulated it will be found that in so far as they are capable of any intelligible answer they are already being tackled by the sciences which alone are competent to investigate them. Much of the business of the metaphysician will thus appear to be entirely bogus. But the question arises, does he put up his show deliberately to mislead others and possibly himself? After all, the metaphysician, like other men, is fairly honest and not necessarily malevolent. As we have already said the metaphysician is a victim of certain circumstances. He imbibes the primitive belief that the language that he adopts is a reflex of nature, a picture or replica of objective reality. To every word, he unconsciously assumes, there must correspond something. Hence, when certain form of words occurs he looks confidently toward nature to show their original or prototype. In this he fails, and by a strange irony while he is a critic of everything else he himself fondly hugs this illusion. Accordingly, he takes refuge in a super-sensible realm where the ideas of his dream take on shape. In the second place, metaphysical assertions arise because of faulty syntactical structure. For instance, when we say 'Dogs exist' and 'Dogs fight' both the propositions appear to have the same grammatical structure and hence they are taken to have the same logical structure too. But this is a mistake. For, while 'fight' is an adjective word which qualifies Dogs, 'exist' does not qualify dogs because it is not an attribute. Again, when we say 'Mithras

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10. Carnp: *Op. Cit.* p. 313.

is fictitious' and 'cow is herbivorous' though the grammatical form is similar, logically the two are different.\* We can not say that the adjective word fictitious qualifies Mithras in the same manner as herbivorous qualifies cow, that because 'fictitious' is a property therefore Mithras must exist to be fictitious ! This is nonsense. But the metaphysician will not be deterred by this ; he will assume a non-empirical realm where Mithras must exist to be fictitious ! He will assume a realm of non-being and proceed to people it with his 'Mithras', 'unicorns', 'round-squares', 'sky-flowers' and what not, where they enjoy a perpetual lease of undisturbed 'existence'. He is not aware of the absurdity involved in 'dividing being into being and non-being.' Obviously, non-being is not a kind of being, it is simply *not-being*.

Like the poet, the metaphysician seems to enjoy a certain license. But whereas the poet succeeds in making statements which are not misunderstood, the metaphysician succeeds in producing nonsense. The sentences of the metaphysician pretend to be object questions while those of the poet lay no such claim. The questions with which the metaphysician deals belong properly to the domain of empirical sciences which alone can tackle them. In many cases the sentences of the poet have some liberal meaning, and in others where they appear to be false they are not at any rate, pseudo-propositions. They are calculated to arouse certain emotive responses and in so far as they do so they succeed in their purpose. The truth or falsity of a literary work or a work of art is irrelevant to its aesthetic and emotive purpose. We cannot properly speaking talk about the truth or falsity of Shakespeare's Hamlet or Raphael's Madonna. Neither of them had any such design. If the metaphysician's statements were made in the same spirit

\*The copula 'is' in the two instances is used with different meaning.

there could be no objection. But the metaphysician is not deliberately writing 'nonsense'; on the contrary, he is desperately serious about the meaning (and reality) of what he writes. This makes trouble, for while his sentences may have a certain emotive value, they fail to have any sense. It may be that he is trying to expound a certain vision like the poet or the mystic, but for the most part his assertions are an instance of bad grammar or faulty syntactical formulation. Where there is any genuine mystical insight they have an aesthetic or moral value which entitle them to a place as work of art or religion but from the empirical or scientific point of view they simply have no significance.<sup>11</sup>

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11. Cf. the following passage by L. S. Stebbing in *Arist. Soc. Proc.* 1932-33 'The Method of Analysis in Metaphysics' p. 94.

"Consequently, none of the Great systems given us by philosophers seems to me to have metaphysical validity. They—or some of them—are great as works of art are great. Hence their spiritual significance. They heighten the joy of living but they do not give knowledge; they are the source of inspiration, but they do not yield understanding."

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# **An Examination of Rousseau's "Particular Wills" and "The General Will"**

BY

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The advance from Hobbes to Rousseau means for us constitutionalism in place of the earlier unconstitutional rule. It means more than that. Hobbes would have us believe that people are incapable of governing themselves. They must, therefore, submit themselves to an external authority. Rousseau believes that people are capable of governing themselves. For Hobbes, Sovereignty resides in one man, the 'Leviathan'; for Rousseau, sovereignty resides in people's representations. In his "Social Contract" Rousseau pleads for the people's state. Our ideas of Government may vary; but when we give expression to these ideas, out of the divergence, a common idea is generated eventually which gives us the law of Government. This he calls the "general will". Over against this, there are "particular wills", wills of men leading the life of separate existence. The general will is not the same thing as your will or my will. Nor is it a summing up of a number of particular wills. "The particular will tends to preferences and the general will to equality." (Social Contract, Book II, Chapter I). Again, the general will seeks to realise public interest, while private interest is the aim of the particular will. "There is", he tells us, "often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general will; the latter regards only the common interest, while the former has regard to private interests, and is merely a sum of particular wills". (Social Contract, Book II, Chapter I).

But having indicated the difference between the life of this or that man and the 'general will', i.e., life of the state, Rousseau committed the very mistake which he was seeking to avoid. He looked upon citizens of a State as so many isolated men and found basis of the State in the detached lives which they were supposed to live. He would divide the State into two halves; on the one side, we have the many people who pursue so many private goods; on the other side, there is the State which stands for public good. The detached beings are for him the units of the State. The State, he tells us, is a "collective body which is composed of as many members as the assembly has Voices." (Ibid, Book II, Chapter III.) He accepts every citizen as one, gives him one vote and regards him as equal to every other citizen. And it is the number of votes which decides what constitutes the public good. Although the votes are cast by particular men who lead particular lives, and who, therefore, have no idea of what a public life is, the general plan emerges as a sum-total of particulars. "Take away from these same (particular) wills", he writes, "the pluses and the minuses which cancel one another and the general will remains as the sum of the differences". (Ibid, Book II, Chapter III).

Carefully examined, Rousseau's position is found to be untenable. For either a particular will is *sui generis* with the general will, or it is not. In the latter case, you cannot construct a universal out of bare particulars. Particulars as particulars have nothing of the universal in them. Particulars will not generate the universal, take what number, you will. In the former case, particular wills yield the general will; and they do so because they have in them the germs of the universal. But Rousseau would have neither the one alternative nor the other. He makes the general will and the particular wills contradictory to one another, and again seeks identity between them. Similarly, if, as Rousseau tells us, there are two kinds

of interests, private and public, you must admit the presence of public interest in some form in the lives of individual citizens; else, you miss the public interest; only private interests remain and continue for all time. If everybody knows private interests and none other, that will not give you public interest, merely because a large number of men have voted in one manner. Numbers will not yield a quality if that quality is altogether absent. When one is present, they can make it more pronounced.

Rousseau started well. He held that in men there exists an innate capacity to govern themselves. But he was not able to make proper use of this position. If men have the power to constitute a state, that indicates that they possess something other than the narrow selfish life, i.e., they are not always swayed by private interests. They have in them the germs of sociality, the essence of a wider life. But Rousseau would grant only one universal life, namely that which is found in the state. Contrasted with this, there are many particular lives lived by different men who inhabit a state. These men have nothing of the universal in them. Nor is there any other universal which intervenes between the particular lives and the universal state life. "It is important, in order to have a clear declaration of the general will, that there should be no partial association in the state and that every citizen should express all his own opinion." (Ibid. Chapter III). This is how he expresses himself. For Rousseau, then, there exist two lives and two interests, the narrow selfish life and the wide state life.

Rousseau places before the electorate the standard of public interest which is the policy of the state and asks people to vote for the same. Now the question is, can the constituents who are so many private interests, vote for public interest, for something which is substantially different from what they are? If Rousseau's supposition is accepted, what is

most likely to happen under the circumstances is that people having no previous experience of anything other than their private interests, would fail to grasp the significance of public interest and vote according to their petty selfish interests. Selfish interest is the very opposite of national interest. And yet Rousseau would try to construct the one out of the other.

There will be universal agreement with Rousseau's contention that the general will is not a thing given or found ready-made and that it is a derivative principle, one which is got out of the original wills, i.e., the manner in which individual members exercise their franchise. But Rousseau's mistake lay in supposing the original wills as bare particulars. He is wrong in his premises. He is right so far as his deductions are concerned. His premises are what he calls the particular wills ; his conclusion is the general will. And despite his attempts to keep them separate, the two wills are found to be substantially alike. We arrive at this conclusion whether we start from the component wills or from the general will. That the particular wills are not radically different from the general will, will be clear from the fact that for Rousseau they represent the matter, the only ingredients, out of which the general will is, and can be, constructed. He derives the one from the other. The two sides far from being opposed or unrelated, stand in the most intimate relation of cause and effect. Again conversely taken, the general will actually gets reduced, by the method of voting which Rousseau recommends, i.e., one vote for one man, to the majority-will which means so many numbers of wills. This majority-will, extended far enough, gradually approximates to, and eventually becomes, the will of all, i.e., the aggregate of particular wills. Therefore, the two wills, i.e. the will that is produced and the wills that produce it cannot be put under different categories. And since the product-will is accepted to be

general, we must grant some form of generality to the producer-wills.

Yet Rousseau would not accept the identity of the two wills. He seeks the help of an intermediary who could bring about the unity of the two wills. This he finds in the legislator. He tells us, "the people always wills the good ; but it does not always see it. The general will is always right, but the judgment which guides it, is not always enlightened. It must be made to see objects such as they are and sometimes, such as they ought to appear to it..... Private persons see the good which they reject ; the public wills the good which it does not see. All alike need guidance. The former must be obliged to conform their will to their reason ; the latter must be taught to know what it wills. Then from the public enlightenment, there results the union of understanding and of will in the social body ; and hence the precise co-operation of the parts and the greatest power of the whole. Hence springs the necessity of a legislator." (Ibid. Book II, Chapter VI) Thus Rousseau assigns to the legislator the role of a mediator. He mediates between sharply opposed things. He brings together the general will and the particular wills, which but for him, would remain quite apart.

But how can a legislator establish identity between the two wills, if they are accepted to be unlike in essence ? The legislator is a citizen of a state as others are. He is not a member of the angelic order. He cannot create identity out of contradictory elements. To say that a legislator is capable of giving us absolutely new things, is to say that he can produce something out of nothing. This is to make him a magician. Hence if we suppose that he succeeds in uniting things which bear no relation to one another, his work will not be science, but miracle. The truth is, the so-called particular

wills and the general will are essentially alike, however divergent they may appear to be. And Rousseau himself admits this in the next chapter. He writes, "In order that a people at its birth should have the capacity to appreciate the sound maxims of policy and follow the fundamental rules of political reason it would be necessary for the effect to become the cause; for the social spirit which is meant to be the work of the legislator, to preside over the legislative itself and *for men to be before laws are made, what they are meant to become by their means*". (§Book II, Ch VII.§) Here Rousseau hits upon the right relation that subsists between the individual voters and the will of the nation.

For Rousseau, particular wills and the general will are found to be related as the beginning and the end of one process. We must not think that individual citizens were first non social, and afterwards developed into social beings, when they came in contact with the legislators. Laws do not create in men the capacity to follow social rules of conduct. The capacity is present before laws begin to function. A voter submits to the general will, because he has in him the marks of the general will. The same idea is expressed by Bernard Bosanquet in his "Philosophical Theory of State" where he writes, "Laws and institutions are only possible because man is already, what they gradually make more and more explicit; because he has a general will, that is, because the good which he presents to himself as his own is necessarily in some degree a good which extends beyond himself or a common good". And continuing, he speaks of the General will as "something different at once from every private will and from the vote of a given assembly, and yet as standing, on the whole, for what both the one and the other necessarily aim at sustaining as the frame-work of their life". (Pages 122-123).

Therefore, the work of the general will is not one of creation, but one of drawing out: and in respect of the individual

wills, it is a case of recognition. That is to say, the ideas of sociality and goodness are present in the minds of voters, consciously or sub-consciously. All that is necessary, is a reminder or a stimulate. You have not to create the idea of general will; you have to bring it out. In another place, Rousseau gives indication of the real characteristics of the constituent wills and the precise relation they bear to the general will. The view that the citizens of a state are not to be identified with particular numbers or particular interests, that the general will and particular wills belong to the same species, receives corroboration from what Rousseau says about the nature of general will. The general will, he tells us, cannot err. It can only be misled. That is to say, if people are properly informed as to what constitutes the general good, they will vote for it. "The people," he tells us, "are never corrupted, though often deceived, and it is only then that they seem to will what is evil". (Book II, Chap. III). This means that individual wills are not evil; they have in them the making of the good will. In some sense, in some form, they are what the general will intends them to be.

The two assumptions which vitiate Rousseau's political philosophy are : first, voters lead absolutely separate lives, in which case State is reduced to an aggregate of isolated men; secondly, men are guided solely by selfish interests, in which case there can be no evolution of citizenship out of these materials. Experience shows that particular citizens do not lead the life of detached human beings. Every citizen belongs to some one group; he has a vocation in life. He is either a labourer or an industrialist, follows physical or mental labour, professes conservative or liberal faith. A voter does not vote as a mere particular; he votes as a mechanic or a peasant, lessor or lessee, an employer or an employee. In so voting he might be said to be voting for a wide interest, viz., interest of

the society in which he lives, moves and has his being. And this wide interest represents a grade of public interest. Thus every voter must be supposed to possess some element of public interest, something higher than the interest of his own. And since he pursues life as a member of a definite group, his life is not a mere particular; on the contrary he begins his life as a universal and continues to live the life of a universal; and before it, there is the larger universal, namely, the state. It follows that the unit of state is not to be found in isolated lives, but in the associated life of the individual citizen. And the state again is not to be viewed as the only universal which subsists over against so many particular lives. Rather the greater Universal is the meeting ground of lesser universals.

The second assumption also is not psychologically true. "Why is the general will always right, and why do all invariably desire the prosperity of each, unless it is because there is no one but appropriates to himself this word *each* and thinks of himself in voting on behalf of all?" (Book II, Chap. IV). Here Rousseau presents to us the picture of individual life as rank selfishness, while trying to construct public life out of the same,—a view which contradicts basic psychology as much as the law of development. Normal human beings possess both egoistic and altruistic elements. Such beings when they grow up, come to perceive the further fact that the pursuit of pure egoism is a delusion and that the good of the self is to be found, not by running after the abstract ego, but by living a life which includes and yet transcends the life of the individual.

Rightly interpreted then, Rousseau's state will be found to be a higher unity made up of smaller unities, i.e., the component associations which inhabit a state.



Every voter is a member of one or other of these associations and necessarily shares the group-life which these associations represent. These associations mark the beginning of political life. They are intertwined with, and lead up to, the broader national life, called the state. The voter understands the meaning of the state in terms of, and through, these associations. For individual voters are limbs of the smaller universal, called a society or a guild, and societies are limbs of the larger universal called the state. Rousseau's Voter, therefore, is not an isolated individual as he is taken to be. If this be the position of Rousseau's voter, the distinction between private and public interests will have to be interpreted in a different way. Private interest will not mean the interest of the ego-centric individual, but the interest of the society which claims the voter as one of its members. And public interest will mean interest of the body-politic, i.e., the state. The task of the legislator also will be different from what is assigned to him by Rousseau. His task is not to get the Universal out of the many singulars, but to define the place of the lower Universal in the scheme of the higher Universal. It may be said that while voting, the voter faces a contrast; he has to choose between the two lines of action. But these two lines do not stand for isolated interests which is an unreality, and public interest. They stand for a lesser universal, i.e., the good of the society of which the voter is a member and a greater universal, i.e., good of the political organism. It is a case of communalism versus nationalism. In choosing the smaller good, he goes away from public interest. He kills the state. In choosing the larger good, he finds good of the state and with it the good of the society with which his own good is directly bound up.

We conclude that Rousseau's voters are not a self-seeking, self-serving lot, nor are they intrinsically bad people.

They are not to be mistaken for mere particulars which are wholly divorced from the universal life. The individual voters produce the general will, because they themselves possess the marks of generality. They produce goodness, because they have in them the traits of goodness.

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# Conation and Feeling

By

P. S. NAIDU

Professor McDougall's death, at a comparatively early age, is to be lamented by psychologists all over the world for two significant reasons. In the first place we still need a champion of hormic psychology gifted with penetrating analytic powers. In the second place there are several lacunae in the hormic theory which the great leader alone could have filled. One such lacuna is to be found in the doctrine of 'pleasure and pain' formulated by McDougall. Professor Flugel, in his appreciative paper on 'Feeling and the Hormic theory',<sup>1</sup> has attempted to show how the theory under reference could be raised to the status of a universal principle covering all shades of affective experience. But, even the learned professor has misgivings regarding the validity of the hormic theory of 'pleasure and pain'. An attempt will be made in this paper to dispel all such misgivings.

In the second, third and fourth sections of his paper Professor Flugel deals with the intellectual, aesthetic and sensory feelings, and argues with great force and conviction for the upholding of the hormic theory in all the three fields, but when he comes to the last section his faith in the great master's position is slightly shaken. Pure and simple sensory experiences we are told, possess an immediate affective tone with no affiliations to conation. And unless this small region, which is now

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1. Character and Personality, Vol. 7, No. 3, March 1939.

All quotations in this paper are from this article of Prof. Flugel.

held by the hedonist, is also conquered, we cannot acclaim the hormic theory as supreme in the field. Here is the challenge to the hormic psychologist, and the challenge must be taken up.

In taking up the challenge on behalf of McDougall, we wish to raise a very important question at the outset. How exactly are we to understand the hormic view of the relationship between affection and conation? Many leading psychologists are of the opinion that in the hormic scheme conation precedes affection. There is first a felt need, and then action directed towards the relief of that need resulting in the experiencing of pleasure. We contend that this is a thoroughly misleading statement of the hormic position. One of the fundamental principles of McDougallian hormism deals with the distinction between the structure of mind and of the functioning of that structure. This structure, which is dynamic and ever changing, and ever developing, is the result of the interaction between and the consequent organisation of the elemental propensities to generate the complex sentiments. This structure is touched off by suitable cognitive situations, and the moment it begins to function, the affective tone is ready to accompany it throughout. So, there is no question of any temporal priority here. The affective tone is concomitant with the conative functioning of mental structure. There is no conation without affection, and no affective experience divorced from conation. This is the correct hormic position. It is meaningless to place the hormic theory in opposition to the hedonistic, and assert that there are certain experiences which the latter alone can explain, for they are not on the same level. The former transcends the latter. Moreover, those who hold that a felt 'need' is the initiator of action, conation and affection, do not seem to realise that the very example which they urge against the hormic theory finally turns out to be a fact in

support of it. The experience of a felt 'need' is conative, and the affective tone which accompanies it is unpleasant. Here, we have only an example of the so called 'feeling of pain' which is generated by the lack of efficiency and smoothness in the working of the conative structure of the mind, and which in consequence turns out to be a beautiful example of the hormic theory.

Let us now turn to the 'intellectual feelings'. Professor Flugel, it is true, defends the hormic theory in this field, and concludes, 'We see then that a pretty good case can be made out for the hormic view of feeling as regards all types of intellectual pleasure.' But the defence ought to have been carried out much more aggressively and much more 'hormically'. In the first place it should be claimed in the most emphatic and unequivocal manner possible that there is *no cognition without conation*. The example that is discussed in this context is this: the solving of a geometrical problem yields pleasure, but implies no antecedent need. In some cases at least conation is not the antecedent of pleasure. The defence against this position which Professor Flugel offers is very weak. '.....if we now derive pleasure from the solving of a geometrical problem, it is clear that our interest in it has been aroused, and the hormic psychologist would say that some fundamental urge (probably that of curiosity) has found a new outlet and that a new sentiment is in the process of formation.. But if we accept this formulation, we must agree that the need was there before the satisfaction...' Both the charge and the defence are based on a distorted view of hormism. Whenever the structure of the mind functions at all, it functions as a whole, that is, the cognitive, the affective and the behavioural aspects of propensities and sentiments function together and simultaneously. To speak of the one phase functioning before or after is to go back to faculty psychology. On hormic principles cognition can function only along with affection and conation, and

the affective tone will be either pleasant or unpleasant according as behaviour is furthered or hindered. A significant quotation comes put to the occasion: 'It is not the case that an unpleasant state of want gives the initial impulse and that the agent learns gradually what will satisfy that want and remove the unpleasant. The picture that presents itself is rather that of an innate capacity which tends to unfold itself gradually, until the full possibilities inherent in it are realised. This process may be accompanied by pleasure throughout, though this will vary in degree according as progress is more or less equal, and will give way to unpleasant, if progress is at any time held up by some impediment.'<sup>2</sup>

The very interesting word 'interest' has been used by Professor Flugel. Now, 'interest' is a quality of the 'object' which is the natural excitant of a propensity or a sentiment. There is no 'interest' attaching to cognition which is not at the same time the interest of the total mental structure which is functioning. Therefore the so called 'intellectual pleasures' are the 'pleasures' of the intellect whose foundation is conation.

We may now turn to 'Aesthetic feelings'. Here again the fallacy of the non-recognition of the structure-function dynamism of hormic psychology is present in an intensified degree. Professor Flugel holds that the hormic theory applies to the matter of aesthetic experience, but not to its formal aspect. It is believed that there are some pleasures relating exclusively to the *form* of aesthetic experience, and that these do not depend on a pre-existing 'need'. A smooth curve as against a sharp angle is invested with a peculiar kind of aesthetic pleasure, which is the pleasure of form *sui generis*. There is no

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2. Allen, A. H. B., *Pleasure and Instinct*: London, 1930, p. 77.

goal seeking activity here, so the hormic theory is not adequate.

In reply we would state, (1) the mis-interpretation of hormic dynamism noticed in connection with 'intellectual pleasures' has infected this region too ; (2) there is over-intellectualisation of the aesthetic *form* ; (3) form and matter are inseparable ; and (4) no attempt has been made to evolve a hormic theory of aesthetic experience and then to apply it to the explanation of aesthetic pleasure, instead the ordinary hormic theory of emotions and instincts is used directly. As against these defects, it must be pointed out that Professor Flugel has given due importance to the work of the psycho-analyst. '...as regards the understanding of our satisfaction in the themes or objects treated by the artist, psycho-analysts have done much service in showing that the work of art, as created or as contemplated may (perhaps unconsciously) give expression to deep-seated desires, tendencies or complexes ; and they have to this extent greatly strengthened the hormic view.'

The 'play' theory of art is pressed into service to explain what Professor Flugel considers to be inexplicable on the hormic basis. But 'play' itself needs explanation, and it is not profitable to seek its aid in this field. The theory of 'sympathetic induction' of emotion, which is one of the major contributions of McDougall, gives us the clue for an all-embracing and thoroughly adequate aesthetic theory. An aesthetic object is the invariable excitant of the dynamic structure of the mind of the person who contemplates it. When the object is the creation of a human being, the artist, it excites in the beholder or enjoyer, the emotion or sentiment which worked in the mind of the artist when he produced the object. As Professor Flugel has suggested, following the psycho-analyst, the whole experience, except the last stage of it, may occur at the unconscious level. On the other hand,

if the object be natural, the principle of transference taken with the principle of 'sympathetic induction' will be adequate to explain the tone of aesthetic experience.

It may be pointed out here that on many occasions aesthetic experience produces sadness, and on certain rare occasions opens out the flood-gates of tears. Such a phenomenon can be explained only on the basis of a sympathetic induction of sentiments and emotions.

We wish to make one remark on the nature of aesthetic 'form'. Smooth forms do not always yield pleasure. To the modern cubist the sharp angle and the harsh bend are much more attractive than the flowing curve. These visual forms have many kinaesthetic associations, and they and their cluster of associates together constitute the cognitive aspect of the total dynamic experience wherein conation is the bed-rock on which the entire activity is founded.

Finally we come to sensory feelings. It is here that Professor Flugel finds an insurmountable obstacle to hormic theory. Simple colours, and tones, certain types of odour and temperature sensation are pleasant in themselves. It is claimed that psychological hedonism is more successful in explaining these facts than hormism. 'The pleasures connected with the digestive, reproductive and muscular functions depend intimately upon physiological condition, and display corresponding fluctuations. The pleasures connected with sight and sound are far less subject to such fluctuations.....' 'Still more constant perhaps are the feelings connected with the more purely sensory experiences which are less obviously linked up with appetite, e. g., a pleasing patch of colour or a musical note which is agreeable in virtue of its pitch and colour.' In criticism of this we need only mention the fact that high fever and severe head-ache deprive the pleasing



sensations of their pleasantness, and that considerable individual variations occur in this matter. There is no constancy of feeling in these cases. Besides there never was, never is, and never will be a pure sensation, a pure cognitive experience wherein the cognitive structure of the mind functions by itself and for itself.

Let us, in this connection, consider a significant pure sensation, the odour of the jasmine. To us in the South the fragrance of this flower is very pleasant. But there are some in the Western countries who find the odour very oppressive. It must be remembered that in our minds this flower is very intimately associated with many auspicious ceremonies, with the bride and the bridal chamber, and many other experiences with intense emotional values. And the affective tone, therefore, is this concomitant of these emotions. Sometimes the emotional foundations of sensation are not visible on the surface, and then we get the illusion that the sensation by itself is affectively toned. If, with the help of the psychoanalyst, we delve into the foundations we shall easily discover the conative bases of cognition.

We have surveyed the three fields of experience considered by Professor Flugel, and have discovered that the hormic view is quite valid in all the fields, and is thoroughly adequate to explain all affective phenomena. Our conclusions are these :

(1) In a thoroughgoing hormic theory there is no temporal sequence between affection and conation. Both are simultaneous.

(2) There is no validity attaching to the distinction drawn in the usual sense accepted by most psychologists who are not hormically inclined, between cognition and conation. Conation is fundamental. There is no cognition without conation.

(3) Hormic psychology should assimilate the essential principles of psycho-analysis. Otherwise it would be faced with several insuperable difficulties.

Hormic psychology requires modification in details, and extension in certain directions, but it is very sound in its foundations.

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# Identities in Mysticism

By

RAM MURTI LOOMBA

Mysticism is widely spoken of as the cult of identity. Yet, what is the nature of the identity that prevails in mysticism? Is it merely a homogeneous identity in general? This is, for instance, what Chiavacci seems to hold in his *Illusione e realta*. He professes mysticism in his philosophy, and repudiates all distinctions as being good enough in the world of illusion but not in the ineffable unity which mysticism represents and in which identification reigns supreme. He would, thus, for instance, do away with distinctions of matter and spirit, knowing and doing, morality and economy, or art, religion, philosophy and history. Where, he asks, is the need for distinctions? Is it not the function of philosophy, or at least of mysticism, to seek unity? Why, then, this desire to distinguish? Shall we accept this view of Chiavacci? Or is it that there are several definite kinds of identity in mysticism? These are questions which have hardly so far attracted the serious attention of students of mysticism. The present paper seeks to point out the existence, and to define the nature, of several definite kinds of identity in mysticism.

In this attempt we are confronted with the apparently paradoxical, yet simple, truth that to understand the significance of an identity we have to proceed by understanding the corresponding distinction, and to understand the nature of one identity in contrast with another we have to proceed by understanding the contrast between the two corresponding forms of distinction.

Firstly, in all mysticism, we come across what might be called an identity of *fact* and *essence*. By *essence* is meant here the inner ultimate reality, by *fact* its apparent manifestation in the universe of our phenomenal existence.

The distinction upon which this identity is based is not the same as the distinction between that which *exists* and that which merely *appears* to be, the distinction said to be at the basis of all our practical and scientific inquiries as well as of philosophical discussion. The latter is a distinction within the empirical. The former, on the contrary, is a distinction between the empirical and the trans-empirical. The motive of the latter is to escape from apparent contradictions with which we seem to be confronted in our experience of nature and of human character and purpose. As Taylor illustrates it, "we contrast the seeming stability of the earth with its real motion, the seeming continuity and sameness of a lump of solid matter with the discontinuity and variety of its chemical constituents and the seeming friendliness of the hypocritical self-seeker with his real indifference to our welfare."\* In such cases we cannot consistently regard both the appearances equally authentic. One must at any rate be false, although perceived in the same empirical manner. The motive of the former distinction, on the other hand, is not at all a need to escape from any contradiction in empirical consciousness by itself. It is the urge to go beyond and transcend the empirical. The *essence* and the *fact*, or, as they are also called, the *that* and the *what*, stand on different levels altogether, and each must be true on its own level. There is one thing which the former distinction would call false. But it is not either the 'that' or the 'what.' It is the mistaking of the 'what' for the 'that' of the fact for the essence itself.

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\*Taylor : Elements of Metaphysics (Sixth edition, 1921), p. 2.

The mystic, then, views the fact as in identity with the essence, the ultimate inner reality to be in identity with its phenomenal manifestation. This does not amount to the fallacy of mistaking the fact for the essence. That would result in an emphasis on the fact while ignoring absolutely the real essence. On the contrary, the mystic experiences an awareness of the essence in his consciousness of the fact which is its figuration. Thus, in every empirical fact, to the mystic, there shines and glows something deeper and more fundamental, a super-empirical essence. Every 'what' seems to lay bare to him a 'that' inhabiting and manifesting itself in it, like a stream of water which is all the time but the water itself. Every object of nature becomes a mirror of some deeper supernatural reality. The mystic finds an angel of heavenly beauty in every stone of this rough gross earth and bursts out in songs of ecstasy. This is illustrated, for instance, in the *Lawaih*, a treatise on Sufism by the Muslim mystic Nuruddin Abdur Rahmau Jami :

'They say, How strange ! This peerless beauty's face,  
Within the mirror's heart now holds a place ;  
The marvel's not the face, the marvel is  
'That it should be at once mirror and face.'

This identity of fact and essence is generally accompanied in mysticism by another, an identity of the essence of one fact with the essence of another fact and thus with the essence of all facts. Every 'that' is identical with the 'that' of another 'what' and with the 'that' of all 'whats'. In other words, it is maintained that there is one and the same 'that' in every 'what', the same essence glows in all facts. Besides the identity of fact and essence, there is also thus asserted what might be called a monism of essence in the universe. The ultimate is held to be a unity. Difference only belongs to the lower, phenomenal level of existence.

Yet, though more often it is a monism of essence that is characteristic of mysticism, the that-what identity may as well be coupled with a pluralism of essence. The ancient spiritualistic belief in a guiding spirit in every kind of thing and Plato's doctrine of archetypal ideas behind every concrete existence might well indicate the lines along which a pluralistic mysticism would be maintained. Monism is a step beyond the principle of fact-essence identity. One may recognise a deeper essence in every fact of existence. But if he further thinks that there is one and the same ultimate essence in the whole universe of facts, he is a monist; otherwise he belongs to the category of the pluralistic mystics. The following passage from Charles Kingsley suggests the combination of a pluralism of essence with the principle of the identity of fact and essence :

'The great Mysticism is the belief which is becoming every day stronger with me, that all symmetrical natural objects are types of some spiritual truth and existence. When I walk the fields I am oppressed now and then with an innate feeling that everything I see has a meaning, if I could but understand it. And this feeling of being surrounded with truths which I cannot grasp amounts to indescribable awe sometimes.'

The identity of fact and essence is combined with a monism of essence in the following statement from Jnanadeva :

'As this hand that tries to catch the waves finds nothing but water ; or as camphor presents itself as touch to the hand, as a white object to the eye, and as a fragrant thing to the tongue ; similarly to the wise ones, one Brahman alone vibrates as the sensible manifold.....The unity of Brahman is running

through all apparent manifestations of sense, and when the senses go to catch hold of their objects, they are lost along with their objects in the one Brahman which alone remains. All apparent disturbances vanish, as the parts that we see in a sugar-cane are lost in its juice ; no trace of multiplicity is to be found, even though the senses may enjoy their objects.<sup>1</sup>

The monism that constitutes this identity is, however, of a character absolutely different from what might be called *scientific monism*. The monism which a scientist as such may seek to establish would be reached by a reduction of existence into its smallest and furthest elements and would conclude that the final simplest elements are all of one particular stuff. The monism of the mystic, on the other hand, is of a different character altogether. While the scientist is concerned with analysis into unanalysable elements or parts of a whole, what the mystic goes about is a passing from diverse empirical particulars to a super-empirical principle which governs the whole. While the scientist conducts his analysis in the universe of factual existence, of the 'what', and seeks the unanalysable element or unit, the mystic goes beyond the universe of the 'what' and seeks a 'that' in a deeper plane of reality. Finally, while what the scientist would finally reach must be a plurality of homogeneous elements the mystic claims to reach a unique and absolute unity. The 'what' can never be one in the same sense in which the 'that' can be. This one 'that' is the residing angel of every 'what' and is yet on a higher level than any 'what'. It is the essence of every thing in this universe of facts. It is its own reality, and the reality of all that is. 'Illumining itself, it illumines all else.'

1. Jnanadeva : *Amṛtanubhava*, quoted in Ranade's *Mysticism in Maharashtra*.

The two types of mystic identity we have just considered are both metaphysical in character. We come now to another which, however, is not a metaphysical but an epistemic identity. It is the identity of subject and object in mystic experience. In the mystic experience, the knower, the finite individual, and the known, the essential nature of reality, are said to be identified. In this identification the mystic asserts, the two do not retain their distinction. They, on the other hand, resolve, as it were, into a unity or one-ness. The knower becomes the known. "Knowing Thee", as Tulasidasa put it, "He becomes Thy very Self".<sup>2</sup> The subject is united with the object and the two interpenetrate each other to the very depth of their being. From this perfect intimacy arises true knowledge, while all other forms of knowledge, in so far as they retain distance distinction and lack of intimacy, must fail. "Pure knowledge", according to Eckhart, is a "self-revealing of God, where the knower is that which is the known."<sup>3</sup> Boehme's mystic knowledge, *Verstand*, is regarded by him true knowledge just because in it the subject-object distinction has been transcended and the knower and the known have become one. All *Vernunft* or knowledge of reason, since it essentially implies distinction, is, he says, only doubtful knowledge.<sup>4</sup> Vedantic mystics, likewise, speak of *anubhava*, a state of experience that is an identification of the *atman*, the individual person, and the *Paramatman*, the Super-Person. The difference between intellectual knowledge and *anubhava* lies in the fact that in the former subject and object are distinct from one another, while in the latter subject and object coincide. This state is called by Samkara one of

2. Tulasidasa : Ramaonaritamansa.

3. Eckhart : *Schriften und Predigten*, I. 124.

4. Brinton : *The Mystic Will*.



*Samardhanam* or accomplished satisfaction, in which one 'feels and vows himself as the sum and totality of all existence.'<sup>5</sup>

This subject-object identity must be distinguished from what has been called the subject-predicate identity by the English absolutists. Bradley, for instance, conceived truth as the identity of subject and predicate and such an identity can, according to him be attained only in an undifferentiated non-relational immediate experience. For, judgmental thought is, with him, the necessary immediate antecedent of the absolute experience. All other levels of cognition lie below this stage and must be passed before it is reached.

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5. Deussen : The Philosophy of the Vedanta.

# Three Theories of Truth

By

A. C. DAS

According to some the problem of truth arises out of a misconception. Thus, Mr. Wildon Carr analyses the different theories of truth, and finds all of them to be erroneous. He is of opinion that the solution of the problem is to be found in the philosophy of Bergson, which furnishes a fresh point of view. "The theory of Bergson", says he, "is that in the intuition of life we know reality as it is, our knowledge is one with our knowing; and in the intellect we possess a mode of knowledge which is equally immediate, but the essential quality of which is that it externalises or spatialises reality. We understand this mode of knowing in recognising the purpose it serves, its practical advantage to us. The theory, therefore, resembles pragmatism in bringing the concept of utility to the aid of its theory of knowledge. But, we insisted, the resemblance is outward merely; for the essential tenet of pragmatism, that truth is a value, is fatal to the theory."<sup>1</sup> Mr. Carr cannot accept anything as mediation of idea in our knowledge. He subscribes to Bergson's proposition that reality is a vital surge, and in intuition we know it as it is in itself. There we can hardly distinguish, we are told between the process and the product. "Our knowledge is one with our knowing." So the problem of truth does not arise at all or it arises in a new form, and is to be put down as all a matter of intuitive experience. He nevertheless allows another mode of knowing, namely, intellection which is as immediate as intui-

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1. The Problem of Truth, pp. 89—90.

tion. But this form of knowing is rather peculiar ; it consists not in representing reality as such, but in distorting it, and creating illusions which are necessitated by the pragmatic conduct of our life.

Now it may be pointed out that, if intellection is a mode of knowing, and, if it is quite as immediate as intuition, its nature remains yet to be analysed out. In logic we are not concerned with anything ultra-empirical. So I should avoid by all means muddling of metaphysics. It cannot, however, be denied that we do, in fact, make a distinction between "true" and "false" in so far as our ordinary experience goes. It is, therefore, worth while to discover what it is that determines this distinction. Mr. Carr cannot make good his point by falling back upon pragmatism ; for he himself clearly distinguishes between his position and that of the pragmatists. According to him, truth is not a value, while according to the pragmatists, it is a value. In his opinion, truth is not to be understood in terms of practical life, and not to be viewed as a workability. Following Bergson, he maintains that intellect solidifies, so to speak, the *elan vital*, and brings into being the spatio-temporal order to serve the purpose of life. The act of the intellect is then essentially selective. But Mr. Carr practically evades the problem of the distinction between "true" and "false," which holds within our ordinary experience, by taking it up into the flow of becoming where it altogether disappears. So we shall gain nothing in going with the philosopher who is much too intoxicated with "supreme surge" to look into the details of our daily life.

Though the intuitionism of Bergson is not spacious enough to accommodate within itself any reasonable theory of truth, yet intuition as a distinctive form of knowledge or experience may be made a basis for a theory of truth. Thus we are often

told that the proper criterion of truth is clearness and distinctness ; when we are in possession of truth in a particular situation of knowledge, it is claimed, we know it immediately, and do not need anything extraneous to ascertain it.

Some try to discard this theory by saying that it is based upon subjective certainty which is really irrelevant in a situation of knowledge where there is an objective control<sup>2</sup>. It may, however, be pointed out in favour of intuitionism that intuition as a form of immediate knowledge does not imply any mere subjective certainty. In my sensible experience, a fact, say, a cow is given, and I judge "There is a cow". Now the intuitionist will point out that the judgment "There is a cow" will be true only if there is actually a cow, and that that I know a cow I know immediately. Hence all that can be meant by the theory is that a judgment is known to be true not on the basis of anything outside of it, but on the basis of itself alone, which amounts to saying that truth in a particular case is known immediately. But it does not mean that this immediacy is nothing but subjective certainty. Or, to put the matter the other way about, if subjective certainty is taken to be the certainty which the subject concerned feels in a situation of knowledge, all forms of knowledge will be found to involve subjective certainty; even errors *qua* errors cannot lack it. There is, therefore no point in saying that intuition is based on subjective certainty alone.

The fact is rather that the intuitionist remains satisfied with a surface view of the situation of truth. There is no doubt that truth, whatever its context, is immediately apprehended. But immediacy which is articulated as clearness and distinctness presupposes a criterion of truth, wherewith we come by a clear and distinct apprehension of truth. Or, if the

2. Hobhouse : Theory of knowledge, p. 489.

immediacy of the apprehension preclude the possibility of any external criterion, we cannot stop short with it ; we have rather to go deep into the matter and show forth the very structure of truth, and that truth is its own guarantee, so that a judgment to be true must fall back upon itself and must not require anything outside of it to make it true, or to reveal itself to be true. Further, the word "intuition" is misleading. Many things in our experience are regarded as matters of intuition, such as axioms of a science, postulates of experience, and, so on. But, if these are really intuitions, they cannot be brought within the purview of truth and falsity which are relevant only in the situation of a judgment which involves articulate ideation, and requires a perceptual basis for the content claimed for.

There is, however, a form of intuitionism, which seems to go a step beyond the ordinary type in implementing clearness and distinctness by the notion of non-contradiction. A clear and distinct case of truth often turns out to be a case of falsity. In view of this it is maintained that mere immediacy will not do, and that a judgment is to be taken to be true when there is nothing to contradict it. The main criticism that is often urged against this theory is that the criterion of truth propounded is negative, and, as such, can have little value. This is doubtless true. But to say merely that the criterion is negative is to touch only the fringe of the problem involved therein. On a closer examination we shall find that the theory makes truth tentative, so that in entertaining a judgment as true, we must have to say, we are also conscious of the possibility of the judgment turning out false. In that case every judgment must be in the form "S may be P", and not in the form "S is P" which is usual. In other words every judgment would be problematic. But this is not evidenced in the least by experience. The negative criterion would serve a very good

purpose if we could show in every case that there is in fact nothing to contradict the judgment in question. In that case, to know a judgment to be true will require omniscience, but will also imply that the knowing of the truth of a judgment is nothing short of showing that there is nothing that can run counter to it, in which case we shall have to wait till the end of time in our attempt to ascertain the truth of a judgment. This is, however, absurd.

It may now be pointed out that I have missed the main point, namely, that non-contradiction means merely lack of contradiction, and is not to be construed into "nothing that contradicts". So when it is maintained that, if a judgment is to be regarded as true, nothing should be presented in opposition to the content fixed on, and, for that matter, to the judgment in question. This is quite plausible. But difficulty will appear if we ponder a bit over the statement and its implication. I may then ask: Should we make any distinction between truth as such and non-contradiction? If we do not make a distinction between them, non-contradiction would itself be truth, and we have to admit that to say that a judgment is true is to say that it stands uncontradicted. But this not only makes truth negative, also makes it entirely dependent upon the notion of falsity, for in saying that a judgment is to be taken to be true only when it is found to be uncontradicted, all that is meant is that truth is nothing more than mere lack of falsity. In short, in so many words we really give a theory of falsity instead of the proposed theory of truth, and thereby give primacy to falsity. But this is not justified by any consideration of the development of our knowledge. It cannot be shown that we come by the notion of falsity first, and then acquire that of truth, which is intelligible only in terms of the notion of falsity. On the other hand, the fact is that in the history of our mental life it is the notion of truth, and not that

of falsity, that presents itself first, inasmuch as our consciousness starts with contact with concrete facts, and it is only later that the notion of falsity gets articulated, functioning in the appropriate circumstances; for falsity, whatever the theory of it, appears on the cancellation of the conditions that make for truth. Anyway, if we fix on non-contradiction as the fundamental characteristic of truth, we may be asked : What is this non-contradiction itself ? The situation of a judgment being cancelled or contradicted by another is quite intelligible as we often come on it, especially in correcting a perceptual illusion. Non-contradiction then, to be understood, must show some aspect of it on which we can fix. But, obviously we cannot get anything like that outside the judgment in question; we have to look for that into the judgment itself. So it is evident that in representing truth as non-contradiction we are simply expressing negatively something that positively determines truth.

It may, nevertheless, be contended that non-contradiction is merely a test of truth. It is then plain that the notion of truth is the presupposition of non-contradiction as a test of truth and is not to be merged, as is implied by the analysis given above, with that of falsity. This will, however, be of no avail. It will, on the contrary, complicate the matter a good deal more. I may now ask : Is it that non-contradiction determines the truth of a judgment, or that we speak of non-contradiction with reference to a judgment because it is true ? If we accept the first alternative, the only interpretation we can put upon this or that judgment which is held to be true is that it is not false, showing thereby that we cannot make the notion of truth articulate inasmuch as 'not false' cannot possibly be identical with 'true', though there is no denying that 'not false' implies 'true'. If we, on the other hand, find that the conditions of truth fall within the judgment

in question, and, in the ultimate analysis, determines non-contradiction, non-contradiction as a test of truth must be, as has already been suggested, a mere negative way of putting the positive structure of truth, which is to be found in the judgment itself. Non-contradiction is then misleading, either as truth or as a test of truth.

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# **The Rationale of the doctrine of Pre-established Harmony**

By

A. HADY TALUQDAR

Ontologically Leibnitz is an Idealist, since he believes that all that exists is spiritual. On the other hand I should say that epistemologically he is a Realist.

I propose to determine what is the basic assumption that an Idealist must make in order that it might be possible for him to be epistemologically a Realist and I shall endeavour to show that like Leibnitz he must take recourse to the hypothesis of Pre-established Harmony.

An Idealist must believe that although perception does not disclose to us the ultimate nature of reality yet that which it does disclose to us *at least* points to, corresponds with or is about, what is real. Doubtless perception discloses to us things as having sensible qualities. Evidently our empirical view of the world is that the sensible qualities do belong to things *because* we perceive things as having these qualities.

It is evident, therefore, that in order that an idealist may maintain epistemologically the position of a Realist, the empirical view of the world must not be treated as wholly erroneous; and for that reason the sensible qualities must have some relation to the ultimate qualities of existents. That is, although the empirical view of the world is due to *our way* of perceiving the world, yet the empirical world is not an illusion. These appearances correspond with the ultimate nature of existents: they are the *ways in which* the existents

present themselves to the perceiving mind and on that ground we can reasonably say that they are of the existents i.e. reality. It is because of the *symbolic* nature of the appearances that they are *phenomena bene fundata*.

Otherwise the term appearance loses all its meaning, and the status of the external world is no better than that of an illusion. But the well-founded appearances must not be regarded as having a status beyond the content of a mind, and therefore the problem arises as to how we can justify that they correspond with the nature of reality? Or otherwise expressed how can ideas find *any* application to things which are outside the mind?

The statement that appearances correspond with reality is then equivalent to the assertion that a content of a mind corresponds with reality. Obviously it is necessary for an idealist to justify the view that when the content of a mind corresponds with the reality that is, when a percept stands in a relation of correspondence, and *not* in a relation of copying or of similarity to the thing perceived, then the content or the percept *does* represent the nature of reality. In other words, the relation of correspondence as constituting a perception to be veridical requires to be justified.

I propose to consider its justification by showing that no other relation e.g. the relation of copying or of similarity, as holding between the percept and the thing perceived can be justified. In the course of this essay it will be seen that the usual argument that the relation that holds between the two terms is a relation of copying or of similarity, is one that rests on an assumption requiring justification. Not only so. There are insuperable difficulties in the way of justifying this assumption: they arise naturally in our reflection upon the nature of the object and of the percipient. In consequence, the plausibility of the relation of correspondence

as holding between the percept and the thing perceived will become evident. But we are concerned with the problem: *Has the Idealist any right to assert that a percept corresponds with the thing perceived? And do we obtain any answer from Leibnitz to this question?* It is here that we can estimate the importance of Leibnitz's hypothesis of "Pre-established Harmony".

It might be urged that there is no problem at all. It is essential to perception that it should express something beyond itself. And since there is no need for a perception to be like the thing it expresses, a perception corresponds with the thing perceived. But the point is, why is it that a perception will not be like the thing of which it is a perception? Why is there no need for a perception to be like the thing perceived? *This* certainly requires an answer. But one may contend that there is here no problem at all. We perceive directly the things of the world. And since, due to direct perception, our perceptions are like the things perceived, there does not arise any problem. But we are then involved in further serious difficulties. For example, there can then be no erroneous perception and therefore no illusion—which is contrary to facts.

Turning now to our question, let us first see how Leibnitz reaches the conclusion that no other relation, *e.g.* the relation of copying or of similarity, as holding between the percept and the thing perceived can hold good. The argument that is usually adduced is the argument from causal activity.

It is maintained that the percept is *like* the thing perceived because of the activity of the thing on the percipient. In other words, in consequence of the assumption that perception is due to the activity of the thing perceived on the percipient, there arises the belief that a percept is like the thing perceived. It is because of the belief that perception is caused by the thing perceived, that a plain man believes that his percepts

*resemble* the thing perceived. For, otherwise, how can his states resemble those of the thing perceived? They can resemble only on the supposition that the object acts on him in the same manner as a seal does on wax. If, however, our perception is not causally determined, our perceptions *may not* resemble the object perceived. But can an object act on the percipient in the same manner as a seal does on wax? Can an object act on the percipient *at all*?

Suppose an object acts on the percipient. Then, it must act through contact. Leibnitz's point is, I take it, that when I want to act on the book before me i.e. when for instance, I want to push it, I do so with my hand. Until the book comes into contact with my hand, I cannot push it, even though I should will it to move. Hence, if the object acts on myself, it must do so through contact in like manner. Thus, to justify this assumption, Leibnitz points out that it must be further assumed that the object acts on the percipient through contact of something emitted from the object. But it is hard to see what can be emitted. The object, whatever its nature might turn out to be, is constituted of qualities although it itself is not a quality. But the qualities can never be separated from the object. "Accidents," Leibnitz says, "cannot separate themselves from substances nor go about outside of them, as the 'sensible species' of the scholastic used to do."

Neither can a quality subsist even for an infinitesimal moment while detached from the thing as a state of nothing. For it is contrary to the notion of a quality to be thus 'homeless' and 'wandering.' Nor is it obvious that a quality when detached will find its way to the percipient. For, who gave the direction to that which is emitted at the particular moment to the percipient and *not* to any other thing? If

we assume that the object has given it this direction, we are then presupposing the same process of causative action taking place between the two terms, which we are here strenuously trying to make intelligible.

Let us however suppose that somehow or other the contact is made. The question will still remain as to the law which entitles this contact to make possible and necessary that which would not occur without it. That is, so far as I can see there is no such inner connexion between the conception of contact and that of action as to make it self-evident that one involves the other.

The object, then, cannot act on the percipient. The same conclusion will emerge if we consider the nature of the percipient.

Underlying the assertion viz., the object acts on the percipient, there is the tacit assumption that the nature of a percipient is such as makes it possible for an object to modify the percipient's state in a manner that we may thereby say that the content is 'given' to the percipient. And this is clearly stated when it is said such a content is a mere receptivity. But how can, Leibnitz asks, anything be given to the percipient? "For it is not conceivable by what passage or by what means of conveyance, *any thing* can be carried..... to the soul." Again, "By what means can ideas be given? Has the soul windows, does it resemble tablets, is it like wax? It is plain that all who so regard the soul, represent it as at bottom corporeal."

Let us however, suppose that something can be given to the percipient. But does it follow from this that the percipient must receive it *in the same manner* as it is given? In other words, on what ground is it held that the content of the mind strictly *resembles* the things which are outside the mind? Is

the action of the object perceived on the percipient adequate to give rise to a content resembling the object ?

An answer to this question requires us to study carefully the nature of a self. According to Leibnitz, a self is active. And it is because of its activity that it is a substance. How can, then, a self whose nature is active, remain wholly passive while an object acts on it ? In that case a self will cease to be a self. Therefore, it is contrary to the nature of a self to remain wholly passive at any time. And if this is true, it is not possible that the activity of an object can give rise to a state that will strictly resemble the objects.

It may be urged that if the nature of the self is passive to a certain extent, then it might be possible for an object by its activity to cause a percept to resemble it.

But it may be said in reply that the perception, which is essential to there being a percept, is an activity, and, therefore, it is quite likely that the receptivity is not quite so straightforward as it might seem. In that case there is no likelihood of a percept resembling an object even though the latter might have the former's genesis in the percipient's mind.

Further, we may ask : Is it true to say that causes resemble their effects ? Certainly causes do not necessarily resemble their effects. Happiness in Rahim does not resemble the misery which it may cause to the envious Karim. An angry man does not resemble a slammed door. A ray of sunshine does not resemble a faded water-colour.

We have been all this while talking about activity of an object on the percipient. But have we ever asked if such an activity exists at all ? What reason is there to believe in the existence of such an activity ?

If we are asked for a proof of its existence, we are usually referred to the evidence of introspection. When I will to

move my arm, and my arm is thereupon moved, I am directly aware, it is said, of an activity which I, the willing subject, am exerting. Even if there were an activity in such cases, it would give us no reason to believe that there was any such activity in an entity without volition.

But I do not believe that there is any such activity to be perceived even when our volitions are analysed. In my own case I can perceive no such activity. I perceive something else which is mistaken for it. I am conscious of willing. And then, after an interval of more or less duration, I am conscious that the result which I willed—the movement of my arm, for example, has taken place. In some cases, also, I am conscious of a feeling of tension or strain within myself. But this is all. This feeling of tension or strain is not an activity exercised by me on my arm. It is itself an effect of some cause or causes, and it is a psychological state and falls wholly within my mind. But I venture to think that this feeling of tension is mistaken for an activity exercised by me on my arm. On these grounds the view that we are directly aware of such an activity on an analysis of volition may be rejected. And no other reasons have ever been given why we should believe in such an activity.

Evidently, then, we have no reason whatever to believe that the assumption, *viz.*, the object acts on the percipient, is valid ; and therefore there is no justification for holding that the percept stands in a relation of copying or of similarity to the object perceived. Have we any reason to hold that the percept stands in a relation of correspondence to the object perceived ?

Has an idealist any right to hold such a view of perception ? Or is it a pleasant and plausible supposition he entertains in order that his metaphysics might come to terms with common-sense ?

Obviously there can be no indubitable empirical fact which might be adduced as a reasonable argument to establish that a percept does really correspond with the object perceived. For, to do so, it is necessary to hold in view the percept and the object as it is in-itself so that a comparison between them might be instituted to determine the truth of the statement in question. But it is impossible to hold the object before our mind as it is in-itself. For its possibility is *ex hypothesi* precluded: a percept as we have seen, can stand only in a relation of correspondence to the object perceived. Evidently, therefore, there is no *direct way* in which the truth of the statement can be determined. It is here that the rationale of the doctrine of the pre-established harmony becomes fully evident. For it will be seen that by having recourse only to the doctrine of pre-established harmony, a belief that a percept corresponds with the object perceived can be justified.

Let us consider an illustration. I believe that at this moment I perceive this paper before me, and not a book on my shelf in the other room. My ground for this belief is ostensibly the fact—I take it to be true—that I am related to this paper in such a way as enables my states to correspond with those of the paper. And it is because I am not, at present, related to the book in the other room in the same or a similar way, that my states do not correspond with those of the book. In other words, I am not suitably related to the book, and therefore my states do not correspond with those of the book. On the same ground also I can justify why I call my dream-objects unreal. What makes them unreal is the unusual nature of their connection with my self. In order that a perception may be regarded as veridical, it is essential that the percipient be suitably related to the thing perceived. A belief in a suitable relationship as existing between a



percipient and a thing perceived, then, justifies us in regarding the states of the percipient as corresponding with those of the thing perceived.

Now this conception of a suitable relationship involves conceptions of fitness, order, and constancy. So, when Leibnitz says that this correspondence between perception and the thing perceived can only be explained by supposing it to have been pre-established by God, what he means, I venture to suggest, is that this correspondence in question can only be explained by supposing it *as due to a suitable relationship* between the percipient and the thing perceived pre-established by God. We may say, then, that in consequence of this pre-established suitable relationship a percept of a percipient corresponds with the thing perceived. "Metaphysically speaking," says Leibnitz, "it is not the nerves which act upon the soul, but the one represents the state of the other through the spontaneous relation."

Hence an idealist in order to be a realist epistemologically must *assume such a suitable relationship as pre-established* between the percipient and the thing perceived, and therefore for such an idealist relation can not be unreal.

As far as I know Leibnitz has nowhere denied the reality of relations. On the contrary, he says something very different.

In agreement with Locke, although Leibnitz says, "I believe that qualities are only modifications of substances, and that the understanding adds thereto relations," yet in the paragraph that follows, he insists that relations 'are not groundless or unreal.' For they are *not* due to the activity of *our* mind; 'there is a supreme intelligence which determines them all for all time.' Not only so. God, we are told, perceives relations, and in this consists the reality of relations. 'God sees not only single monads and the modifications of each monad, but also

their relations, and in this consists the reality of relations.' Surely, then, a thing which God perceives can not be unreal.

It is true that at one place Leibnitz says that relation 'is a mere ideal thing,' yet he does not mean thereby to deny the reality of relations. On the contrary, I think what he wants to point out is that relations are real for a reason different from that for which the qualities are. Leibnitz argues that relations can not be 'in' the things. Neither can they be ultimately 'in' our mind. Hence, I think, that by the phrase 'ideal thing' Leibnitz wants to point out simply the peculiarity of relation, namely, that although relation is something real, yet we cannot say that relation is 'in' anything, meaning by anything, that with which we are acquainted.

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# The Two-Fold Path in the Gita

By

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN

[What is attempted in this paper is a faithful presentation of Saṅkara's point of view. There is, however, a growing section of Advaitins who, taking their clue from Maṇḍana, believe that the contrast between Jñāna and karma is overdrawn by Saṅkara. It is urged that the path of activity as such is not incapable of sublimation into Brahmānubhava. Even Jñāna is activity of a sort. Brahman-intuition is not Brahman, and so far forth it falls within the ambit of avidyā. The path of Jñāna too starts *from* avidyā; and what helps in the transcendence is itself avidyā.]

## I

The Vedas teach a two-fold dharma—pravṛtti or the path of works for those who desire prosperity here and happiness in a hereafter and nivṛtti or withdrawal from all action for those who long for liberation from transmigratory existence. The two paths lead to two different goals, one perishable and the other imperishable. The path of works was taught to Prajāpati and others of his stock, while the Upaniṣad-way was revealed to those who are in quest of release like Sanaka and Sanandana. Vedic rites are for persons who are endowed with nescience and desire :<sup>1</sup> the renunciation of these works is enjoined on those who seek only the self and are free from desire. It will thus be seen that these two ways do not meet.

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1. Mem. Edn., Vol. II, p. 20.

They can even be said to proceed in opposite directions—the path of works leading into, and the way of wisdom leading out of avidyā.

The *Gītā* too teaches two paths—yoga or the path of works and sāṅkhya or the way of wisdom; and the adhikārin (eligible person) also is different for each.<sup>2</sup> But the discrepancy between the two ways is removed by making the path of works subservient to and terminating in the higher way. This the *Gitācārya* is able to do, following the Upanisadic teaching, by revising the concept of *karma*.<sup>3</sup>

He is sternly against the performance of Vedic rites in the expectation of rewards here or in a hereafter. He calls it trayi-dharma or trayi-vidyā, and says that those who adopt it are subject to death and rebirth. Religious rites may bring in merit and consequent pleasures of heaven ; but as soon as the stock of punya (merit) is exhausted, one has to return to this world and suffer from the ills of samsāra (IX, 20 & 21). No lasting bliss can be achieved through this method ; and those who pursue it come in for severe condemnation by the Lord. At one place he says that the Vedas treat of the triad of the gunas (dispositions of Nature), and asks Arjuna to pass beyond. (ii. 45)

The karma-yoga which Sri Krishna prescribes in the *Gītā* has the sole purpose of purifying the mind and preparing the way for wisdom. Says Sankara : "The path of works is not of itself the instrument of attaining the human goal ; it is so only through the way of wisdom."<sup>4</sup> Even this it is able to do

2. Bh. G., III, 3.

3. See Sir S. Radhakrishnan's *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 570 : The *Gītā* transforms the Vedic theory of sacrifices and reconciles it with true spiritual knowledge.

4. Mem Edn., Vol. II, p. 84.

because the sting has been removed by making karma *niskāma* (selfless). The two methods are but two stages in the path to perfection. Though they are not identical and cannot be combined, they are not discontinuous.

## II

This view of the *Gītā*-way some exponents of the Scripture would not endorse. They maintain that the *Gītā* is a call to action. Activism is its central teaching. The Gospel was occasioned by a moral *impasse* when Arjuna was paralysed into inaction, overcome by delusion and weak-minded compassion ; and it was intended to make him shake off his misplaced pity and fight to the finish, be the result of the war victory or vanquishment. Thus karma-yoga is the sole purport of the *Gītā sūtra*. Action is its essential lesson. The entire *Gītā* is an exhortation to action. Work is inevitable, according to Sri Krishna ; for he declares, "No man can sit idle even for a moment without some work" (iii, 5) ; "It is indeed impossible for any embodied being to abstain entirely from work" (xviii, 11). And to Arjuna for whom the *Gītā*-teaching is primarily intended, the Lord says, "Thou art entitled to work alone" (ii, 47) ; "Do thy allotted work ; for to work is better than to desist from work" (iii, 8) ; "Do thy duty always without attachment, for a man who does his work without attachment wins the Supreme" (iii, 19), How in the past the goal was reached by persons who took to this path is shown in the next verse: "It is by works alone that men like Janaka attained perfection ; and works thou shouldst do also with a view to the maintenance of the world." (iii, 20). "Do thy work therefore as the ancients did in former times" (iv, 15): "Let Scripture be thy authority in determining what ought to be done and what ought not to be done. Knowing the Scriptural Law thou shouldst do thy work in this world" (xvi, 24). Thus it is concluded from these and

similar statements in the *Gītā* that disinterested work is taught by Sri Krishna as the one inescapable means to perfection.

There is much to be said in favour of this view. One meets with the command 'yudhyasva (Do thou fight)' here and there in the Gita. The message was delivered to Arjuna in order to whip him on to execute his erstwhile resolve. But still the *Gitāchārya* recognises the fact that karma has to stop half-way. We should not make too much of the historical setting. As Sir S. Radhakrishnan remarks, "As the dialogue proceeds the dramatic element disappears. The echoes of the battle-field die away, and we have only an interview between God and man. The chariot of war becomes the lonely cell of meditation, and a corner of the battle-field where the voices of the world are stilled, a fit place for thoughts on the Supreme."<sup>5</sup> Any one who is conversant with the story of the *Mahābhārata* knows well that nobody was enthusiastic about the War except Duryodhana and his compeers, that every attempt was made to prevent the catastrophe, and that Sri Krishna himself undertook to act as the ambassador of peace. Verses 31-38 Ch. II in which are set forth the most convincing arguments, from the point of view of world-affairs as to the righteousness of the Great War and the duty of Arjuna to wage it, do not constitute the central teaching of the *Gitāchārya*. Arjuna is not unaware of arguments such as these ; for, on an earlier occasion he himself has tendered them to his brother Yudhishtira. As Sankara points out while commenting on verse 18 in Ch. II, the duty of fighting is not enjoined by the Lord ; Arjuna has come to the battle-field prepared to fight ; but owing to the obstruction caused by grief and delusion he remains inactive ; and the Lord wants only to remove the obstacle. Hence the words 'Do thou fight' signify no command, but constitute merely a restatement. The *Gita-śāstra* is intended to remove

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5. *Indian Philosophy*, vol I. p. 521.

the cause of samsara such as grief and delusion, and not to enjoin works.<sup>6</sup> This is corroborated by Arjuna's admission at the end of the Gita : "My delusion is gone, and I have gained recognition through Thy "grace" (xviii, 73). Sankara has these words to say on this passage : "This shows conclusively what the purpose of a knowledge of the whole śāstra is, namely, the destruction of delusion and the attainment of the recognition of the self."<sup>7</sup>

If it were the teaching of Sri Krishna that karma is obligatory on all persons irrespective of their attainments, then many passages in the Gita would be unintelligible. Even at the very beginning of the discourse the Lord imparts to Arjuna a knowledge of the indestructible self which is eternal and has neither birth nor death. From the way in which the Gospel is commenced it would appear that its purport is to bring home to the mind of man who is upset at the onslaught of troubles and loses his balance easily, that all these that are the necessary accompaniments of temporal life—loves and hates, calm and storm—avail nothing and seem insignificant *sub speci æternitatis*. The need for renunciation on the part of one who seeks release is stressed by Sri Krishna in several places : Surrender all thy works to me (iii, 30) ; those who worship me, renouncing all actions in me, regarding me as the supreme, meditating on me with single-hearted devotion ; I save them, O Arjuna, from the sea of mortal life (xii, 6 and 7) ; surrendering mentally all actions to me, regarding me as the supreme and resorting to steadfastness of mind, do thou fix thy thought constantly on me (xviii, 57). The supreme state of freedom from action is stated to be attained by renunciation (xviii, 49). That there is no use of works for one who has reached the goal or for one who with a purified heart longs to reach it is stated

6. *Mem. Edn.* Vol. 11, p. 31.

7. *Mem. Edn.*, Vol. 12, p. 568.

in iv, 13 : the soul which has renounced all actions by mind dwells at ease self-subdued in the nine-gated city, neither acting nor causing to act. The Yogārūḍha or one who has attained to yoga has no attachment to the objects of sense nor to works and has wholly renounced his desires (iv, 4). He is said to have crossed the guṇas, who is the same in honour and dishonour, the same to friend and foe, and who has renounced all undertakings (xiv, 25). It is declared also that the fire of wisdom consumes all works, and that for him who rejoices in the self there is nothing to do.

In view of the evidence set forth above, Sankara's interpretation of verse 2 in Ch. V seems to be the most fitting. Arjuna asks Śrī Kṛṣṇa to tell him for certain which of the two paths—renunciation of works (sāṅkhya) or their performance without attachment (yoga)—is the better. The Lord replies that both lead to the same goal, the highest bliss, and adds that karma-yoga is better than renunciation of karma. As it is not possible even in dream that the person who knows the real nature of the self can have anything to do with works which are opposed to right knowledge and are based on ignorance. Arjuna's question concerns only those who have not known the self. Of the two paths, which is better for the ignorant ? Both these are characterised by Śrī Kṛṣṇa as leading to mokṣa—though one of them, viz., yoga, can do so, according to Sankara, only indirectly. As karma sannyāsa is a dangerous weapon in the hands of the ignorant (in fact, they are incapable of it), karma-yoga is to be preferred in their case. It is superior to the renunciation of works unaccompanied by knowledge ; it is easier of accomplishment and culminates in real sannyāsa.<sup>8</sup>

The reason why release is unattainable through works is this. Mokṣa is not what is accomplished in time. The end

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8. Mem. Edn., Vol. II, pp. 155-156.



which is called in the *Gītā* by different synonymous names—mukti, brāhmi-sthiti, naiṣkarmya, nistraigunya, and brahma-bhāva—is not a temporal terminus. It is the realisation of the non-difference between the absolute and the apparently sundered self. The result of an act may be one of four kinds—origination (utpatti), attainment (prāpti), modification (vikāra) and purification (samskāra). The Absolute is eternally attained and devoid of change. It is ever pure and perfect. And so it can never be the fruit of an act. It is ignorance that is the cause of misery and metempsychosis, and karma which is but its offspring cannot remove it. It is through delusion by egoity that man thinks 'I am the doer' (iii, 27); and this avidyā cannot be destroyed by karma.

As for the passages quoted in support of the view that karma-yoga is the message of the *Gītā*, they must be reinterpreted in a way that sets them in harmony with the entire scheme. Verse 5 in ch. iii, where it is stated that no man can sit inactive even for a while, refers to those who are ignorant. They cannot be still even for a moment without work. They may think themselves to be not working; but all the time they are at work. As for those who are wise, there is no activity at all for them. In truth, the self is non-active. It is through ignorance that agency is illusorily superposed thereon. The term 'embodied being' in xviii, 11, refers to the individual who identifies himself with his body for no one who is wise can be called a body-wearer. The meaning of this verse is that it is not possible for an ignorant person to abandon actions completely. As for the remark that Arjuna is entitled to work alone, it is true. Arjuna has misjudged his eligibility. The Lord, his friend and master, shows him his rightful place and urges him to prepare himself for the higher way through selfless work. Verse 8 in ch. iii is also addressed to Arjuna and persons of his stamp; and in their case, verily, action is superior to

inaction in of point result. Both action and inaction pertain to the ignorant. With reference to the enlightened man who is devoid of conceit in agency, it is as meaningless to assert 'he does not act' as it is to say, 'he acts.' The verse (iii, 20) which speaks of men like Janaka having attained *samsiddhi* by works alone is best understood in the light of Sankara's remarks. If Janaka and others had attained right knowledge already, then they appeared as if to act in order to prevent the world from being misled. It is dangerous to create in the minds of the ignorant a distaste even for selfless work. To the leaders of men Sri Krishna gives the salutary advice: "Do not unsettle the minds of the ignorant that are attached to work" (iii, 26). If persons like Janaka had not attained right knowledge, then the word '*samsiddhi*' means '*sattva-sudhi*' (purity of mind). Verse 5 in ch. v which reads, 'that state which is reached by the *sāṅkhya*s is reached by the *yogins* also; he who sees that *sāṅkhya* and *yoga* are one—he sees indeed,' must be understood to mean that release which is the result of *jñāna* is attained by the *yogins* also indirectly through the acquisition of right knowledge and renunciation and that the two paths are declared to be one as leading to an identical end. Thus it is evident that the *Gītā* while teaching *karma-yoga* as the preparatory means to the dawn of wisdom, does not regard it as the direct instrument of release.

### III

It may be held the *Gītā* teaches combination of works with wisdom (*jñāna-karma-samuccaya*). It is this view attributed to the *Vṛttikara* that is repeatedly condemned by Sankara. Apart from the fact that it is impossible to combine *karma* with knowledge, there is no evidence whatsoever for such a view in the *Gītā*. The Lord assigns the two paths.

jñāna (sāṅkhya) and karma (yoga) to two different sets of persons (iii, 3). The two are distinct and should not be mixed up. The sāṅkhya view implies non-agency and unity, while the yoga view involves agency and plurality. In ch. ii. Sri Krishna teaches the way of wisdom first and then the path of works. At the beginning of chapter iii. Arjuna asks his master why he should engage himself in a horrible war if it was the view of Sri Krishna that wisdom is superior to works. This question implies that the Gitācārya has taught two distinct paths jñāna and karma of which the former is the superior. It may be thought that Arjuna has misunderstood Sri Krishna's teaching. But if that were so, the Lord should have corrected him in his reply. Instead, he declares that a two-fold way of life was taught of yore by him—knowledge for men of contemplation and works for men of action.

#### IV

The *Bhagavad Gītā* is meant for the generality of mankind. It was taught to Arjuna, the Representative Man. Hence the prominence given to the path of works therein. The philosophy of work, however, is not so easy of comprehension as it appears to be. Hard to understand is the way of work (iv, 17). Even the learned find it difficult to distinguish between what is work and what is no work (iv, 16). What apparently seems to be work may not be really so, and what appears to be no work may in truth be work. To one who is on board a fast moving ship the trees on the shore seem to move, while the ship itself appears to stand still. He is wise among men, he is a yogin, who is not beguiled by appearances, who sees no work in work and work in no work (iv, 8 & Commentary). As the theory of relativity tells us, a

rod of steel is no more rigid than a wriggling eel.<sup>9</sup> Relativity penetrates a region which is deeper than that of the physical. In a world of claims and counter-claims such as ours there will always be difference in points of view. And the aim of the *Gītā*, as it is the aim of every book based on the philosophy of the Upanishads, is to lift man out of this vicious circle and enable him to realise the eternal and non-dual nature of the self. Work is advocated therefore only as a step to regain that higher vision, and not as an independent means self-sufficient and self-complete.

A distinction must be made between karma mārga and karma-yoga—the path of work pursued for selfish ends and the path of work that culminates in the acquisition of right knowledge. Even at the outset the Gita warns against indulgence in work for the sake of earthly prosperity or heavenly enjoyment. It calls them fools who rejoice in the letter of the Veda, and perform rites for the purpose of attaining the pleasures of heaven (ii. 42 & 43). They are hurled from death to birth, from one world to another; the choicest joys they can conceive of turn out to be sources of misery; and they find no rest (ix, 20 & 21). Optional rites (Kāmya-karma) lead to perishable results when a person performs them with a selfish motive, and he is afflicted thereby. Real yajña (sacrifice), according to the Gita-teaching, is that which is done with no axe to grind. It is through this kind of yajña that the world order is kept on. And he who does not help to promote the cosmic weal lives in vain. Through

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9. See Bertrand Russell : *The ABC of Relativity*, pp. 117 & 118 : The point is, not that eels are really rigid, but that steel rods really wriggle. To an observer in just one possible state of motion the eel would appear rigid while the steel rod would seem to wriggle just as the eel does to us.

sacrifice the world is sustained ; and through sacrifice man gets liberated from attachment. Work that is not done as a sacrifice reinforces the fetters of finite existence (iii, 9 & 16). Thus the first part of the *Gita*-ethics is concerned with pointing out the evil effects of egoistic hedonism ; and it holds aloft *loka-sangraha* (maintenance of the world or general welfare) as a worthy ideal of conduct.

To attain to this state of thought and action a rigorous moral discipline is necessary. The root of all evil is attachment to objects of sense, hankering for pleasures in this life and in the life-after-death (if it is believed in). A man first thinks of an object of sense as worthy of attainment. He feels drawn to it. From this attachment arises desire. Desire prompts him to activity. If he is frustrated in his attempt, he gets angry. Anger breeds delusion, and delusion the loss of recollection. Sanity takes leave of such a person ; and he perishes at last (ii, 62-64). Desire and wrath are enemies of man. In fact, they are not two ; they are identical. The world is wrapped in desire as a flame is enveloped by smoke (iii, 37-38). Lust, wrath and greed are the three gateways of hell (xvi, 21); the first rung in the spiritual ladder is reached by avoiding these. Hence the *Gītā* urges repeatedly the cultivation of an attitude of detachment.<sup>10</sup> Work should be done without attachment (ii, 48 ; iii, 19). The difference between a fool's work and a wise man's actions is this : while the ignorant man acts from attachment to his work, the enlightened individual acts without attachment (iii, 25).

Non-attachment to objects of sense is gained by control of the senses and mind. The senses should be restrained even at the start (iii, 41). One should not come under the sway

10. Mahatma Gandhi gives to the message of the *Gītā* the significant name, *anāsakti yoga*.

of the senses and their objects. The *Kāthopanishad* compares the senses to horses and the sense-objects to the spheres of their roving; the body is the chariot, the intellect is the charioteer, the mind is the rein, and the self is the lord of the chariot. If the reins are not held firm, the senses, like wicked horses, become unmanageable.<sup>11</sup> Mere control of the organs of action is futile. The senses may be inactive; but the mind may wander afar. He is a hypocrite who puts on an air of piety without first cleansing his heart (iii, 6). Inner purity is more essential than external conformity to ethical codes.

As an aid to mind-control the yoga of meditation (dhyāna-yoga) is taught in chapter VI. The yogin should choose a clean place for his yogic practice. The seat should be neither too high nor too low, *kuśa* grass is to be spread over it, and then a deerskin, and then a piece of cloth. Seating himself thereon, the yogin should control his thoughts, senses and movements and make his mind one-pointed. He should maintain a steady posture, hold his trunk, head and neck erect and still, and gaze on the tip of his nose, without looking around. He should not swerve from his vow of celibacy and should direct his thoughts Godward. He should eat neither too much nor too little. He should not sleep too long; nor should he keep vigil all night. Thus the yogin's way is the Middle Path of judicious moderation. Through this path he attains peace of mind.

The yogin whose mind is under control is not affected by heat and cold, pleasure and pain. The results of his action do not worry him. Success and failure make no difference to him. He works with an even mind, having given up all attachment. His actions are prompted by yoga and not by

11. *Kāthopanishad*, I. iii, 3-5.

desire. He is not tormented by the vicissitudes of fortune. He bestows no thought on what he will get or what he will not get. He has risen above his lower self of passions and desires. Looked at in this light, yoga is evenness of mind (*samatvam yoga ucyate*, ii, 48).

The yogin who keeps his mind even does his work without a desire for its fruit. Even the optional rites (*kāmya karma*) he performs as if they were obligatory rites (*nitya-karma*). Optional rites lead to some specific results. *Jyotiṣṭhoma*, for instance, is an optional rite; and one who desires heaven is asked to perform it. Letting alone the sphere of Vedic rites, we find that almost everyone of our conscious activities is undertaken for the purpose of attaining some desired end. But these ends are only further obstacles in the way to the soul's progress. To be more correct, what binds the soul is not the fruit of an action, but the craving therefor and the clinging thereto. In the case of obligatory duties (*nitya-karma*) there is no positive result over and above the cleansing of the heart. Hence, they do not bind the soul in the sense in which optional rites do. If the optional rites are performed in the same spirit in which the obligatory duties are done, then they also do not bind, for they become *niṣkāma-karma*. This is the unique contribution of *Gītā* to the philosophy of work, namely, the teaching: *Act in such a way that your actions shall not bind you. Do your duty for the sake of duty.* This the *Gītā* extols as 'wisdom in work'; this is yoga (*yogāḥ karmasu kauśalam*, ii, 50).

If the Gita-account of yoga stopped with the doctrine of 'duty for duty's sake', it would be formal and negative, even as the Kantian dictum is criticised to be. The standard of moral action must refer to an end. Only this end cannot be pleasure. It is perfection. As the *Gītā* puts it, the self is to be saved

by the self (vi, 5). This implies a sublimation of the lower instincts and appetites, passions and desires. The deeds that are performed must yield their results ; there is no escape. But the yogin does not regard these results as ends, but only as consequents. Niṣkāma karma makes for the purification of the mind. The yogins do their work without attachment for the purification of their souls (ātma-śuddhaye, V, 11) ; and they offer their actions and the results as oblations to the Lord. The goal of moral action is the attainment of communion (yoga) with God who is the internal ruler of all beings. In this way, the yogin gives up conceit in enjoyership, and becomes eligible to receive the lamp of wisdom which the Lord bestows on him by dispelling the darkness of ignorance (X, 11.)

Yoga is a channel to sāṅkhya or knowledge of the nature of the self. Sri Krishna begins his teaching, as we said, with a discourse on the immortality of the self. There is no non-existence of the real, nor is there existence of the unreal. The self is real ; and therefore it ever exists. Bodies are no more than cloaks which the soul puts on and off. Life and death do not make any change in the self which is indestructible, which neither slays nor is slain. It is never born, it never dies, nor having come into existence, does it again cease to be. Unborn, eternal, everlasting and ancient, it is not slain when the body is slain. He who knows thus the true nature of the self 'does not grieve', for he has attained to the highest knowledge. He renounces conceit in agency. He relinquishes all resolutions (sarva-saṅkalpa-sannyāsa). His renunciation is more mental than physical, more internal than external, real rather than apparent. The *Gita* sets itself against hypocrisy and superficiality in religion. It is not, however, true to say that Sri Krishna does not hold up sannyasa as the highest ideal.



Niskarma-siddhi (transcendence of all work) is declared to be the supreme end and sannyasa to be the means (xviii, 49). Renunciation is not idleness. It is compatible with the normal activities of life. In truth, all actions are really done by the dispositions of prakṛti. But man, deluded by egoity, thinks that he is the agent (iii, 27 ; xiii, 29). He who is wise keeps himself aloof and merely witnesses the show got up by the sense-organs in company with the sense-objects (iii, 28). He delights in the self and is satisfied with the self alone ; for him there is nothing to be accomplished, there is no work (iii, 17). Chapter IV tremes with passages in praise of jñāni, declaring that in the case of the enlightened there is no consideration of work whatever. The actions of the jñāni are all apparent. Others think that he works ; but he does no work. He is ever engaged in work, and yet he does nothing (iv, 20). He is not bound, though he may seem to be active. All his actions belong to his body and not to his real nature as self (iv, 21 & 22). He thinks 'I do nothing at all'; and this is the truth ; for whatever may be the form of activity—seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, tasting, walking, breathing and sleeping—all that is an affair of the senses which are engrossed in the objects of sense (v, 8 & 9). Of the four types of people who are devoted to God—those who are in distress, those who wish to learn, those that seek certain ends and those who know the truth—the last class are considered superior to the rest, for their devotion is centred in the One and they are ever undistracted and attuned. Sri Krishna says that the jñāni is supremely dear to him, nay, his very self (vii, 17 & 18).

Jñāna is the fire that burns up all works (iv, 19) ; as the fire which is kindled reduces all fuel to ashes, so the fire of knowledge reduces all works to ashes (iv, 37) ; the sword of knowledge cuts asunder the doubts in the heart, born of ignorance (iv, 42) : the raft of knowledge enables even the most

sinful of sinners to cross over all transgression (iv, 36)<sup>12</sup>; many there have been who have become pure through the austerity of knowledge (iv, 10); verily, there is no purifier on earth equal to knowledge (iv, 38); in knowledge all works get lost (iv, 23); all works without a residue culminate in knowledge (iv, 33). Knowledge is attained through faith and through knowledge supreme peace is gained (iv, 39). In chapter XIII, a list is given of the constituents of knowledge. Modesty, freedom from vanity, non-violence, patience, uprightness, service of the teacher, purity, steadfastness, self-control, renunciation of desire for objects of sense, absence of egoity, perception of the evil of temporal events, non-attachment to the things of the earth, constant evenness of mind amidst pairs of opposites, unremitting devotion to the Deity, love of solitude, aversion to crowds, steadfastness in the knowledge of the self, and an insight into the nature of truth and the knowledge thereof—these constitute true knowledge (xiii, 7-11). Through knowledge one crosses over sorrow and attains Brahma-nirvāṇa.

Thus it is clear that the Gita is not only a yoga-śāstra, but also Brahma-vidyā told in song. While showing to man the path of selfless work and warning him against pseudo-sannyasa, it points to the higher way of wisdom whereby he reaches the goal whence there is no return.

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12. *Mundakopaniṣad*, I, ii, 7 characterises sacrificial forms as unsafe boats :

# **The Meaning and Possibility of Knowledge**

**By**

**R. DAS**

I have often taken the term knowledge as synonymous with consciousness or awareness, and have argued that it is not possible to define this term, because it is an ultimate and simple notion which cannot be further analysed. I do not think I can maintain this position now. There are agnostics and sceptics who deny or doubt the possibility of knowledge, but they do not deny or doubt the possibility of consciousness as such. Consciousness is such a patent fact that it is impossible to deny or doubt it or its possibility. We can deny or doubt what appears in consciousness, but consciousness itself cannot be doubted or denied. It is consciousness that makes doubt or denial possible, and they cannot reasonably be directed against what constitutes their ground as also the ground of any other mental act. It is thus clear that when anybody says that knowledge is not possible, he does not and need not mean that consciousness is not possible, that the denial of knowledge is consistent with the affirmation of consciousness.

We find nothing strange in this position, when we reflect that although knowledge is a mode of consciousness, consciousness has other modes besides that of knowledge. The volitional and emotional modes of consciousness are distinguished from the cognitive mode. Moreover we know cases of error and illusion which are admittedly not cases of knowledge, but nobody will ever contend that there is no consciousness present in them. Thus it is evident that we

cannot equate knowledge with consciousness, but must regard it as a specific mode of consciousness.

A case of error or illusion is not a case of knowledge, because what we are aware of in such a case is not a real object. When we see a snake in the place of a stick, the snake as thus seen is no real snake at all. If the snake were real as it appeared, it would be a case of knowledge and not illusion. If this is so, then I think we can define knowledge in the following way : Knowledge is a mode of consciousness in which we are aware (conscious) of an object as it really is. Here knowledge is defined in terms of consciousness and object. We admit that consciousness is indefinable, but knowledge need not be so, inasmuch as we seem able to assign its genus as well its differentia. Consciousness gives the genus of knowledge, and the 'reality' of its object defines its specific character as distinguished from other modes of consciousness. By the object of a mode of consciousness we mean what appears in that mode. When the object is real as it appears in a mode of consciousness, then the mode in question is one of knowledge. In all other modes of consciousness, the object has no reality, at least no being apart from and independently of the mode of consciousness in which it appears. The object of an illusion for instance has no reality apart from the illusion.

By the reality of an object of knowledge people have often understood its independent existence. Of course the concept of reality and that of independent existence are not exactly identical ; but in the present context, we should not object if the reality of an object of knowledge is held to involve its independent existence. Independent existence here does not mean independence of all things whatever. It is to be understood in reference to the act of knowledge by which it is revealed. When we say that in the case of

knowledge the object appears as it really is we imply that the object of knowledge has a nature of its own, which is not dependent on or constituted, created or otherwise modified by the act of knowledge in which it is revealed. The thing may be as dependent as you like on various other things, but if it is to be known at all, it cannot be dependent on the act of consciousness which is to be its knowledge. If the thing had no independent being or nature of its own, we could not significantly speak of it, as appearing in knowledge 'as it really is.' 'As it really is' then comes to mean 'as it exists independently of the act of knowing.'

When we have thus understood the reality of the object of knowledge, we have practically left no room for an objection of this kind : 'since an object appears, in whatever mode of consciousness, it is always real at least as an appearance ; and so its reality cannot be a distinguishing mark of knowledge'. Because when an object is real only as an appearance, it has no being apart from the mode of consciousness in which it appears. Moreover for an object, to be real only as an appearance is not the same thing as to be real as it appears. In the former case there is only appearance and no corresponding reality ; in the latter there is correspondence between reality and appearance.

Bearing our definition in mind how should we answer the question whether knowledge is possible ? Now, to begin with there appears nothing impossible in this notion of knowledge. There is no contradiction no obvious infringement of any law of thought, in the idea of an object appearing in a mode of consciousness as it is in reality. We may wonder at the fact of consciousness and may not really understand how the character of an object gets revealed in knowledge, but for all this we cannot pronounce knowledge to be an impossible phenomenon. We may then affirm that knowledge is possible.

And very often we feel that it is actual also. We pass through modes of consciousness in which we think the objects appear as they really are. These we take to be cases of knowledge, and so we cannot doubt that knowledge is possible.

We no doubt take certain modes of consciousness as modes of knowledge ; but how do we know that we have actual knowledge in them ? How can we be sure that the object, as it appears in knowledge is really there ? Can we have a case of knowledge about which no doubt can be raised ?

It may be possible to doubt every case of knowledge, but this theoretical possibility of doubt is not actual doubt. The question is whether the knower himself entertains any doubt in his mind when he thinks he knows. Moreover absence of doubt is only a negative test of knowledge. I cannot know when I doubt but this does not mean that I really know when I do not doubt. For actual knowledge the essential thing is that the object should appear as it really is, and in order to secure this point we have to see that the object is not interfered with in any way by any subjective acts. We are not for eschewing all kinds of mental activity from knowledge but only those which are likely to distort the object or to set up some kind of mental construction or subjective fancy in the place of objective fact. Our mind is often in a state of distraction and some kind of special activity may be needed to keep the mind steady and in a fit condition to receive the revelation of the object. But knowledge itself is never an act. It happens as a revelation without making any change in reality. An act is always understood as making some change somewhere in reality. 'Making change' is no part of the meaning of knowledge as it is that of an act.

But how are we to be sure that we have not acted, that there has been no subjective admixture in the object we think we know, seeing that many times we fall into illusions,

to which we feel we have not contributed anything but which after all must be products of our troubled fancy ?

We readily acknowledge the force of this objection. We know that illusion is a fact and a standing reproach to human intelligence. But what can we do ? The fact that we are sometimes mistaken should make us careful in accepting as genuine what offers itself as a case of knowledge. But if after due examination it still appears as a case of knowledge, we have no other alternative than to accept it as such. After all nobody can or should disregard the evidence of his own consciousness. If the few cases of error you have yourself experienced have so powerfully influenced your mind that nothing appears in your consciousness now without being doubted, I cannot undertake to lay to rest your all-consuming scepticism, and prove to you that the table you see before you is a real table and not an illusory one. I, however, find myself in a different case. The cases of error which I myself have seen have not so impaired or improved my psychology that I can no longer apprehend anything with a feeling of knowledge. Logically too I find the fact that there have been some mistakes quite insufficient to lead to the momentous conclusion that there is no knowledge at all. In these circumstances I accept with natural piety what comes to me as a case of knowledge even after a cautious self-examination.

We are not able to prove, one may admit, from the previous cases of error that the present case is one of error but one may still argue that we cannot also prove this to be a case of knowledge. The argument is beside the point. We have not started with an indeterminate position trying to arrive at a determinate one. We are not in a state of doubt, hesitating between two alternatives so that without positive argument we could not hold on to a definite position. But we are already in a definite position. We start with a feeling

of knowledge and if we are to be dislodged from this position, some conclusive argument must be offered to prove us false and no such argument, so far as we can see, can really be produced. What is meant is that apart from obvious cases of error and others in which empirical considerations have shown the object to be non-existent in which case of course the feeling of knowledge can not be sustained, there is no theoretical argument to prove that consciousness of independent objects as such must be false. It is possible that just as I was wrong in certain cases in taking for knowledge what was really not such, I may be wrong in the present case also. But this is a contingency which is part of our human destiny. For us knowledge is never constitutive and no theory of knowledge can be devised which will ensure us for good against all possible errors and illusions.

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# **The Conception of Love in Vaishnavism**

**By**

**SHUBHA BRATA ROY CHOWDHURY**

“Worship God through the senses”—this was the cry of Chaitanya—said Swami Vivekananda in one of his inspired talks on Vaishnavism. Sree Chaitanya is, undoubtedly, the real founder of Vaishnavism, as we know it to-day,—though Vaishnavism existed from long before as a religion, the philosophy of which was to worship Vishnu as the Creator, the Preserver and the Giver of all the ecstatic enjoyments of life and to reach finally the realisation of God through such worship. The profound and subtle significance of such worship was practically lost to India and it was Lord Chaitanya who by flashes of divine insight realized the special charm and the intense appeal of this cult and infused a new life and orientation to it by his “gospel of love founded on mystic union with God.” The figure of Sree Chaitanya, its inspired guide, thus, symbolises a special attitude towards life full of exquisite graciousness and bliss emanating from this sublime conception of love. It is thus that we find in Vaishnavism to-day the eternal quest of “the wandering Bride,—the Human Soul—seeking the Divine Love.” as Romain Rolland puts it.

Sree Chaitanya extended to the suffering humanity the gospel that the Kingdom of Heaven would be revealed through the way of love—the highest and the most exalted love that man feels for woman or woman for man, husband for wife or wife for husband—love without the least thought of

return—love, in which there is no desire for reciprocity. Love has thus been recognized in Vaishnavism as the highest religious emotion—the manifestation of the divine bliss. The conception of love in Vaishnavism stands like a great spiral of emotion—its lowest circles held fast in the love of the body—physical union,—its next, embracing the entire range of the mind and the spirit, and the whole converging and centering upon one definite point—the transfusion of the souls—the merging of the human in the divine. This, in short, mellows down to love which will unify both body and soul—love, in which there will be the most exquisite unity of the bodily elements and the most blissful transfusion of the psychic and the spiritual elements. The unity of the bodily elements in such a conception of love is never an end in itself, but an indispensable means to an end. Vaishnavism has not made the enormous error of seeking happiness from sensuality; it is the psychic and the spiritual elements that predominate here. It is the unification of the soul that it wants. It is the divine solace to the burning human heart that it seeks to obtain through the delicious union of the flesh. The Vaishnavites differ from the Christian and the Buddhist ascetics of old with repression as the guiding principle of their life, and assert that life is most precious where it is most intense. Vaishnavism does not believe in treading under foot all the sweet and sunny aspects of life, and, in the language of an erudite psychologist of the modern world, “investing their enjoyments in a heavenly bank which will pay large dividends in another world.” It traces life to its roots and dives deep into its core and finds that one thing needful to attain the essential joys of living is to seek wisely the fullest satisfaction of the deepest cravings of the organism which and which alone is the way to let fall g’adly the burden of restraints and licences which are not required for fine and ideal living. “If a man,” says Havelock Ellis, “cannot sing

as he carries his cross he had better drop it." In a spirit of universal brotherhood—with arms open to embrace men and women of all religions and all castes, beggars and pariahs, even the untouchables and the impure,—the Vaishnavites go from place to place, far and near, singing their ecstatic 'Kirtans' and dancing to the tune thereof as they carry the cross of their faith and preach the message of love to the world at large.

But what are those senses through which God is to be worshipped and how to worship God through them? To the Vaishnavites, to worship is to love. They do not believe in any other form of worship. To worship God through the senses is, to the Vaishnavites, tantamount to the Love of God through the senses. But there must be no tepidity—no half heartedness in the love. This love through the senses, liberated as it is from all gross and trivial conceptions, calls forth the highest human activities alike of the body and of the soul, and brings into play all the various senses of humanity at their best and the loftiest. And what are these senses? The sense of sight, the sense of hearing, the sense of smell, the sense of taste and the sense of touch—these are indeed the various elements composing the urge for physical union, and involving the whole range of mental and emotional complexes. "Love" says Stendhal, "means taking pleasure in seeing, touching, perceiving with every sense and the closest possible contact, someone whom we find lovely and who loves us." This conception of love, when supplemented by the views of Guy de Maupassant and Omar Haleby, will give an idea of the love cherished in Vaishnavism. "When two people love each other," says Maupassant, "nothing is more imperative and delightful to them than giving; to give always and everything, one's thoughts, one's life, one's body and all that one has; and to feel the gift and to risk everything in order to be able to give more, still more."

Love such as this refines the human Ego and extends it to include the beloved. "Give yourselves to this work of love," says Omar Haleby, "with your souls and with your minds, even as with your flesh."

There are, of course, other conceptions of love in Vaishnavism as well, such as the love that exists between an affectionate mother and a devoted son or that which exists in disinterested service or all-sacrificing friendship ;—but love that has been described above contains that divine light of eternal joy and celestial bliss which is the goal of human life. Tagore, with the vision of a seer, gives a clue to the fundamental note of this divine love in his serene and melodious way when he says with all fervour of a spiritual messenger :

"No, I will never shut the doors of my senses. The delights of sight and hearing and touch will bear thy delight.

Yes, all my illusions will burn into illumination of joy, and all my desires ripen into fruits of love."

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# THE DEFINITION OF BEING (SATVANIRUKTI) ACCORDING TO THE NYAYAMRITA

BY

H. N. RAGHAVENDRACHAR.

After stating the position of Advaita that "being" can not be defined and therefore it cannot be attributed to the world, Vyāsarāja, the author of the Nyāyāmṛta, states his position that 'being' can be defined and it can be attributed to the world of experience. His position is based on the teachings of Madhva and his contribution lies in clearly and effectively stating the solution of the problem.

An Advaitin is not one who denies 'being' as such. Though he denies 'being' with reference to the world, yet he holds that Brahman has 'being' and this being he is bound to define. In whatever manner it is defined, the author holds that in the similar sense it can be attributed to the world. Further the Advaitin may draw the attention to the position of Advaita that Brahman transcends conception and so also 'being'. But this does not solve the difficulty. Though 'being' transcends conception, it is still held to be real (Paramartha) in Advaita. Similarly the being of the world may transcend conception and it may still be real.

To meet this difficulty, the Advaitin may adopt the following position—the being of Brahman can be defined in two ways. (1) It is the difference of Brahman from the unreal (anṛtavyāvṛttimātram Satvam) and (2) It is the essence of Brahman that is never sublated (abādhita svarupa). The former of these definitions is formulated following the *apv-*

*ĥavata* accepted by Sankara as Brahman is opposed to the unreal and the inert (*Anrutajalavirodhi*). In connection with the latter, sublation (*bāhā*) must be defined. Sublation may mean two things. (1) The denial of the essence with reference to all time and to the locus in question. (*Prathipannaupalabhostrikalika svarapanisodha*) and (2) The destruction from knowledge (*Jnanena nivṛtti*). What is meant is that the essence of Brahman is never sublated in either of these two senses. Sublation in the sense of the denial of essence with reference to all time and to the locus in question cannot be applied to the essence of Brahman, because the essence or 'being' of Brahman is the presupposition of all, including the denial; and therefore it cannot be denied and consequently the essence or being of Brahman is never sublated. Further sublation in the sense of destruction from knowledge can be applied to *ajñāna*. Knowledge destroys *ajñāna*, but not Brahman, because Brahman is the very presupposition of knowledge. This means that the essence or 'being' of Brahman is not subject to sublation.

In answer to this, the author notes that the same might be the case with reference to the 'being' of the world. He means by this that the position of Advaita that 'being' cannot be defined and therefore the world cannot be considered to have it is not so far justified.

Further the Advaitin may point out the difficulty in this position as follows. If the being of the world is similar to that of Brahman, then the world and Brahman ought to be the same. In answer to this difficulty, the author notes that in point of 'being' the world and Brahman may be the same, but yet this should not be taken to mean that they are the same in all other respects.

I may note in this connection that in answer to a difficulty a similar position is held in Advaita. According to Advaita the world is *mīṭhya* and Brahman is *satya* and

the former is superimposed on the latter even as silver is superimposed on the being of a shell. With regard to this position the Vivarṇaprameya sanghra mentions a difficulty. With reference to the example it is easy to understand that silver is superimposed on a shell. Silver and a shell are similar in point of shining and so it is easy to mistake the shining shell for the shining silver. But the case of the superimposition of the world is different. The mithyā-world and the Satya-Brahman are not similar and therefore the former cannot be superimposed on the latter. In answer to this difficulty the work mentions that though the world is mithyā, it is an entity (padārtha) and in this respect i. e. as an entity, it is similar to Brahman. Brahman also is an entity and because of this similarity the world can be superimposed on Brahman. This is so far the position of the work. What is necessarily implied by this position is that though the world is similar to Brahman in point of being an entity, it is not the same in other respects. And in the face of this admission "If the being of the world is similar to that of Brahman, then the world and Brahman ought to be the same" loses all its force.

The idea that the being of the world is similar to that of Brahman may be still rejected by the Advaitin making use of another conception of Advaita that Brahman is unlimited (Aparicchinna). Brahman is, according to Advaita, not limited by time, space and distinctions and so also is its 'being'. But the being of the world is not so. It is in time and space and it is limited by distinctions.

In reply to this what the author notes may be summarised as follows :

'Being that is inconceivable is impossible and to attribute such being' to Brahman is not to explain. Its reality and 'being' that is conceivable cannot be attributed to Brahman and what follows finally is that Brahman has no being.

The Advaitin may further explain his position as follows : 'Being' cannot be limited (Paricchinna). To hold that it is limited means that any limited entity has it. A shell is limited and it has therefore 'being' in the present sense. Similarly the silver that is superimposed on a shell is also limited and therefore it must have also 'being' in the same sense. But the opponent is not prepared to accept the position. According to him the silver that is superimposed is unreal (Asat) and has no being. So in order to avoid this difficulty he too must hold that 'being' is not limited and it is unlimited.

In answer to this difficulty the author makes the following observation : This difficulty has been raised on the unwarranted supposition that if 'being' is limited, then all that is limited must have 'being'. Following the spirit of this argument, a counter difficulty may be raised with reference to the position of Advaita. In Advaita, Brahman is supposed to be unlimited. From this one may conclude that according to Advaita, all that is unlimited has an unlimited 'being'. This is obviously wrong. To illustrate this point a reference to Buddhism may be made. According to Buddhism void (sunya) is taken to be unlimited (aparicchinna). Though it is unlimited, it is devoid of 'being'. This means, in the light of philosophical tradition, that an entity which is taken to be unlimited does not necessarily have 'being'. So in Advaita on the ground that Brahman is unlimited 'being' cannot be attributed to it. If it is necessary to attribute 'being' to Brahman, the Advaitin must explain his position in some other manner. In this attempt he has finally to hold that there is 'being' only in Brahman but not in sunya, though both are taken to be unlimited. If so on similar grounds it may be held that there is 'being' only in a shell but not in the silver that is superimposed on it, though both are taken to be limited. If the truth



of this position is granted, as it must be granted, then it follows that the state of being unlimited (*aparicchinnatva*) or the state of being limited (*paricchinnatva*) has nothing to do with 'being'. Just as this state is no more than the state of the thing that is unlimited or limited being' is also a state of it. In the entity that is unlimited, it is unlimited and in the entity that is limited, it is limited. Brahman is unlimited and its 'being' also is unlimited; and the world is limited and its being also is limited. If this is granted, then the Advaitin's attempt at proving the *mithyatva* of the world becomes futile. For just as Brahman has its being, the world also has its being. This is what is meant in the previous statement that like Brahman the world also has 'being'.

So far the author has shown inconsistency in the position of Advaita, and in this connection he has justified that the world has 'being' like Brahman. He defines 'being' that is common to both the world and Brahman in the following passage: "Trikalasarvadeceyanishedapratiyogitasattocyateladhyastatucchetaprati pratyogini." "Being is not the object of the denial that has a reference to all time and all space". The following is an explanation of the idea contained in this passage.

From the point of Nyaya-vaisheshika a difficulty may be raised with regard to this definition. According to Nyaya-vaisheshika *samyoga*, the relation between two substances is *avyavyavrtti*. This term, *avyavyavrtti* as applied to *samyoga* means that *samyoga* is not where it is. To illustrate this point we may take for example the *samyoga* between a tree and an ape on it. To hold that there is *samyoga* between the two does not mean that they are related to each other with reference to all their parts. If the ape is on the tree, it is evidently not related to the root of it. Similar is the case with the ape. So both are related

to each other only with reference to particular parts of each. Though *samyoga* is in each, yet it is not at the same time in it. On the basis of this idea it may be said that the definition is too narrow. For *samyoga* is a fact. It has a being. But the definition cannot be applied to it because *samyoga* is the object of the denial of itself that has a reference to all time and to all space, as it is not where it is (*avyapyavrtti*).

In reply to this difficulty, the following may be noted: We need not accept the teaching of Nyaya-vaisheshika that *samyoga* is not where it is. *Samyoga* is a fact. It is where it is and it is not where it is not. It is in the parts of things that are related and it is not in the other parts of the same things. So to put it in an obscure manner as it is not where it is, is not correct. If it is a fact, then with reference to the parts of things where it is the definition can be applied to it and the definition is not too narrow.

Another objection to the definition might be stated. Space is not in itself. If it is, then there is the difficulty of accepting space in space. If it is not in itself, then just as space is everywhere, there is also its absence everywhere. If so, space, though it is an item of the world, is the object of its own denial and the definition cannot be applied to it. Similarly time is not in itself. From this it follows that the definition is too narrow.

The position of the author against this difficulty is this. This difficulty occurs only with regard to the position of those thinkers who hold that space and time are not in themselves and in each other. But the position in the present case, is different. Space is in itself and time is in itself and space is in time and time is in space. To hold that space is in itself or time is in itself does not mean that two spaces or two times are accepted. What is meant is that it is the very nature of space or time to

be in itself (*svavrtti*). This is implied in the very conception of space or time. That space or time is in itself may be further illustrated by taking the general attitude of thinkers who believe in the reality of the world. From the time of Nyaya-vaishesika, the entities like the state of being apprehended by right knowledge (*Prameyatva* and nameability) (*Abhidheyatva*) are accepted to be in all things that exist including themselves. Every thing that exists is a *prameya* i. e. it is the object of right knowledge and therefore it has *prameyatva*. Similarly every thing that exists has a name and in this sense it is called *abhidheya*. This means that there is *abhidheyatva* in every existent thing. But *prameyatva* and *abhidheyatva* are not excluded. Each is the object of right knowledge and each has a name, and therefore each is *prameya* and an *abhidheya*. So there are *prameyatva* and *abhidheyatva* in each. This means that *prameyatva* or *abhidheyatva* explains not only a *prameya* or *abhidheya* but also itself. Similarly space or time explains itself. So space or time is not the object of its own denial and the definition of being can be applied to it.

The object of its denial with reference to all time and all space is the unreal, *tuccha* or *adhyasta*. The horn of a hare is *tuccha* and the silver superimposed on a shell is *adhyasta*. Both are in fact the same. The definition cannot be applied to them. This means that they have no 'being'.

The definition is applied to all things that exist and such things form the world. They exist in time and space and therefore they are not the objects of the denial which has a reference to all time and all space. This is their 'being.'

'Being' in Brahman is infinite (*aparicchinna*) in the sense that Brahman is in all time and in all space. To say that Brahman is in all time and in all space is not to limit Brahman by time and space, but it is to explain the

being of Brahman. 'Being' that has no reference to time and space is no "being." It is no being because it cannot be conceived. The truth of this idea is granted by the critic himself. That he has granted it is implied in his criticism against being. He starts with the idea that being cannot be defined and therefore it is not possible. This means that which cannot be defined is not possible. The same in other words means that which cannot be conceived is not possible. That which cannot be defined and that which cannot be conceived finally mean the same thing.

So the being of Brahman must be conceived if it is in Brahman. If it is conceived then it must necessarily be defined and it cannot be defined without a reference to time and space. But the fact that it is defined with reference to time and space does not necessarily mean that it is conditioned by time and space. Brahman is self-established and it is not conditioned by anything external to it. It is the basis of all things that exist including time and space. Time, space and the world in them are the indications of the truth of Brahman. That they are eternal and all-pervading in some sense or other amplify the same truth. At all time and under all circumstances, they are the marks of the truth of Brahman. This is why we understand the truth of Brahman only with reference to them. Though the being of Brahman is unconditioned and self-established there is no time and no space and no circumstance in which it can be denied. It is just to indicate this truth the definition is put in a negative form, as Nisedhapratyogi i. e. not the object of denial with reference to all time and to all space. To put it in a positive form as that which is in all time and all space, may not have the same force, as it would mean that time and space are the conditions of 'being'.

The definition in the negative form has another significance. Generally, things of the world exist at a period of time and in a limited part of space. But they are not the objects of their

denial with reference to all time and all space, though they can be denied with reference to a particular period of time and a particular part of space. To put the definition in a positive manner would mean that they must in order to be real be at all time and all space. Thus the definition in the positive form cannot be applied to things that have a particular duration and occupy particular parts of space.

Further in the present connection the definition in the positive form is no definition at all. In the positive form it would be that the real is that which is in all time and in all space. What is meant by 'is' here ? It is being itself. This is to make use of 'being', the defined in the body of the definition. Thus the definition as it is stated in the negative form can be applied both to Brahman and to the world ; and this signifies that the world is as real as Brahman. One important lesson from these considerations is that to deny one is to deny the other and to accept the 'being' of one is to accept the being of the other.

So far is the explanation of the position of the Nyaya-mṛta. In conclusion a comparative note on the definition of 'being' may be added. Irrespective of the particular conclusions attained, the insistence on the definition of 'being' has no doubt a profound philosophical significance. With this insistence Indian Philosophy makes a great contribution to Modern thought. Modern thought has made the question : 'What is that in itself ? or what is reality in itself at the back of all these appearances ? In the course of dealing with this problem the Western thinkers are confronted with two more fundamental questions—the quantitative and the qualitative characters of the reality. According to the Indian thinkers, the question, of 'What is, What *is*' of modern thought means primarily 'What is *isness*', 'What is *satva*', and this means 'What is the definition of *satva*'. Consistently from the beginning of philosophic thought

Indian thinkers hold that every idea, conception, or problem must be first well defined before the discussion about it takes place. If a conception does not admit of a sound definition then it cannot be the subject matter of discussion ; because discussion about it is impossible. So the definition of a conception is the necessary presupposition of the discussions about it and as such it is more fundamental than the quantitative and the qualitative determinations.

It may be noted that in these considerations, it is not meant that in Modern thought there is no definition of 'being'. Every system of thought naturally comes to have its own definition of 'being'. What is meant is that with reference to the question 'What is, What is' the importance of the significance of the definition of Reality is not recognised in Modern thought. If 'What Reality is' is defined first, next there may follow the considerations about the quantitative and qualitative determinations.

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# **The Doctrine of Liberation in Indian Philosophy.**

## **Liberation as the Highest Goal of Human Life.**

**By**

**MANUBHAI C. PANDYA**

In Indian Philosophy Moksha or Liberation constitutes the final goal and summum bonum of human life and all schools of Indian Philosophy, orthodox or heterodox, theistic or atheistic, realistic or idealistic, agreed as to the goal of human life though they differed in their views as regards the exact nature as also the means thereof.

Some of the Indian Schools take a negative view of Moksha as meaning freedom from all pain and bondage as the Naiyayikas, Vaisheshikas, Sankhyas and Bouddhas, while others take a positive view of Moksha as meaning the highest pleasures of the Paradise as in the case of the Mimamsakas, or the quiescence and supreme peace and joy as in the case of the Vedantins and the Jainas. A common belief is shared by all Indian thinkers as regards the cause of bondage and liberation. According to them, ignorance of truth is the cause of our bondage and sufferings and liberation from these cannot be achieved without a true philosophical knowledge of reality and the self. The state of liberation has been variously described as Mukti, Moksha, Apavarga, Kaivalya etc.,

The highest state of existence according to Buddha is *Nirvana* which is described as absence of all physical and mental states including passions etc. *Nirvana* does not mean

total extinction of existence as is interpreted by some scholars. Though Nirvana according to Buddha stops rebirth and therefore means the extinction of all misery and the conditions that cause future existence in this world after death, it does not mean necessarily that after death the liberated soul does not continue in any form.

According to the Nyaya system, liberation is a consummate state of the soul's existence, a state of negation—complete and absolute—of all pain and suffering. *Apavarya* or liberation is absolute freedom from pain. It is a state in which the soul is released from all bonds of its connection with the body and the senses.

Similarly in the Sankhya-Yoga system, liberation is just the absolute and complete cessation of all misery natural, supernatural, or intraorganic without a possibility of return and constitutes the ultimate end of our life. The cause of suffering being ignorance or non-discrimination between the self and the non-self, freedom from suffering must come from knowledge of the distinction between the two. But this saving knowledge is not merely an intellectual understanding of the truth. It must be a direct knowledge or realization of truth.

Liberation according to Mimansa is the attainment of Paradise or a state in which there is unalloyed happiness and which is obtained as the reward of sacrifices and rituals. Liberation according to the Mimansakas unlike the Vedantins is desirable not as a state of bliss but as the total cessation of painful experience. It is a state where the soul remains in its own intrinsic nature, beyond worldly pleasure and pain.

According to Sankara, realization of the identity between the self and Brahman is liberation from bondage. Liberation is possible even while the body may continue. But the liberated soul never identifies itself with the body nor it feels



any desire for the worldly objects. He is therefore not affected by the world's Misery. This conception of liberation is called *Jivan Mukti* or the state of liberation of one while he is alive. It is a state of perfection attained here. Like Buddha, the Sankhya, the Jaina, and some other Indian thinkers, Sankara believes that liberation can be reached even here in this life.

Deliverance from repeated births and the sufferings of the empiric world was the consequence of the doctrine of Idealism and the Philosophy of Advaita (non-dual-mouism) which was positive and not negative. The doctrine of liberation is older than that of transmigration.

The true philosophical knowledge alone constitutes the direct means of emancipation and deliverance from death.

Though knowledge is the direct means of Liberation yet there are others which are indirect means as moral virtues, disinterested works, social and religious duties, meditation and so on and are useful adjuncts and aids to knowledge and help the realisation of the self by purifying the mind and purging it of all selfishness.

Next to moral virtues and even superior to them are the virtues of surrender of the self to the Supreme self and meditation on His pristine and pure form as the other means to reach the goal of self-realization. A man cannot hope to be liberated unless Brahman's grace falls upon him and unless Brahman helps him graciously in the task as stated by Sankara. A criticism is sometimes made against the Vedantic view of emancipation that it amounts to a mere abstraction into a bottomless abyss of Void or annihilation. But this is contradicted by Mr. Gough in his Philosophy of the Upanishadas. He says "It is not empty abstraction in the ecstasy of the Indian ; it is positive and self-affirming. The last residuum of all abstraction is not non-entity but entity."

Besides this state of oneness with the Supreme Being, there is another kind of liberation in which the aspirant seeks companionship with God, and a conscious participation in divine joys and the grandeur and glory of God. This is however on a lower plane and is meant for those who could not rise to the heights of transcendental idealism. According to this view which was subsequently maintained by Ramanujacharya, there can be deliverance only after death (*Videhamukti*) but not deliverance during life time (*Jivanmukti*). But this view is inconsistent with the view propounded by Yajnavalkya in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, according to which "a wise man who is freed from all desires can become immortal here in this very life and he enjoys Brahman in this body."

A compromise was however effected between the above two conflicting views later on by the theory of *Kramamukti* or release by stages, according to which, the souls that ascend to Brahman by the path of the Gods (*Devayana*) are not yet emancipated as they are still lacking in perfect knowledge.

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# IS GAUDAPADA BUDHISTIC ?

BY

S. V. DANDEKAR

Gaudapāda, whom Sankar calls his Great Guru and who was until recently looked upon as the fountain-head of Post-Upanishadic Advaitic Vedānta, has been recently considered as 'possibly a Buddhist'. The view has been clearly stated by Dr Das Gupta in his 'A history of Indian Philosophy' Vol. I (pages 421—429). Sir Radhakrishnan does not totally subscribe to this view. But on page 29 of the Vedānta, while comparing Gaudapāda with Buddhism, he says 'He (Gaudapada) seems to have been conscious of the similarity of his system to some phases of Buddhist thought. He, therefore, protests—rather over much—that his view is not Buddhism.' Views like this supply the data for this paper.

The writer of this paper holds that the older interpretation of Gaudapāda is correct, that Dr. Das Gupta reads more in the Kārikās than is justified by an impartial study of the Kārikās. A re-establishment of the old view is essential for two reasons : (1) Justice must be done to Gaudapada and (2) in a sense justice must also be done to Sankar. For, if Gaudapada, his great Guru, is proved to be Buddhist, Sankar, his follower, will necessarily be proved to be Buddhistic. This is neither true nor desirable.

Dr. Das Gupta says, 'There is sufficient evidence in his Karikas for thinking that Gaudapada was probably himself a Buddhist'. On page 429, he says, 'It is so obvious that all these doctrines are borrowed from Madhyamika Karika and the Vijanavada doctrine as found in Lankāvatār that it is needless to attempt to prove it.' For these conclusions, he relies mainly upon the study of the fourth Prakarana.

But we are of opinion that Dr. Das Gupta's arguments are not strong enough to prove that Gaudapada was possibly a Buddhist.

His argument is largely based on the numerous references to Buddhism found in the अलातशान्तिप्रकरण. That there are numerous references to Buddhist doctrine in this Prakarana is no new discovery shown by the fact that Sankar himself was quite conscious of this. In his Bhāṣhya on the first verse, he says, that the Dualist and the Buddhist are the opponents of the Advaita doctrine which the Upanishads want to teach. In this Prakarana an attempt is made to establish Advaita by showing how these adversaries contradict one another.

1. In the fourth Prakarana, meant as it is for the refutation of the Vainashikas, it is but natural that Gaudapada should make an abundant use of Buddhist terms. This explains the Buddhist colouring of the fourth Prakarana which is the main prop of Dr. Das Gupta's position.

2. Secondly, the most important Upanishads are not definitely Buddhist in their teaching. The Atman doctrine, the core of Upanishad teaching, is the exact contradictory of the 'Nairātmya' or 'Anātma' doctrine of the Buddhists. All the Buddhist schools accept this doctrine of a 'Chain of becomings and extinctions'; while the Upanishads, with one voice, declare that the Atman is an infinite, self-conceived eternal existence. In very clear terms does this Mandukya Upanishad declare that 'All this is Brahman.' 'This Atman

is Brahma.' Gandapada chose this Mandukya not simply because it was the smallest, but because it was the only Upanishad where a clear and yet brief analysis of all the states of experience is made. This Upanishad shows a clear epistemological approach to the problem of ultimate reality.

3. Sankar calls Gandapada his Great Guru (second verse fourth Prakarana). After a long discussion of various views concerning the date of Gandapada, Dr. Belvalkar comes to the conclusion that there is no necessity of changing the traditional view that Gandapada was the teacher of the Great Acharya's teacher (Basu Mallik Lectures on Vedanta, 1925). Dr. Das Gupta also accepts this view. If this is true, the best man to know what the Karikas meant was Sankar. It must not be forgotten that in those days all teaching was oral and there was a personal, living contact between the teacher and the taught. It is therefore unbelievable that Sankar, only second in spiritual generation, should not be carrying forward the tradition of his Great Guru. Dr. Burnet has brought forward a convincing proof to decide the question of historicity of 'Platonic Socrates.' He inclines to believe that Plato must not have created the whole story from his imagination, that there cannot be a wide gulf between Platonic Socrates and Historical Socrates. For, Plato was writing at a time when the contemporaries of Socrates were still living. Similarly, it should not be forgotten that Sankar was writing at a time when, if not the contemporaries, at least the disciples of Gandapada and the other disciples of Govind-Yati must be living. Had Sankar misrepresented the teaching of his Great Guru i. e. had he offered a distorted version of the Kārikās, there would have been some voice raised to oppose his interpretation. So far scholars of Indian Philosophy know no such work. This proves that Sankar's interpretation was acceptable to his contemporaries.

4. It seems contradictory to say that Sankar was a concealed Baudha and at the same time to say that Sankar tried as best as he could to dissociate the distinctive Buddhist traits found in the exposition of Gandapada (Page 437). Had Sankar been a concealed Baudha, he would have welcomed a work from his Guru, supporting the Buddhist doctrine. He would have pulled all his resources and shown that his Great Guru was Buddhist, at least that he inclined favourably to Buddhism. Sankar does nothing of this type.

5. Sankar will be the last person to accept a Vaināshika as his Great Guru.

6. A monistic position can be stated from the standpoint of the world. But, a man may like to state it also from the standpoint of Ultimate Reality. And in the case of Advaita, as the very words suggest, only negative characteristics will have to be used in the description of the ultimate Reality. Hence, some of the Upanishads make use of what is known as *Via Negative* (नेति नेति) to describe the Ultimate Reality. To illustrate, a man may describe the phenomena of day and night from the standpoint of his own experience and state that day follows night and night follows day. But, if a man were to make an attempt to describe the same phenomena from the standpoint of the self-luminous Sun, he will find himself in an awkward position. He will have to say 'There is neither night on the sun nor there is anything like day on the Sun'. Every great monistic writer has at one moment or another attempted to describe in this way this Advaitic position where there is no possibility of any talk of creation or dissolution, bondage and freedom. The speciality of Gandapada consists in concentrating on this aspect and not caring to present the ultimate reality as it presents to man. Sankar's aim is different. His ideal is synthesis (समन्वयः). That is not Gaudapada's aim. He wants to describe the ultimate reality as it is. Hence it is natural for him to

say न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिः But let it be clearly noted that this अजाति is far from void. A failure to understand this पारमार्थिक point of view leads men to regard Gaudapada as Budhistic. A true statement of the Infinite from the point of view the Infinite shall necessarily be negative.

7. It is not necessary to go to Nāgārjuna to find out the root of Gandapada's Monisim. There are several passages in the Brhadāranyaka, in the Mundaka, and Māndukya which definitely provide us with the basis of Gandapada's Philosophy.

(1) न हि द्रष्टृदृष्टे विपरिलोपो विद्यते । Br. 4-3-23

(2) यत्र हि द्वैतमेव भवति तदितर इतरंरपश्यति ।

Br.2-4-13, 4-6-15

(3) शिवं शान्तं अद्वैतम् ॥

Man. 7

(For a similar view as Belvalkar's Basu Mullik Lectures on Vedanta, pages 186—7.)

8. There is nothing in Buddhism which corresponds to the following in Gaudapada's Karikas :

ज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यते (18 Agama Pr.) G.K.

अजं अनिद्रं अस्वप्नं अद्वैतं बुध्नेत तदा । (16 Agam Pr.) G K.

प्रपञ्चो यदि विद्येत निवर्त्येत न संशयः ।

मायामात्रमिदम् द्वैतम् अद्वैतः परमार्थतः ॥

9. It is necessary for Gaudapada to refer to Buddhism because his theory of Idealism was likely to be misunderstood as Budhistic.

On these grounds noted, we conclude that the supposition that Gaudapada is Budhistic is not justifiable. A criticism of minor points such as an interpretation of a word here or an analogy there has only a secondary importance. For, it is generally quite possible to interpret words and analogies in different ways.

# How Ought we to Educate our Philosophers ?

BY

J. F. BUTLER

In this discussion, I shall take 'philosophy' in what I suppose to be something like its usual sense. There are, of course, certain special views of philosophy which carry with them special views of philosophical education. For instance, it is difficult to see what philosophical education a sceptic could reasonably require, except a detailed study of Sextus Empiricus, helped out, perhaps, by Brochard's *Les Sceptiques Grecs*, Montaigne's *Essais*, and Santayana's *Scepticism and Animal Faith*. A 'logical positivist' needs only mathematics, mathematical logic, and the pragmatists. One traditional Indian school of thought needs only a thorough acquaintance with monistic metaphysics and practical *yoga*. I shall ignore these types because, whatever their value may be, they neither need nor generally desire a university education in philosophy.

But philosophy, as usually understood, is not confined to any one of these or other systems, but includes them all ; and a philosopher, as usually understood, is one who knows these systems and is capable of an intelligent choice between them, having a trained judgment on the problems with which they deal. Philosophy, to be a little more specific, is the intellectual study of the more ultimate problems of the universe. That, I admit, is not really very specific : 'intellectual' is a very vague term, and 'ultimate' cries aloud for further definition. But, tempting though it is to feel that one must at all costs be definite and deal only with 'clear



and distinct' ideas, there are some words which one cannot adequately define until after a long discussion about them, but which for certain purposes can be used satisfactorily whilst only vaguely defined. Such, I think, is the case with the present terms.

For, even if those very vague words 'intellectual' and 'ultimate' are very vague indeed, they are not so vague but that they rule out some false notions of philosophy and philosophical education. 'Intellectual' implies that the philosopher works mainly with his mind, with his mind in its most disinterested, theoretical aspect: 'ultimate' implies that he has a subject-matter of his own, which is distinct from the practical details of every-day, or even political, life. The would-be philosopher, in fact, has to be taught to think, and to think about subjects such as substance, causality, time, which he will find discussed by philosophers, but not normally by other people. In accordance with this, his philosophical education must include, and include at its very centre, the study of the works of the great philosophers and independent thought on the subjects which the great philosophers have thought about. And so, very rightly, our universities fill their philosophy syllabuses with problems and periods and individual authors all more or less definitely 'philosophical.'

This may seem too obvious, and too sufficiently recognised in general practice, to need any special mention. But there is another side to the matter, which I am going to discuss shortly; and I want to make it clear that this other side is *only* one side it needs emphasis, indeed, but it must be preserved from over-emphasis. There is a tendency today to merge philosophy completely into practical activities, to say that it is very much, if not entirely, the same as religion, or, alternatively, as political doctrine. Certainly, as I shall emphasise soon, it has connections with these matters; but it must

not be merged in them. It is easy to see how the temptation so to merge them arises. In a world where philosophers, conscious of being at least as intelligent as many big business men or political leaders, find their opinions neglected as the views of 'mere theorists,' while the others are listened to with respect as 'practical men'—in a world where the young men and women whom we educate in philosophy have to enter an employment market in which many posts are advertised as open to 'graduates in any subject except philosophy'—in such a world it is obviously in our interests, and in the interests of our pupils, to try and convince people that we are really quite sound, practical fellows after all. But the fact remains that if we once separate our thinking from a disinterested, intellectualist outlook, and abstract, ultimate subject-matters, then we may have chosen something better than philosophy, but we shall have renounced philosophy itself.

When this proviso has been made, however, we have to admit that it takes more than academic philosophy to make a real philosopher. No one in these days can go far in logic without fairly advanced mathematics. There are aspects of metaphysics which demand a fairly advanced knowledge of the physical, biological, and psychological sciences. No metaphysics is complete without its ethics, aesthetics, and (positive or negative) philosophy of religion : and these involve a knowledge of life (including a first-hand knowledge of how life is lived by either other classes, or other nations, or preferably both), a wide experience of art, with some knowledge of its history, some form of religious experience, a deep knowledge of poetry, and doubtless many other things as well.

All this is a very tall order for the philosophy department : Indeed, it is obvious that only a very few minds, if any, could prepare themselves for the task of philosophy in

this very comprehensive way. Universities the world over must be content with a compromise. What I would suggest as a practical scheme for India consists of three stages :

(i) A special Inter.—cum—B. A. course, with no philosophy in it whatever. The course would consist of : (1) a sound training in the literature of at least two languages, *viz.*, an Indian modern language and English ; (2) a reading acquaintance with at least two languages chosen from Sanscrit, Greek, French, and German ; (3) a sound training in a period of history, or economics ; (4) a sound training in either mathematics or one science ; (5) a smattering of general science ; (6) compulsory social study and service, leading up to a short thesis, in an Indian language, on some aspect of Indian life ; (7) a study of the world's main religious beliefs—not from text-books, but from the actual basic scriptures of each religion ; (8) a course of prose composition (I will return to this matter later) ; (9) courses in physical exercise, hygiene, civics, typing, and elementary book keeping—these being necessary elements in any proper education.

This stage of study should be carried out in India, and marks should be given, as in America, on separate courses, not by the English system of one big, crammed-for, memory-overloading examination at the end.

Many students would get no further than this stage, whether from mental incapacity or lack of money. It is true that they would then be left without any of that specialist training which is the modern fetish, but they would (in fact, if not, under existing regulations, on paper) be admirably equipped, after an L. T. course, for school-teaching, and would be admirably equipped, again, after specialist technical training, for such professions as journalism.

Of the next two stages, one should preferably be taken outside India. By this, I do not mean a unilateral migration

of Indian students to England and America, but a general interchange (given world peace) between students of India, England, the British Dominions, America, the Continent of Europe, China, and Japan.

(ii) An M. A. course in the history of philosophy.

(iii) A Ph. D. or M. Litt. thesis on a problem of philosophy, or a period or personality in the history of philosophy which raises important philosophical problems. This stage is essential if philosophy is to be a matter of individual thought as well as an accumulation of scholarship about other people's thoughts.

And the necessity of this final stage brings me back to a point to which I have promised to revert, namely, the necessity, at the B. A. stage, of a thorough study of prose composition. Clarity of style should be achieved by every philosopher; distinction of style should be aimed at by all who have first achieved clarity—though it is no disgrace to a man to fail to attain this second virtue of style. It is true that the libraries of philosophy are full of bad writing; but that is our scandal. Most philosophers will want or need sooner or later to express their thoughts by the spoken or written word; they ought not to insult their audiences or readers, and degrade their themes, by ugly or unnecessarily difficult form. Nor, for their own sakes, ought they to risk making their thought second-rate because of a third-rate prose style. It is true that there are some writers like Descartes, whose style is clear though their thought is not; there are even some writers, like Mr. Joad when not at his best, who get their clarity by an improper simplification of their thought; there are many writers, like Hegel, the sublimity of whose thought is matched by no sublimity of style. But, on the whole, the more clear and distinguished are our thoughts, the more clear and distinguished a style do they attract to

themselves ; and the more clear and distinguished a style we can command, the more clear and distinguished is our thought likely to become. But clarity first : we must learn to walk before we can run. We must aim first, and teach our pupils to aim, at a good sound clear style like Professor A. E. Taylor's—or, outside the philosophers, like the style of the leader-writers of any good Indian or English paper, or the writers of articles in the better American magazines. If we can, let us even seek the crystal clarity of Mr. Joad, Dr. Broad, Principal Sarma. If, in addition, we can attain to something of the distinction, in some cases mainly rhetorical, in others mainly poetical, which marks the styles of Plato, Schopenhauer, Bradley, James, McTaggart, Dr. Santayana, Sir S. Radhakrishnan, we shall add to the joy of philosophic thought the joy of artistic creation, and so know a double happiness in our philosophy.

What language this art should mainly be studied and practised in, is a matter for the experts. My own lay opinion is that the ideal language for the purpose would be neither an Indian language nor English, but French ; for among the French the art of writing clear, rhythmical prose is both more highly developed and more widely spread than among any other people. But to insist on this would no doubt ludicrously over-complicate the already far too complicated problem of languages in India.

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**The Conception of Self-Determination**  
**in**  
**Islamic Mysticism**  
**By**  
**Mir VALIUDDIN**

No problem has been more persistent in Philosophy than the question of the Freedom of the Will. In spite of the theoretical character of the problem man has been enthusiastically engaged with it for centuries. For after all the issue is not one of merely academic import. Our systems of theology, politics, and education are based upon the primary ways in which man has met this historic query.

To my mind reflective thought has not been able to unravel the difficulties of this old problem, to offer a satisfactory solution of it. It is still a "problem"—perhaps a puzzle! An ingenious solution, however, has been suggested by the great Mystics of Islam who get their clue from the teachings of the Holy Quran. I propose to set forth clearly the main lines of their argument here, and to show how far they have been successful in reconciling the opposite claims of Determinism and Indeterminism, thus giving an original doctrine of Self-Determination.

At the outset the Sufis frankly embrace the doctrine of "Predestination:" "God is the Creator of all the acts of human beings, even as He is the Creator of their bodies and souls: that all that they do, be it good or evil is in accordance with God's decree, predestination, desire and will." This is strictly in accordance with the teachings of the Holy Quran.

"Verily all things have been created by decree ... and every thing they do is in the books" (S. Liv. 49, 50) Now "things" include "acts" also and God being "Creator of every thing", it necessarily follows that God is the Creator of acts also. If acts had not been created, God would have been the Creator of certain things but not of all, and then His words "Creator of every thing" would be a lie,—far exalted is God above that.

We do not need this deductive argument even. It is clearly stated in the Quran: "God has created you and what ye make". This makes God the Creator of all our actions.

This is the positive statement of the matter. There is no ambiguity or vagueness in it. It is sun-clear.

*Negatively*, God denies that there is any Creator other than Himself when He says :

"Or have they made associates with God who can create as He creates so that the Creation seems familiar to them ? Say God is the Creator of every thing and He is the One, the Dominant." (S. XIII, 16).

Now suppose God has created man and man creates his own actions. It is certain that acts are more numerous than men themselves, for each man creates innumerable acts. It follows that the creation of man—the creature of God—is greater than the creation of God—the Creator of man. Consequently man will be more perfect in power—more fruitful in creation than God. This is palpably nonsense. The creature cannot be more powerful than the Creator. Therefore God created not man alone but his actions also. God is the only *Creator*, the agent, the doer, The whole universe is "created" by Him.

This thesis is supported by the spoken words of the Prophet of Islam. It is said that Omar asked the Prophet,

"What thinkest thou of that in which we are engaged ? Is it upon a matter which is already completed or a matter only now begun ?" The Prophet replied "upon a matter already completed." Omar said "then shall we not have trust ?" i. e., why should we endeavour to do anything when the whole thing is fixed and completed ? The Prophet answered *Perform* (what ye are about) *for every one is prepared for that for which he is created.*" So no body can sit idle, pleading predestination in support of his argument : Performance of duty becomes a pleasure. Effort is freed from anxiety. We know interiorly that a stream of Divine Providence is carrying us along in its bosom to our highest good, and all the Divine forces are hastening to minister to our eternal joy, while every needed blessing is coming to us just at the right time. For, are we not prepared for that for which we are created ?

The Prophet was also asked : "What thinkest man of the spells which we employ, and the medicine wherewith we treat ourselves ? Do these reverse the decree of God ?" He replied : "These came of the decree of God." He also said : "Truly no man believes until he believes in God and in the decrees of God, be it for good or for ill."

I have so far stated the doctrine of predestination or Determinism in clear and precise terms and have supported it by the Quran and Tradition. Now I proceed further to posit that according to the Quran, as shown by the Sufis, *Predestination does not negative Free will.* Apparently this seems to be a strange thesis, combining two irreconcilables—predestination and free-will. I hasten to marshal my arguments in support of what I have said. First let me formulate the thesis of freedom of will and responsibility as stated in the Quran.

Man is held *responsible* for his actions. He is accredited with acts and "merit" in a true sense for which he is



rewarded and punished and on account of which God issued command and prohibition and announced promises and threats, Says the Quran :

"On no soul doth God place a burden greater than it can bear. It *gets every good* that it *earns* and it *suffers* every ill that it *earns*."

The responsibility of action is placed upon man. He *earns* his good and he suffers his evil. It is obvious that there cannot be a true moral act if the individual who performs it is not responsible for its execution. A person asleep or under anesthetic, a very young child, an idiot and one in an hypnotic trance are not ethical agents because they do not act on the basis of rational will and choice. And when the Quran says :

"If ye did well ye did well for yourselves, if ye did evil, (ye did it) against yourselves", it is holding man clearly responsible for his actions, on the basis of rational will and free choice. Hasan Ibn Ali said : "God is not obeyed through compulsion, nor is he disobeyed by reason of an overwhelming force : He has not left His servant entirely without work to do in His Kingdom." "Let there be no compulsion in religion" is the mandate of the Quran. Sahl Bin Abdullah said, "God did not strengthen the pious through compulsion, He strengthened them through faith." One of the great Sufis has laid down the law when he said "whoever believes all in predestination is an infidel and whoever says that it is impossible to disobey God is a sinner. To disobey God man must be credited with free choice. It is possible to disobey God, therefore *man has free choice* which he exercises whenever he sins.

Now we have before us, both the thesis and the anti-thesis clearly stated. Man is determined in his action. God creates man and man's action as well—Thesis. Man

is free in his choice and therefore responsible for his actions for which he is rewarded and punished—anti-thesis.

How do the Sufis reconcile this contradiction? By a higher synthesis. Here a clear knowledge of the metaphysical back-ground of the problem is necessary. As we know the Sufis believe that God exists and that He is the absolute knower. Knowing implies knowledge and the object known. God knows His own thoughts—these being the objects of His knowledge. If God's knowledge is perfect His ideas (objects of knowledge) are also perfect in every way. But God has knowledge, is a knower from eternity. Therefore His ideas are also eternal. They are *uncreated*. Knowledge is an attribute of God and cannot, therefore, be separated from Him: It constitutes the very essence of God. As God is uncreated, His knowledge (or ideas) is also uncreated.

Now the ideas of God are technically called "essences". The essences are firstly, uncreated and secondly, perfect and unchangeable. They are the "essences" of things. Every "essence" has its own characteristics or essential nature.

It is necessary to remember that as the essences are uncreated and unchangeable, their characteristics or peculiarities are also uncreated and immutable.

Now creation is an act of will. The will of God obeys the knowledge of God. Creation is nothing but the external manifestation or actualisation of the ideas of God or the "Essences". That which is manifested or actualised existed eternally in the mind of God as an idea. Ideas actualised are called "things."

Now what we call "Determination is nothing but the temporal limitation of a thing's essential nature" (i. e. its "essence," i. e. "idea" in the mind of God). *Whatever is*

*contained in the essence is made manifest.* That is why Ibnul Arabi says "whatsoever fate decrees concerning a thing is decreed (not by an external agent, but) by means of the thing itself. This is the essence of the mystery of Determination." This view is supported by the Quran for it says : "God gave you what you asked for." That is to say God manifested externally what was contained in the "essence"— or the essential nature of things. So every one's portion in this world is that which God knows he will receive and which is all that he is capable of receiving. God Himself cannot alter it— for it is His own idea or knowledge and God's knowledge being perfect needs no alteration. The true believer here and now was a true believer when his soul existed only as an idea in God and the infidel of today has been an infidel from eternity. Hence God says in the Quran : "I do not the least injustice to My servants," i. e. as Ibnul Arabi explains. "I did not ordain the unbelief which dooms them to misery and then demand of them what lay not in their power to perform..... If there be injustice, *they* are the unjust." "Therefore do not praise any one but yourself or blame any one but yourself."

To sum up : God, the knower together with His knowledge and the objects of knowledge or ideas exists eternally. The ideas are the essences of things. The 'essences' of things are eternally known to God—being His ideas. God's creative word (Kun : "Be :") actualises their existence but properly they bring themselves into existence because *He only wills what they have it in them to become.* The fate of every individual is his essential nature as it exists from eternity in the Mind of God (i. e. Divine knowledge). Men receive of good and evil what the necessity of their natures demands.

Human actions are self-determined, because they are strictly in accordance with their essential nature (i. e. essences, which are uncreated and perfect, being the ideas of God). That is why we are *responsible* for our actions, and being responsible we are rewarded or punished.

It is also true true that God creates our actions, because it is He who manifests externally what is contained in the "essence"—the "essences" being ideas, and ideas being accidents, depend for their being on God.

That is how Islam reconciles Determinism and Indeterminism in a Doctrine of Self-Determination.

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# The Passalong Test

BY

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We have for sometime made investigations into the average intelligence of our college students and we propose to put down in these pages the results so far arrived at.

Students who were put to the test were selected at random from all the four classes of this college, their ages varying from 15 to 26. We did not pay attention to the communities to which the subjects belonged nor did we attach any importance to their social or cultural status. We laid a special emphasis on *age* and tried to find out at what age level intelligence reached its height. We are convinced that the Passalong Test is a reliable measure of intelligence at higher age levels.

We shall now describe the test itself. It is known as the Passalong Test and consists of nine wooden boxes, one side of each of which is painted red and the other blue (lengthwise). Boxes are named A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I. Each box contains a few wooden blocks, some square in shape, others rectangular, and in each box (excepting B and C which contain two red blocks), one red block is placed in a definite relation to other blocks which are blue and it is kept on the blue side of the box whereas the blue blocks on the red side. What each subject is required to

do is to shift the red pieces to the red side and the blue pieces to the blue sides, keeping in view that the original order of arrangement of the blocks is maintained. He is forbidden to lift any of the blocks in the performance of the feat. The *end position* as distinguished from the *initial position* marks the success of the performance.

The subject begins with box A and then proceeds to 'B'. Box 'A' contains two blue pieces and one red piece; Box 'B' contains three blue pieces and two red pieces. Then he proceeds to Box 'C' and from 'C' to 'D' and so on. As he proceeds from 'A' to 'B', from 'B' to 'C' and so on till he reaches the final box, the ninth box "I", he meets with increasing complexity in the arrangements of the blocks. The order of arrangement of the blocks differs from case to case, but an intelligent student can discern a relationship between any two boxes placed in juxtaposition. For each performance there is a minimum time limit and if it is done successfully within the limit, the subject gets full score. There is also a maximum time limit beyond which if the performance is carried, it is counted as a failure. The subject loses one score for each half minute extra to the minimum.

We have tested a fairly large number of students from year to year, but we shall tabulate here the results of about fifty students for the sake of simplicity and convenience.

The Tables elsewhere will give the reader some idea of the results obtained so far.

It will be noticed that we have compared the average score secured by students with the marks obtained by them in the college examinations and we have found that a student securing a fairly good score has also been able to secure more than 30 per cent of the marks (pass marks) on the average. We may, therefore, say that our examinations are

Table I

Table II

Score	No of Frequency	Total R. Time	Average R. Time	Rection Time	No of Frequency	Total Score	Average Score
21	1	·18	·18	·17	9	232	25·8
22	2	·41	·205	·165	3	74	24·7
23	5	·845	·169	·16	13	367	28·2
24	7	1·31	·187	·155	1	28	28
25	9	1·515	·168	·15	11	335	30·4
26	3	·485	·162	·145	5	162	32·4
27	3	·485	·162	·14	5	153	30·6
28	7	1·12	·160	·13	2	65	32·5
29	6	·89	·15	·125	1	34	34
30	9	·140	·155	·12	3	100	33·3
31	2	·28	·14	·11	1	30	30
32	3	·45	·15	·10	1	34	34
33	3	·45	·915				
34	5	·645	·129				
35	1	·12	·12				
36	1	·12	·12				
37	2	·30	·15				
41	1	·145	·145				

Table I

Table II

Score	No of frequency	Total R. Time	Average R. Time	Reaction Time	No of frequency	Total Score	Average Score
8	1	·24	·24	·26	1	19	19
10	5	1·08	·216	·24	2	28	14
14	2	·43	·215	·23	5	72	14·4
15	6	1·27	·211	·22	7	99	14·1
17	1	·20	·20	·21	6	105	17·5
18	3	·67	·223	·20	10	205	20·5
19	8	1·71	·213	·19	6	117	19·5
20	4	·82	·205	·18	8	195	24·4



on the whole a fair measure of the intelligence of students notwithstanding the vituperation to which they are liable.

We have further attempted to find out a correlation between score of performance and average motor reaction time which has been measured by a Vernier Chronoscope. Remarkable results have been obtained which have led us to believe that high levels of intelligence can be reasonably associated with efficient motor reactions—the more the score secured, the less the reaction time observed in particular cases.

We have recorded in a graph the correlation of reaction time and score with reference to different age levels. Students who are of age level from 20 to 22 have secured the highest score and the least reaction time has been recorded in their cases. We have further observed a rise and fall in reaction time and *scoring-rhythm* which clearly indicates a definite relation between the height of intelligence and the lowering of reaction time. The curve also shows average reaction time and average score.

In another graph the percentage of marks obtained by students of different classes has been recorded in relation to the average score secured by them. It is distinctly observable that boys having scored above the average have secured more than 30 per cent of the marks in the subjects in which they have been examined. It will not be unreasonable to assume that success in an examination depends not only on intelligence but also on the general motor capacity which we have determined by the reaction time experiment.

#### SUMMARY

The Passalong Test is a new performance test of intelligence. It was used by P. W. Alexander of the Glasgow

University. This new test takes a higher place than any of the other tests in the Collins-Drever Scale. Mr. Alexander assures it to be an exceptionally good test of intelligence at age level 14 years and suggests that it may be found useful at higher age levels. We have found it to be reliable at higher levels.

From the data we have obtained, it may be inferred that an individual securing a score in the Passalong Test and taking a low reaction time is also endowed with good mechanical fitness and practical ability.

*The record of the first fifty students examined.*

Total score	1263
Average score	25.25
Total Reaction Time	8.7
Average „ „	.174
Total gain in rank	118

$$R = 1 - \frac{\frac{Eg}{x^2 - 1}}{6} \quad (\text{Spearman})$$

$$= 1 - \frac{\frac{118}{50^2 - 1}}{6} = 1 - \frac{118}{416.5}$$

$$= 1 - .28 = .72$$

$$R = .90 \quad (\text{Pearson})$$


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# **The Psychology of Adhyasa**

## **The Place of Imagination in Philosophy**

By

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Among the well-known motives of the play of children is *Empathy*. How does a child feel when he sees his kite soar high in the sky ? He experiences a feeling of self-expansion and self-gratification. The kite is his self projected into the sky, soaring high and free. It is the means of achieving something which his little body cannot do. He is small and tied to the ground ; but by identifying himself with the kite he has set in motion, he can see himself transcending his limitations and ineptitudes. For the time-being, he is far above the earth ; not bound, but free ; moving fast, and not standing still ; and so on. So with other forms of the child's play, and with the grown-up child's, man's play. We all like to set things in motion, whether it be a top or kite, rocket, motor-car or aeroplane ; and see it released from the inertia and gravity that limit our activities ; for, through these our projected selves, we rise superior to the limitations of our finite selves.

*Empathy* is a form of Imagination ; and it is the same as *adhyasa* taught us in the Upanishads. In both, one "feels oneself into" the object contemplated. One identifies oneself with the object through one's imagination ; and thereby gets

some of the satisfaction that one would get by *being* that object. It fascinates the child to watch the train rushing along its track ; or the aeroplane soaring in the sky ; for he asks himself, "How grand would it be to *be* that train, or that aeroplane !"—These things fascinate him because they give him through his imaginative empathy, the sense of power, freedom and movement that he himself does not possess ; and through it he can temporarily escape from his littleness and limitations.

Empathy is the imaginative transcendence of our limitations. All idealism and hero-worship are forms of Empathy. Our admiration for a great man is an indirect desire to *be* great like him. It also gives rise to the *feeling of the sublime in Art*. When we stand and watch by the sea-shore, do we not feel one with the vast boundless ocean ? Or, when we contemplate the mighty snow-capped peak of the Himalayas, do we not feel lifted up to those lofty heights ? This is the motive of all that is grand and architectonic in the construction of Indian temples, like those of Madura and Tanjore, mosques like those of Delhi and Lucknow ; and tombs like the Taj Mahal and Goli Gumpas. The aspiration for the Divine in man can be adequately fulfilled only by his erecting his places of worship on the tops of high hills ; or if they have to be in the plains, by making their spires pierce the skies.

According to Sri Sankara, the whole objective world with all its characteristics is an *adhyasa* on the Subject-Self ; the characteristics of the latter being likewise transferred to the object-world—and all worldly life and worldly intercourse are the result of this mutual transference or *adhyasa* of each other's mutually incompatible attributes between the self and the not-self—all worldly knowledge and experience is thus a mixture of truth and falsehood.

Sankara defines *adhyasa* as "the appearance in one thing of something else seen before due to memory." It is "the transference of the property of one thing to another." It is "the confusion due to inability to distinguish between two things," or "the attribution to a thing of a property quite the opposite of the one possessed by it"—Whichever definition is chosen, *the transference of one thing's quality to another is the essence of adhyasa*. For example, a pearl-shell is taken to be silver; or the one moon appears as two in the sky.

Of course Dualists demur to Sri Sankara's Doctrine of *adhyasa* in general: and to his fundamental teaching that this *adhyasa* is the root-cause of worldly ills; and that all the Upanishads aim at the removal of this *adhyasa* to which all mankind are subject. But, if we turn to Ch. III pāda 3 of the *Brahma-sutras*, we will find that *adhyasa* is not a doctrine of Sankara's discovery at all. Discussing the question whether in the case of the affirmations of identity heard often in the Upanishads, like, "Om is Brahman," "The Sun is Brahman," "Prana is Brahman," and so on, Badarayana raises the question of *adhyasa*. In all these cases, there is *adhyasa* in the sense that one thing is to be thought of as an entirely different thing, while the mind is aware also of their difference. When it is said that "name is Brahman," we do not think of Brahman alone, but of name also. Similarly, when an image is worshipped as God, the idea of the image is present along with the idea of God. The opposite of this is called *apavada*, which consists in one's disillusionment, when the error is removed by correct perception or information; in the case of all the vedic injunctions of *adhyasa*, like "the Sun is Brahman," Badarayana's conclusion is that it is the former that is to be thought of as the latter; or the superior category is to be super-imposed on the inferior; and not *vice-versa*.

If *adhyasa* in this sense is a Vedic injunction found often in the Upanishads, one can ask : What is its purport ? and one cannot find a better answer than what the Psychologist gives to the question : What satisfaction does the child get in seeing his kite fly ? Through an appeal to our imagination, the Upanishads repeatedly ask us to transcend the limitations of our finite selves by lifting and extending our vision ; and to think ourselves as this or that superior object. While the supreme Upanishadic teaching that "Everything is Brahman," may sound simple, it is not easy of comprehension, and much less easy of realisation. Therefore, to bring it home to one's understanding, we are constantly asked to pitch our mind high and contemplate the Divinity in the sun, the moon or the sky.

The VIIth. Chapter of the *Chandogya Upanishad*, containing the story of Sanatkumara's instructions to the divine sage Narada very well brings out what I have in view. The teacher takes his pupil gradually from one known category to another more inclusive one—from mere names to the all-inclusive Whole. First, he tells us that everything is a name; and that name is Brahman ; and name is to be worshipped ; i. e. name or everything nameable is to be looked upon as Brahman ; then, since all names are vocal, we are told that voice is Brahman, and so on. He stops with *Prana* or the *anima mundi*—the *Elan vital* of Bergson. The pupil, who till now has been keeping on asking if there was anything greater than name etc., does not ask if there is anything greater than *Prana*. The teacher urges him to think ; and instructs him of something greater even than the all-pervading *anima mundi*.

In all this, the appeal is to one's imagination. This faculty can often take us where Intellect or Emotion will not help us. Psychology knows that it is not the faculty of fiction and story-telling. It is the faculty that furnishes the keys to

scientific explanations, artistic inventions and creations. Beauty like Truth is objective ; and ever so many real things of practical life we owe to our imagination. Has it no place in Philosophy, which must be explored only by pure Reason ? As every Philosopher knows and has said, Reason has its limits ; but imagination can take us beyond those limits. No one need think that we are passing beyond the realm of reality thereby. At any rate, for the realisation of the transcendental truth of the Vedanta which is "beyond speech and thought" Imagination is of great help. With its aid, we can pitch ourselves higher and higher, transcend our limitations little by little ; ascend in the scale of being ; and finally shed our little selves and project ourselves into the one Supreme Reality which is verily the True Self of each one of us.

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# **GITA AND OUR THREE ACHARYAS**

**By**

**B. T. NARASIMHACHARI**

**( An Abstract )**

The problems of Vedanta centre round three things, namely, God, Soul and the Universe.

As regard the problem of the Universe, Sree Sankaracharya brushed it aside saying that the Universe is unreal and is an illusion.

As regards the second problem, the problem of the soul Sree Sankaracharya declared that the soul is God. But how did he reconcile that the weak, ignorant, suffering soul is God ? The other two Acharyas shrank back from the bold theory of Sree Sankaracharya. They could not agree with Sree Sankaracharya that the Universe is unreal and at the same time could not prove that the universe is God.

Coming to Gita, what does Gita say about Sree Sankaracharya's fundamental point of his Adwita philosophy that all this is Brahman ? Lord Krishna says in VII. 19 that all this is God. Since this fundamental point is accepted by Lord Krishna, he had also to solve the two problems, the problem of the Universe and the problem of the soul. Lord Krishna had to prove that the Universe is God, and that the soul is God. We may state here that the agreement between Sree Sankaracharya and Gita is in this respect only. But in all the other respects Sree Sankaracharya and Gita differ.

It is true that Sree Sankaracharya said that the soul is God. But the soul of Sree Sankaracharya is an individual soul contaminated by Karma and sin ; a fallen soul veiled by Maya



and Avidya, illusion and ignorance ; a soul imprisoned in the body and struggling for liberation from pain and suffering ; in short in the conception of Sree Sankaracharya soulhood is the fallen state of Godhood.

There is another important point about soul concerning which our three Acharyas and Gita differ. Our three Acharyas held that the 'I' in us is this soul itself. But Gita holds a different view altogether. Gita calls the 'I' in us by the name of 'Ahankara' and puts it as one of the eight forms of God's Apra Prakriti, the attribute of God.

Gita calls God Adhiyajna which means that God became the Universe and made it His Abode. Gita holds that the whole God became the universe and that there is no residual God beyond the universe. When Arjuna prayed that Lord Sri Krishna should show His Original Form, He showed His Universal Form. If there is a God outside the universe, Lord Sri Krishna would have shown him that original and true God instead of the Universal Form. This vision of the Universal Form signifies that God's Being and Becoming is the Universe itself.

Thus we see that Gita and our three Acharyas disagree in every detail and are poles apart.

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# **Elements of Religious Belief**

( Specially with reference to Islam )

By

**M. M. ZUHURUDDIN AHMAD.**

It is very difficult to define the term "Religion" exactly. A number of definitions have been offered. E. Durkheim in his "Elementary Forms of Religious life" defines it as "a unified system of beliefs and practices related to sacred things." G. Galloway in his "Philosophy of Religion" suggests that "it is a man's faith in a power beyond himself, whereby he seeks to satisfy his emotional needs and gain stability of life." E. Caird in his "Evolution of Religion" says, "it consists in consciousness in which man takes up a definite attitude to the world." J. Webb has on the other hand asserted in his "Group Theories of Religion" that "he does not believe that Religion can be defined." Mr. J. H. Leuba in his "A Psychological study of Religion" has criticised various definitions and has come practically to the same conclusion. The meanings of the term 'Religion' have so much varied from time to time at the different epochs of history and in different groups and communities that from being considered as a mere symbol of belonging to a certain group, it has occupied the total range of the activities of life and views.

Even if we agree with E. B. Tylor that "Religion consists in the belief in spiritual beings" and consider it to be the absolutely irreducible minimum implied in the meaning of the term, three main problems are immediately suggested. (1) The nature of the spiritual beings (2) the nature

of belief in the spiritual beings and (3) the association of these two in the mind of an individual.

The first of these problems i. e. an enquiry into the nature of the spiritual beings is a mataphysico-logical problem which will have to be treated as a part of the general problem of Reality—its existence, nature, and characteristics. The second problem of the belief in such beings is mainly psychological and will have to be determined from the point of view of origin, purpose, and the verifiable validity of such beliefs. The third problem, how, why and in what manner, an individual comes to hold these beliefs is a psycho-social problem which can be ascertained by analysing the nature, development, and social conditions of an individual.

Each one of these three problems requires full and lengthy treatment and I regret to say that it will not be possible for me to take up any one of them just now and do full justice to the topic within such a short time. I will only take up the elements of belief involved in one of the positive ethical Religions prevalent in the world at present. In my treatment of the subject I will exclude any reference to those forms of Religion which are not based essentially on ethico-social relationship like Totemism, Exogamy, nature-worship etc.

For the sake of brevity and convenience I will select Islam as one of the types and discuss briefly the elements involved in it, which it essentially enjoins its followers to hold. In the last 'Ruku' of chapter II 'The Cow' in verse 285 the Quran mentions that certain essential elements of belief must be accepted by every Muslim.

If we analyse this Verse we find that it states the elements involved in the faith of the believers in Islam and

enjoins them to believe in (i) Allah the only God in Whom alone Islam prescribes to have complete and full belief and faith (ii) a belief in angels (iii) Revealed books (iv) The messengers, apostles or religious Prophets (raised by God from time to time) (v) to regard all such messengers of God in whatever country or community they might appear, as of equal importance (vi) to hear and follow the commands of the prophets (vii) a belief in the hereafter presentation before God or on the Day of Judgement as mentioned in other places in the Quran.

These beliefs quoted above can be divided into two groups—theoretical and practical. The practical commandments relating to beliefs are very simple, can be easily understood and acted upon. They consist in hearing the commands of the Prophets carefully and to obey them sincerely and carry them out in the reverent spirit. These commands are socio-political in their nature and are in keeping with the polity which Islam intended to create. In the verse 286 of the same chapter the Quran has continued in the same tone to lay the limits of the practical obedience to the Prophet or the group-leader, The Quran says that this practical obedience to the Prophet or the group leader is expected to be according to the physical and economical conditions of the faithful. This question of the limit of obedience is ultimately to be decided by the individual person in the light of the general understanding, that he is expected to make the greatest possible individual sacrifice for the development progress and welfare of the group or community to which he belongs. It is to be noted that in this verse the belief in future or the Judgement by the Highest Judge i. e., Allah, is linked up with the practical aspect of religious belief, although it has been pointed out by some annotators that, since it comes in the end of the

verse it applies to the total number of beliefs mentioned here, both theoretical as well as practical. But as the next verse seems to apply mainly to the practical beliefs, it will not be wrong to say that the final Judgement, can be taken to be an extension of the practical deeds of a man on this earth.

The verse begins with laying down theoretical beliefs necessary for a Muslim and these four elements (1) a belief in Allah (2) angels (a group of spiritual beings) (3) belief in revealed books (4) a belief in the holy personages or prophets, to whom the holy books are revealed through inspiration, are such which are preached by Islam in common with other semitic religions like Judaism, Christianity etc. The fifth that all the holy prophets or the leaders of various communities raised by God at different epochs of history are to be regarded as of equal importance, is the foundation of the claim made by Islam, that it was the best and the most universal system of Religion, summarising all the past revelations and trying to create a universal reverence for all great leaders of thought. A general principle of paying equal respect to all holy founders of various religions is laid down in this verse, without mentioning any names in particular. Islam made an attempt to bind together all the various prevailing religions by one common bond of unity through a universal reverence for all founders of various faiths. It is on account of this element of belief in a Muslim's faith that he will never be found using foul language or irreverent words, criticising the personality, character or writings of any great man, who might have been regarded as venerable by any group of persons or community.

Taking up the other four elements mentioned in the above verse one by one, we can say that a belief in some or all of them in some form or the other is found in almost

all the prevailing religions of the world. Semitic religions believe in them in the same form as Islam accepts them. The Quran, however, has mentioned these elements in one place in such a manner that any possibility of confusion has been completely avoided. In several other religions the idea of God, the Highest Spiritual Being, the Real Object of Worship is often mixed up with the idea of spiritual powers, while in some other religions the Personality of the Prophet is often confusedly mixed up with the notion of God. The Quran has mentioned all of them separately, each one clearly differing from the other principles posited for the belief of a Muslim.

The question of the origin of these beliefs is very obscure and may be said to be the proper object for enquiry by Canons of mysticism. Objectively speaking, the purpose of the raising of the prophets and the revelation of the books to them seems to be the reformation of human beings from social, ethical and spiritual point of view. The prophets as human beings can be easily understood, but it is difficult to conceive the source, the way, and the manner in which they receive revelation from Allah, the only Real Being, according to Islam. Several theories have been propounded to show how some sensitive souls can come in touch with the mysterious records of the events in the distant past and can feel the coming of events in near or distant future. It is, however, very difficult to say anything definitely, about the manner in which the human mind can touch the mind of God, so long as psychology does not succeed in finding out that element in human mind call it, spiritual or godly, whatever name you like to give it, which is sensitive to the will or the wishes of God, the Highest Spiritual Being. In my book on "A Peep into the Spiritual Unconscious," I have made

an humble attempt to show that there is certainly some element in the mind which knows, feels, and is sensitive to the spiritual messages emanating from the mind of God, but without a great deal of further research it is very difficult to find out the nature of this element which I have vaguely called in my book mentioned above as "Spiritual intuition". In my lecture "On development of Personality" delivered to the students of philosophy at Bombay sometimes back, I had suggested that a deeper investigation into the depths of personality might reveal some of these mysteries of spiritual revelation at some future date, in the history of psychology. I still hold that these elements of faith which we regard today as mysterious may after some research be found out to be ordinary but essentially bound up with the nature of human mind.

The idea of Allah which according to Islam is the only Being to be believed in and the only object of worship, makes Islam a completely mono-theistic religion. It has been pointed by the annotators of the Quran that Allah is the personal name of God, as opposed to His attributive names, and Islam has insisted on the unity of the person of this Being as no other religion has done. The word 'person' has often been interpreted so as to connote a Being necessarily possessing a body, and this wrong interpretation is due to the fact that the only beings we call as 'persons' are human beings who happen to possess a body also. This, however, is not true. Speech and its communication from a distance, which is a means of bringing persons in touch without bringing their bodies in contact can be taken to show that the persons can meet independently of any bodies they may possess. Still further research in psychology may show that the personalities embodied in physical organisms may be absolutely independent of them.

Dreams, visions, mysterious voices are a proof of the fact that personalities may have independent existence, not in any way identical with the material body possessed by them. Once this idea of a spirit without body can be conceived as reasonable it becomes easier to understand the existence of the spiritual beings called angels. About this class of spiritual beings the Quran has clearly established, that like all other powers of heaven and earth they are also subserviant to human beings. In Chapter II verse 34 the Quran says "When God asked angels to make obeisance to Adam they did obey". Thus the only power above human beings is that of One God who is the all-powerful creator of the total universe. He is the only Being who is the Creator, Controller, Ruler, Judge, Master and the only being of permanent existence. Therefore, to him alone man bows down. The position of man has been established by the Quran to be above all created beings, including the angels.

It is clear from the above that according to the religion of Islam all these are intended to serve them, the prophets and their books to reform them and to help them to develop their individual social and spiritual personality. The belief in Allah, on the other hand, gives an indefinite and vast scope for the personality of the believer to develop to the highest and the most unlimited extent. This fact is borne out by a tradition of the Holy Prophet—"try to create in you the characteristics of Allah". In other words try to attain the highest goal of the greatest development of your personality by becoming as much like the Creator as possible. The same idea, of becoming as much like the creator as possible, is involved in the practical obedience to the Prophet who is conceived to possess very high qualities, moral, intellectual and spiritual, much above the other persons of his age. It



is, however, to be clearly understood that the ideal which has been presented by Islam to be worshipped and equalled is so infinitely and enormously greater than any human personality, that there is little possibility of its being reached to the smallest possible extent. It is an ideal, which is not completely super-human and impossible to reach, but at the same time very difficult to reach and thus providing the greatest possibility and chances for continuing to attain it. This is perhaps the best and the most desirable quality that can be found in an ideal that can be presented to human beings. It is clear from this that the fourth element of belief also is intended for human good. The elements of faith involved in the belief of a Muslim are, therefore, all intended for making him great, helping him in his progress and making him a real protector of the creation of God and the Caliph of God on earth.

The whole discussion can be briefly summed up by saying that apart from the practical commands enjoined for a Muslim, out of the five theoretical elements of his faith, one (equal respect for all prophets) is intended to make the believer a citizen of the whole world, belonging to the universal brotherhood of all faiths of humanity, while the other two (Prophets and the books revealed to them) are intended for his reformation and development ; the fourth class of spiritual powers or beings is to be believed as intended for the service of man and the fifth, a belief in one God, which is the most important element in his faith, provides an ideal and a vast scope for his personality and his powers to develop and rise. Thus all the elements in the faith of Islam and perhaps all other religions, are intended for the good, greatness, and progress of the human beings who follow that faith. It is likely that some elements in the faiths of some religions may have temporary value and require to be modi-

fied with changed conditions, but the elements of the Muslim faith mentioned by Quran are permanent, bound up with the human nature and the deepest and most potential springs of actions, are most deeply rooted in human life and refer to convictions which humanity cannot but recognise and believe to be of the most vital importance.

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# Immortality

By

E. AHMAD SHAH

The Cave-man of Palaeolithic age is known to have buried his dead. It is suggested that he believed in some kind of continued existence after death. The fact that the prehistoric man placed food and drink beside the dead body in the grave indicates that he entertained the idea of a continued existence. The savage races of mankind had a belief in the survival after death. They held that as soon as a man dies his shadow ascends into the air and is blown about by the winds till it reaches a kind of Elysium. Some maintained that the anima goes up into the sky. Others believed that spirit of the dead ascended up the heaven by the bright rays of the sun.

According to primitive people this surviving something is either man's 'shade' or his 'double' or his ghost. It was exactly like the visual image of the body without its solidity. Gradually the 'shade' or Man's 'double' changed into the conception of a soul, entirely distinct from the body.

The Greeks and the Romans developed the doctrine of survival after death. Homer maintained that man has, besides his body, a psyche. During earthly life it remains within us, but after death it escapes to Erebus, the abode of King Hades. Its existence is like that of a shade and is semiconscious of what goes about in that region, which is dark, dreary and dark. It is like an underworld, which may be imagined at the bottom of a grave. Some go to an over-world, known as the Elysian Fields or Island of the Blest, where only heroes and demigods go.

The Romans had a similar idea of the continued existence of 'manes' (shades) of men. The state of existence was gloomy, without any hope of anything better than what they had while on the earth.

The sheol of the Jews was very much like the Erebus of the Greeks. It was a region of silence. But the soul of man which continued to live was conscious, possessed memory and moved about freely. It could influence the lives of its relatives on the earth.

The Philosophical Greek period further developed the doctrine of survival after death. Plato following the teachings of Socrates maintained three orders of existence, *viz.*, of bodies, souls and forms—realms of matter, mind and essence. Matter is a compound, hence it changes, consequently it perishes. Form or essence is simple, hence unchangeable, hence eternal. Souls are connected with matter and essence (universals), but they being invisible and simple are more like the essence than matter. Soul animates matter and prepares it for the manifestation of Form. Death is the separation of the animating principle, soul, from the body and its consequent association with Form or essence. The Soul, therefore, shares in the eternal existence of the essence. The conception of spirit was evolved out of the idea of Form or essence (Universals). As the essence was eternal, spirit likewise was eternal.

The Indian Philosophy based the doctrine of survival after death on the ideas of reward and punishment. The law of Karma (action) was the governing principle of life. As a man soweth so he reapeth. As each action done has its consequences, so a life full of actions necessarily demanded another life to bear the consequences of actions of a previous life. The doctrine of the transmigration of souls was a logical corollary to the law of Karma.

Vedanta philosophy suggested the immortality of 'Atman' (Spirit) on account of its identity with "Param Atma" (Supreme Spirit). According to this Atman remains in the cycle of existence because of Karma (actions). Good actions have to be rewarded and evil actions to be punished. Therefore so long as an Atman acts, it lives in one form or another. But when it knows its true nature that it is Brahman (the Absolute), it is released from the Karma ridden life and finds its rest in the Absolute. It is absorbed in the Absolute, as the water drop is absorbed in the ocean.

The ethical implications of life did form a basis for survival after death in the Indian Philosophy ; for good actions were to be rewarded and evil actions were to be punished in a subsequent life or lives. But it finally assumed a minor aspect in the light of higher speculative thought of Advaita (Monistic) Vedanta. Moral issues were subordinated to metaphysical considerations. The highest state was not to imply the survival of individual existence, but its absorption in the Impersonal Brahman.

The Greek Philosophy, on the other hand emphasised the ethical basis of existence. The "idea" of the good was the highest end. The ultimate aim was to realise the virtues of truth, beauty and goodness, goodness being supreme. The great contribution of the Greek Philosophy was its clear indication of the true end of life, but it remained a speculative ideal, in the realm of Ideas.

The prophets of Israel likewise emphasised the moral implications of life. God, though depicted as the Lord of Hosts—Almighty and powerful—yet He was Holy. Just and Righteous. Man who was created in the image of God, was to grow and develop in perfection. "Be ye perfect, even as your father, who is in heaven, is perfect." But as man did not attain perfection in this life, he was to continue to exist in another life.

becoming more and more like Him. The survival of the moral personality was the greatest achievement in Christian philosophy and life. It did not remain a mere speculative thesis, but was translated into a concrete fact in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus, the Christ.

The animistic conception of ghostly survival, the survival of shadows or doubles of human life, the survival of spiritus, the breath of life and the speculative conception of the survival of impersonal elements of human life were replaced by a new conception and a new hope of immortality of the self in communion with his creator, God.

If naturalism is the philosophy of life and existence, and the Universe is explained in terms of a mechanical theory, human immortality cannot be proved. But the Universe is not a mechanical whole. It is not governed by blind forces. There is plan, design and purpose, which is indicative of the work of intelligence, emanating, rather radiating, from the Supreme Intelligent Being. Self is not a conglomeration of electronic arrangements and composed of four elements, viz., hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen and oxygen. Life is not an accidental factor which somehow or other has stumbled into the universe. It is a *Unique something*, which has appeared in the colloidal carbon compounds under the creative activity of the supreme Being. At the time of death, it dissociates from the body and abides in its own sphere in association with other elements in other climes and spheres.

There are two distinct views of the immortality of the self, viz., Pantheistic, which gives rise to impersonal immortality and theistic which results in the personal immortality.

God, according to Pantheism is the immanent ground of all that exists. His all-pervading being is differentiated into individuals existing in space and time. Individual human personality is not an end in itself. No animate or inanimate

organism has a permanent individuality. Human soul exists as an individual for the time being. Its individuality is on account of its not knowing its true nature. As long as it does not know itself, it remains aloof, like a rain drop away from the ocean ; but as soon as by enlightenment it knows itself as the supreme being, ("Thou art that") the illusion of existence vanishes and it is absorbed in the infinite plenitude of the impersonal being, the absolute. Thus it attains the state of "Shanti" (quietude) in the being of Non-differentiated whole, which is unconscious though immortal. Being identical in nature with this Supreme Impersonal, the Soul enters the immortality of the Ultimate reality.

Theism maintains the immanence of God in His Universe, but He is the Creator of the Universe ; while immanent in it, He is transcendent as well. He is not exhausted in His handiwork, which is the universe. Human beings are not parts of Himself, they are His creatures. They live in a world of infinite variety in space time which is not illusory but real. The human self is a subject which experiences multiple aspects of the world. He is conscious of himself as an object which makes him a person—personality being the self-objectifying consciousness. He is the centre of all kinds of experience. He interprets the meaning of reality. Each bit of meaningful reality becomes an object. Thus bit by bit the self constructs reality. His understanding truly maketh nature. This self, or ego, is the fundamental unit of reality. Should he, can he, perish ?

God governs the Universe. The Laws of nature are the expression of His will and intelligence. The myriads of worlds in the universe show design, plan and purpose, which God has implanted in them. "Heavens declare the glory of God and the firmament His handiwork." The universe shows signs of intelligence and is rational.

Man has come into being with the creative activity of God. His mind functions along with his body. He realises truth, enjoys beauty and attains goodness, while in this frame of physical substances. A question may be raised once again, does he survive when the bodily organism ceases to function at death ?

Life as an animating agency, vivifying principle or conscious entity was not automatically evolved out of the inorganic substances. Nothing can evolve which is not involved in reality. Life is a Unique reality, which has come into being through the creative activity of God, the Supreme Being. In death there is not an extinction of life but only its dissociation from the body. Life abides. It survives. Just as the material elements of the body do not perish, but survive death—dust to dust and ashes to ashes—so likewise the spiritual elements of the self do not perish but survive death. These spiritual elements of the self are the eternal verities, *i.e.*, truth, beauty and goodness. Virtues are the qualities of the soul. They are imperishable ; they abide and as such are eternal. Human personality, as an embodiment of these eternal virtues, therefore is immortal.

Theism therefore maintains God's immanent transcendence, the creation of a rational universe and conscious human beings, which in realising the eternal verities of the universe, survive the earthly existence and as such are immortal.

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# **Gaudapada's Asparśayoga and Sankara's Jnanavada**

**By**

**P. C. DIVANJI.**

The etymological meaning of Asparśa-Yoga is 'the process of joining together' any two things either objectively or subjectively. It has however a secondary and specialized sense in Indian philosophy and that is 'a process by which it is sought to restore the individual soul to its original state.' There is a wide divergence of opinion amongst the Indian philosophers as to the true nature or original state of the individual soul and as to the particular process which would be resorted to for the attainment thereof. But all, even the philosophers of the Non-Vedic schools called the heterodox schools, except the Cārvākas, are agreed on one point and that is that the individual soul is different from the physical body, that it existed before the body came into existence, and that it will continue to exist somewhere in some form even after this body becomes lifeless. Sankara understood this to be a particular kind of Yoga for the restoration of the Jīva to its original state in which it was unaffected by anything at any time. This is further made clear by Ānandagiri in his commentary (G. K. III. 39). It may, however, be concluded that the term 'Asparśa Yoga' means the Yoga, i. e. the realisation of the essence or the non-dual, whose fruit is repose in one's own nature and whose special characteristic is Asparśa, a complete absence of touch of or connection with any merit or demerit.

### *What is that Yoga ?*

This does not however explain what that consists of i. e. to say what is its *modus operandi*, the nature of the process which leads to that result. On the examination of the Karikas it may be remarked that the term 'Asparśayoga' has been used by the author not in the sense of a realization of non duality itself but in that of a specific kind of Upāsana or mental exercises and that its peculiarity consists in making the mental arena clear of all objective and subjective ideas.

The next question for consideration is whether this Asparśayoga is a new species of Yoga or is it one already known but named differently by Gaṇḍapāda. As to that he himself has not incorporated any Śruti texts in his Kārikās but as he has used the indeclinable 'Vaināma' while mentioning that name, it can be reasonably inferred that he meant that it was a familiar kind of Yoga. Śaṅkara too says in his Bhāṣya on G. K. III. 39 that this is well known in the Upaniṣads and in that on G. K. IV. 2 that it is well known by that name to the knowers of Brahma. He does not however cite any texts in support of that view at any of those places. The reference to Kārikās 40 to 48 of Chapter III thereof shows that the author has recommended thereby the cultivation of Vairāgya (non-attachment) and the practice of Abhyāsa (mental exercises) in order to get control over the mind. It can therefore be inferred from that fact that these are the two principal characteristics of his Asparśayoga. Such a Yoga is certainly not unknown to the Upaniṣads. In Kathopanishad I. 2. 12 there is mention of an Adhyātmayoga and its *modus operandi* has been described in details further up upto the end of the sixth Valli. In Muṇḍakopanishad III. 2. 6 there is again a mention of a Sannyāsayoga and it has been further up explained therein what constitutes it. In Svetāśvataropanishad I. 3. there is a similar mention of a Dhyanā yoga and in VI. 13 thereof one of a Sāṅkhyayoga.

These are not really distinct kinds of Yoga but only distinct designations of the same Yoga looked at from different view points.

Therefore one can conclude with certainty that the Asparśayoga under consideration is not a new species of Yoga but an old one with a distinctive designation which has reference not to the means for accomplishing it as in the case of the terms 'Dhyānayoga,' 'Sāṃkhyayoga,' 'Sannyāsayoga' etc., but to the objective to be kept in view by the practiser namely complete detachment from the products of Avidyā, mental as well as material as in the case of the term 'Adhyātmayoga.'

The last question which I want to discuss is whether Sankara who is well-known as a strong advocate of the view that Mokṣa takes place only as the result of knowledge of the true nature of the Self admits that there is a place for the practice of Yoga of the above type in his said doctrine. At first it might be thought that he could not have done so and many people confidently assert that he does not. My study of a few of his principal works has however convinced me that he does. In order to be convinced of this one must read patiently and reflect over his Bhāṣyas on Brahmasūtras II. 1, 3 and Bh. G.V. 27 and VI. 1. In that on Bh. G. VI. I. he has called the Dhyāna yoga an "Antaraṅga" of "Samyagdarśana." In Aparokṣanubhūti 10-44 he having given this process the name 'Rāja Yoga' has expounded each of its Aṅgas whose names are the same as those of the Aṣṭāṅgayoga expounded in Yogasutra. There can be no doubt that this Rājayoga is the same as Nididhyāsana or Paraśamkhyana which is the third stage in the Jñānamārga, the first two being Śravaṇa (study of the scripture) and Manana (reflection over what one has gathered from the study). In order that this may not appear inconsistent, he has in his Bhāṣya on G. K. III. 40 made it clear that no practice is required by those who are

of the nature of Brahma and look upon the mind and the senses as imaginary substances like a rope in a snake and therefore as having no separate existence apart from Brahma but that those Yogis who are of the low or the middling type cannot attain the Śānti known as Mokṣa without resorting to some remedy and that therefore it in their case is dependant upon a control of their mind.

Now since Yogis of the first type were few and far between in the whole history of Advaita doctrine it is crystal clear that even according to Śaṅkara the statement that Mokṣa takes place through knowledge unaccompanied or unsupplemented by any kind of Yoga must be taken to be true only in the case of an ideal individual and that in the case of all practical men in all ages the right view even according to him is that knowledge derived from the scripture or a Guru is not enough by itself for reaching the goal but must be supplemented by the Yoga which consists of a control of the mind as stated in this work or in the Bhagawadgītā and the concentration thereof on the true essence without which the eradication of Vāsanā (latent desire) is impossible and so long as that has not taken place it would be self-deception to believe oneself to be a *Brahmarit*.

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# **Is Knowledge a Kind of belief ?**

( An abstract )

By

C. Bhattacharya

In knowledge we are directly face to face with a fact. There is an indirectness in belief ; its content is never identical with, though it may correspond to, the fact. But still mediate knowledge is not belief ; for the mediacy really qualifies the ways leading to some knowledge and not the knowledge itself. Mathematical and logical inferences give knowledge. Mr. Russell's contention that knowledge is true belief seems to be not quite correct ; for a knowledge may be false even if its ostensible content be true. But a false knowledge is really a case of belief, though subjectively not so. It is due to a subjective illusion in which a belief is mistaken for knowledge. This mistaking is only believing the untrue proposition : "This experience is knowledge." The conception of subjective illusion partially resolves the enigma that the object of false knowledge must be both real and unreal. But is there any genuine knowledge at all, which is not belief mistaken for such ? Yes, there is genuine knowledge of mathematical facts, subjective facts apprehended by internal perception and objective facts apprehended by external perception.

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# **AN ASPECT OF CAUSATION**

By

**S. S. RAGHAVACHAR**

Causality is one of those categories which have involved the major part of human speculation in their elucidation. Modern European philosophy owes its dominant interest in the question to the disturbing enquiry of Hume, which was amplified by Kant and the later Idealists like Bradley.

In the world of science the postulate of universal causation is conceived to be the ultimate basis of all empirical investigation. The distinctive tempo of the scientific enquiries has as its ruling ingredient the conviction that phenomena are subject to determinate causal laws which leave no room or gap for super-natural intervention or chance-determination. In recent times the supremacy of causal explanation has become suspect owing to the impossibility of prediction in connection with certain atomic phenomena.

In Indian philosophy, the Buddhists initiated the explanation and examination of the principle on purely rationalistic grounds with characteristic thoroughness. This procedure influenced the Advaitic school of Vedanta so profoundly that the latter incorporated into itself the entire critique of causation instituted by Sunyavada. The other schools of thought continuously elaborated the grounds for the acceptance of the causal scheme as they conceived it.

The essence of Gaudapada's criticism of the principle, is that it is impossible to describe the cause of a phenomenon itself, either as an effect or as an uncaused existence. To consider it an effect of some antecedent occurrence would involve an in-

finite regress. But to regard it as an unoriginated reality would imply the impossibility of accounting for the commencement of its causal operation at any particular time.

अजाद्वै जायते यस्य दृष्टान्तस्तस्य नास्ति वै ।

जाताच्च जायमानस्य नव्यदस्या प्रसज्यते ॥

It is interesting to see that the undeniable consequence of the first alternative is not crisply and convincingly stated. Sankara in his commentary does not amplify the argument. But it receives its best expression from a critic of the theory :  
न तावदविकृतमुत्पादयति सर्वदोषातकत्वप्रसङ्गात् नापि विशेषा-  
न्तरमापन्नं विशेषान्तरापत्तेरपि विशेषान्तरापत्ति पूर्वत्वेन भवितव्यं  
तस्या अपि तथेत्यनवस्थानात् ।

If the cause produces the effect, when modified in a determinate manner, it follows that it acquires that determinate modification, as a result of some prior determinate modification and so on *ad infinitum*. If, on the other hand, the cause produces its effect, by its own nature without any specific modification being necessary to start its causal operation, then at no time should the cause remain without producing the effect. The cause and effect should be co-extensive in their existence. This is the fundamental point in the thesis of Kant's third antinomy. The heart of the difficulty involved in causation gets stated there in the clearest and the best possible manner.

Bradley's chief objection to regard the causal system as ultimately real is that it involves this dilemma. "Mere A would still be mere A, and, if it turns to something different then something else is concerned. There must, in other words be a reason for the change. But, if so, then A has already been altered, and hence the problem of causation breaks out within the very cause." Either the effect is co-extensive with the cause or the cause itself is an effect. Either an

unoriginated effect or an indefinitely regressing causal series ought to be accepted. It is untenable to believe that the cause remained in-operative for an indefinite duration and then assumed its productive function at a particular time by itself, in spite of the fact that its conditions of existence suffered no alteration. It is equally untenable that the regressive determination of the cause must never achieve completion.

## II

We must now try to test the validity of this refutation of the causal principle. The argument, by its surprising universality, acquires significance. The very commonness of the attack in the views of varied thinkers like Nagarjuna, Gaudapada, Sankara, Kant and Bradley, reveals that it touches a real and objective difficulty about causation.

It is possible to meet the criticism on lines implicit in Whitehead's description of cosmic causation. The cause may be conceived as a system of eternal possibilities. It is not a temporally determinate phenomenon. It is not an emergent or occurrent of the process. It is to be cognized as possessing 'translucency of realisation'. The cause of every event is constituted by 'eternal objects' or 'ideal forms' which have it in their constitution to transcend the spatio-temporal determination. This alternative fees the explanation from the fallacy of infinite regress. 'But', the objection would arise, 'if the cause is an eternal object or a whole realm of eternal objects, how can the causal efficiency manifest itself at any specific time?' The answer would involve an adaptation of the concept of the principle of concretion. The real causation of phenomena is an outcome of the action or the dynamic agency of some transcendent determinants as directing the system of eternal possibilities. This determinant is responsible for the emergence of causal operation.



It is an influence that sets the productive process going and shapes its movement. It is the principle of concretion. The eternal objects are impotent and inoperative without the power imparted to them by the activity of the principle.

Such an explanation does explain causation. The process has both a non-temporal foundation and a determinate structure. It makes it unnecessary why the cause should either always be producing its effects or should recede indefinitely back for self-explanation.

One obvious difficulty in this justification of the causal process is, "If the eternal objects require determination by the principle of concretion for their ingression, they should undergo another such determination as a prior condition of this determination. Otherwise, if the determination is not preceded by any such antecedent, they should always be so determined by the principle of concretion; and consequently either the infinite regress recommences in the cause itself or the effect is co-terminous with the cause."

The answer to such an objection is that the eternal objects do not acquire the determination by the force of anything they have in their nature. The determination is *imposed* upon them by a transcendent principle irrespective of their determined or undetermined condition. They do not generate the determination, but receive it from the other principle. As the determination is not the outcome of their nature, the question whether they should be subject to a prior determination to be subject to this or not, is definitely irrelevant.

A similar criticism can be formulated with regard to the transcendent principle itself. The specific causal activity of the principle of concretion should be accounted for. Is that activity the result of some specific antecedent con-

dition or is it rooted in the unchanging nature of the principle itself? The dilemma reappears. Either an endless regress to the preceding states of the principle should be tolerated or we must accept the eternity of the activity of the principle from which the eternity of the effect would inevitably follow.

Such a criticism of the principle of concretion ignores the reason for which the principle of concretion is postulated. It is postulated to account for the temporal passage of events. It is a pre-supposition of time itself, for time is a character of events. Hence it is non-temporal.

Further, it cannot be classed with eternal objects and held to be incapable of determinate creativity. It is definitely posited to supplement and complete the non-temporal possibilities. If it shares their indeterminate character, it would be a superfluous category. It is an *activity* and not a mere *potentiality*. It is not an unchanging form, but a dynamic power. That is an implication of the very reason for its affirmation.

Therefore, the principle is a *non-temporal activity*. The fallacy of endless regress does not affect the conception because it is non-temporal and indeterminate creativity does not arise from it because it is a dynamic determinant. It is the pre-supposition of time and the completion of the world of eternal possibilities. It is the *supra-temporal* principle of limitation. Hence the general dilemma of causality cannot be applied to this unique principle, and the extension of the critique of causation to its creative agency is founded on the confusion of categories.

### III

The general philosophic import of the issue requires statement.

The philosophers of Naturalism, based their faith on nature

as a self-maintaining system, where causal laws were conceived as sufficient for the explanation of all reality. Such a philosophy rigidly dispensed with all beliefs in transcendent and supra-temporal principles like Soul, God or Absolute. It reduced the entire cosmic order to natural phenomena.

But such a view was bound to be resented by thinkers who clung to the conviction that the highest in life and thought is in some sense beyond nature. Super-naturalism or a mystical acosmism of that kind is obliged to regard time as a falsification of eternity, and nature as the mere appearance of a transcendent reality. Hence the attempt of schools like Advaita and those akin to it, to condemn the causal scheme, which is but the description of the temporal flow of natural events, as inexplicable and therefore illusory. But we have seen that it is not possible to prove that the causal explanation is irrational. We cannot establish on logical grounds that causation is a mere make-shift. Causation is an explicable fact. But it involves the affirmation of a transcendent determinant, or a non-temporal principle of concretion, within the causal situation itself. In other words we will re-establish Naturalism on a higher basis. Nature includes this deeper eternal power from which flows the cosmic process. It is higher Naturalism according to which, nature is not a self-dependent category but is the creative self-manifestation of the ultimate principle. This ultimate category is not an alternative to nature but is its essential implication. It is not a world-transcending Noumenon, but a world-maintaining Spirit. The choice for thought is not 'Absolute or Nature' but it is 'Absolute or no Nature.' Mere Nature or mere Deity is a fictitious abstraction that does violence to the synthetic teleology of reason. Such is the deliverance of a true philosophy which is but the critic of abstractions.'

# **The Development of the Advaita Doctrine of Antahkarana in relation to perception**

**By**

**G. HANUMANTHA RAO**

It is maintained by advaita vedantins that, in perceiving an object, the antahkarana streams out to it and gets itself determined by it. Modern Vedantins like Dr. S. Radhakrishnan and Dr. D. M. Datta, while admitting the philosophic value of this conception of antahkarana arraign its scientific validity. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, for example, speaks of it as "crude on the scientific side though its metaphysical insight is valuable."<sup>1</sup> Dr. Datta who sets out to defend it is of the same opinion when he concludes that "notwithstanding its weak scientific basis, it may suggest to us a new direction of thinking from which a solution may ultimately come."<sup>2</sup> But neither Dr. Radhakrishnan nor Dr. Datta make clear as to what exactly is weak or valuable in the conception. But if we would look carefully into the matter, it would appear that what is considered to be weak scientifically, is exactly what makes it philosophically valuable. The fact of the antahkarana going out to the object and getting itself determined by it is what is crude scientifically, and what is valuable epistemologically and metaphysically is just the implication of that fact. But if it is true that the fact is crude scientifically or has a weak scientific basis, one wonders how it could be valuable philosophically; for, the value of the idea can only arise from its being true. If, as Dr. Datta maintains, it supplements the western accounts of perception,

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(1) S. Radhakrishnan : Indian Philosophy, Vol. II p. 492-3.

(2) D. M. Datta : Six Ways of knowing, p. 43.

it is by virtue of its affirmation of what western psychologists have failed to affirm. It would be doing the advaita theory of perception much injustice, if one looked upon it as metaphysical or mystical. For, according to advaita, the function of antahkarana in perception is a psycho-physical function and the antahkarana itself is a physico-biopsychical entity which works on the physical level subject to the laws of physics, on the physiological level subject to the laws of physiology, and on the psychological level subject to the laws of psychology, it is distinct from, but continuous with, the physical as well as the psychological. It can send its feelers out to the object as it can all over the body. It is essentially mobile, pervasive and projective. Deny this to be a fact and you will deprive it of its epistemological, ethical and metaphysical value. If one's behaviour has value or significance by virtue of the fact that one is a human being, one cannot establish the value, without admitting the fact underlying it and, if the fact is not what it claims to be, the value simply disappears. Even so, we would not establish the value of the function of antahkarana in perception if we failed to show that the function was a real function in space and time. The object of this paper is first to show that this function has a factual or empirical basis. It should, at the very outset, be made clear that the fact is proved as a fact not merely on the basis of arguments and facts put forward by vedantins; the proof attempted is with reference to facts and ideas of modern science. But it should not be thought that there is some modern western scientist who holds this to be a fact. Though what is here attempted is consistent with the vedantic theory of antahkarana and facts and tendencies of modern science, it is not identical either with what is said by vedantins or with what is stated by modern scientists.

The basic vedantic ideas about antahkarana are: (1) that it is *bhautika* being constituted of the five elements; (2) that it is

*taijasa* (of the nature of light) since *tejas* (the element of light) predominates, (3) that it is unstable, being liable to change its form where it is or where it reaches by streaming forth through a sense, and (4) that, like light, it can assume the form of the object on which it shines or in which it is confined.

Upto this point the analysis of the nature and functions of antahkarana is literally vedantic every word being supported by texts. I wish to add by way of defining the nature of antahkarana, and what I add is perfectly consistent with vedanta though it may not have any textual support, (5) that the antahkarana acts at different levels—physical, vital and psychological, being a complex constituted of matter, life and spirit. As a material thing, it is subject to the laws of physics so long as it is in contact with the physical and moves in the physical field. The velocity with which it streams forth is determined by the laws of physics; the form it assumes of the object is physically determined—the size of the *vrtti* (the form which the antahkarana assumes) is determined by the distance of the organism to the object; the changes that the *vrtti* undergoes are in relation to the physical character of the stimulus, its behaviour is similar to the behaviour of light. As it is constituted physiologically, it obeys the laws of physiology so long as that part of it is functioning; it is subject to the laws of reflex action. As composed of mind, it obeys the laws of psychology so long as it is limited to that field; it is subject to the laws of conation, affection and cognition. There are other aspects of antahkarana which have a moral and metaphysical bearing which need not concern us at present. Its behaviour changes as it moves from one medium or field to another. In dreams, it transcends the limitations of space and time and can live in the past, present or future; in thinking and willing it transcends the physical and physiological but is bound down by the laws of logic and ethics. All this may not have been said by any vedantin but it is vedantic as it is not inconsistent with it.

I add a further deduction, (6) since the structure of the antahkarana is complex, being constituted of physical, physiological and psychological elements its function in perception is also complex, omissions, additions, alterations take place in the content of perception, accordingly as there is the imposition of the psychical or physiological on the physical. The antahkarana can see objects as they are, in their true shape, size or colour within certain spatial contexts. If the physical stimulus is below or above a certain threshold, it cannot see the object, in certain spatial contexts it sees things as small, as for example, the mid-day sun, it sees things as big, for example, the setting sun, it sees certain things as taller, as for example in the hat illusion, it sees successive stimulations of a certain frequency as discrete, but, at higher frequencies, as when images are presented in a cinema, it experiences identity and continuity, under the influence of intoxicants it sees things differently ; under the spell of sentiments, prejudices, fears and obsessions, it sees what is not and fails to see what is. Thus, it sees silver where there is only a shell or a snake where there is only a rope; it sees no flaws in persons who are near and dear. While in true perception it streams forth in response to physical stimuli without carrying with it any of its likes and dislikes, in erroneous perception it carries with it its sentiments and prejudices, its loves and hates, its doubts and fears, and clothes the object to which it flows and by which it is determined in part, with its own subjective forms.<sup>3</sup> The antahkarana can, not only

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3. M. Luckish and F. E. Moses : The Science of Seeing : p. 63 :—

'Even though the physical and retinal characteristics remain constant, the effectiveness of the latter may be altered by the simultaneous functioning of other senses by physiological factors such as fatigue, and by innumerable psychological characters such as the emotional state of the individual.'

reflect the object but also refract it; it can show forth as well as suppress what is in the object, it can delineate as well as distort the object. It may again be repeated here that all this may not be vedanta but it may safely be said to be vedantic ; it is, of course, clear that the facts stated above are all facts of modern psychology.

7. The vedantins only say that the object stimulates the sense-organ and that the antahkarana flows out through the eye towards the object. They do not describe how, for example, in visual perception the rays of light enter the eye and what changes they undergo there and how they awaken the central energy and how the central energy moves out towards the object. Modern accounts of the process are by no means full either. I shall here venture to supplement the vedantic account with facts of modern physiological psychology and western accounts of perception with the vedantic account, and complete both with reference to facts and assumptions which, though they are not the current coin of modern psychology, must soon become current.

Western psychology starts with the rays of light originated or reflected by the object and tells us that these rays of light enter the eye and are refracted through the lens and throw an inverted image on the retina and stimulate the optic nerve and release impulses which are allied to light and electricity but distinct from them as their velocity is distinctly lower than the velocity of light or electricity.<sup>4</sup> The impulses thus released pass through intermediary nerve centres till at last they reach the occipital cortex and then perception of the object results. Here western accounts of perception ordinarily stop. But some very recent studies of perception by western psychologists

4. M. Luckish and F. E. Moss : Science of Seeing, p 109:—  
 'The impulses travel at the rate of approximately 220 miles per hour in the human nerve'.



like M. Luckish and L. T. Troland, seem to indicate that it will not do to stop here to account for perception. If that were all, we should have seen them as pictures upon the retinal screen and not as objects as they are out in space.<sup>5</sup> The phenomenon of vision may be defined as the total process by which activities within restricted portions of the nervous apparatus of the visual organs of the observer may, in conscious experience, be correspondingly localised in space. This projection is not a faculty of the retina but is a mental act.<sup>6</sup> This is more explicitly put by J. D. Lickley when he says that the image on the retina is of course inverted, but the brain does not take cognizance of this fact; in other words, the brain does not realise the image but projects it back to the object from which it is derived.<sup>7</sup>

In order to complete the account of perception given ordinarily by western physiological psychologists, we shall have to say that when the central energy in the occipital cortex is awakened, it streams forth to that portion of the retina which has been stimulated and through it and through the lens to the object outside, along the path of rays of light which entered the eye. Thus the antahkarana does not see the inverted image which is only a means through which the antahkarana reaches out to the object and in reaching out, it has to pass through the lens and the inversion is corrected and the path of the rays of light determine the direction and shape it should assume in relation to the object. This assumption not only explains the fact that we see things as erect and not, as inverted, but also the fact that we see things as outside of us. On this assumption, it becomes easy for us to explain truth as well as error. Truth results when the antahkarana vṛtti and the

5, Ibid p. 112,

6. Ibid p. 112.

7. J. D. Lickley, Nervous system, p. 35.

object agree, spatially, temporally and qualitatively, error results when the antahkarana vṛtti is coloured by its bias rather than determined by the object. Thus, the antahkarana vṛtti may be, in a sense, identical with the object and, in another sense different also. There is always identity between the vṛtti and the *vishaya* (the object) in point of the ground they occupy, but the content of the vṛtti and the content of the object may agree or differ. When there is agreement there is valid experience, when they differ there is erroneous experience. This assumption helps us to steer clear of the pitfalls of epistemological dualism as well as of epistemological monism and at the same time, it synthesises the elements of truth in both.

All this is theory, besides, it is of oriental origin. One will naturally ask : are there any facts with reference to which the hypothesis could be verified ?

It is possible to show that recent scientific developments in physics, physiology and psychology lend support to the theory.<sup>8</sup>

There are experimental facts that could be cited by way of demonstrating the theory. But limitation of space will not permit me to undertake this task here, this must be reserved for another paper. I shall here confine myself to one set of experimental facts that may be said to prove the hypothesis conclusively and they are the facts of after-images.

In ordinary perception the antahkarana vṛtti and the object coincide so well that one cannot say whether the two are separate and whether the antahkarana vṛtti is a projection. But for the facts of error and after-images, it would never have been possible to distinguish between the vṛtti and the *vishaya*. Error makes it clear to us that the subject

imposes something of its own on the object. Even there, we can only show the distinction by means of the fact that the erroneous experience is sublated; we cannot show the antahkarana vṛtti as a distinct entity. This would be possible if the antahkarana vṛtti could be isolated from the object which determined it. Such an isolation is rendered possible, by nature, in the phenomenon of after-images.

The phenomenon of after-images could be easily experienced by any one if he will conduct the following experiment. Cut pieces of coloured paper—red, green, blue and yellow, one inch square, and paste them on four different sheets of white paper. Take any one of them, say, the one on which the red square has been pasted and gaze at it for a minute or two till you feel that your eyes are fatigued. Then cover this sheet of blank paper and continue to gaze on it and you will see, in the course of a few seconds, a patch of the same size and shape but of a complementary colour i.e. green appearing on the blank sheet. If you repeat this experiment with the other sheets, you will see after-images of different colours. When you experience the after-image you will realise very clearly that it is the projected vṛtti of the antahkarana.

That its behaviour is similar to the behaviour of rays of light will become clear if you vary the experiment slightly. After gazing at the sheet of paper on which the coloured square is pasted, cover it with a white sheet of paper and wait till the after-image appears. As soon as the after-image appears move the blank sheet towards you or farther away from you and you will see that the image grows smaller when you move the sheet towards you and larger when you move it away from you. Its shape also changes accordingly as you hold the sheet of paper vertically, horizontally or at an intermediate angle. If you observe a ray of light passing through a slit and falling on a screen which can be moved backward and forward, you will observe that the patch of light thrown

on the background behaves precisely in the same way as the after-image.

Thus no one who experiences the phenomenon of after-images will, for a while, doubt the fact that the antahkarana streams out to the object, and he will realise that it is not crude or weak scientifically but quite as refined or strong as any experimental fact could be.

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# **'Svapramanatva and Svaprakasatva'**

## **An inconsistency in Kumarila's Philosophy.**

By

**S. K. SAXENA.**

The Mimansa is noted for its unusual view of the authoritativeness and the validity of all cognitions as such. The view is taken from the Jaimini Sutra 1, 2, and 5, and is developed by both Kumarila and Prabhakara in their respective works of *Sloksavartika* and *Brhati*. Kumarila expounds the view in *Sloksavartika* Sutra II. It is maintained that all cognitions as soon as, and when they arise are inherently endowed with validity. Thus, starting from the supposition of an inherent quality of truth of the cognitions, what is to be established by subsequent investigation is not their truth, but their falsity. The question is asked, wherein can the truth of a cognition lie ? It can lie either in its own self or outside itself, i.e., in the excellence of the sense organs etc. But if the truth of a cognition did not belong to the cognitions and depended upon external conditions, one would have to wait for the actual experiences of life till the ascertainment of their truth by an examination of the external causes of alleged discrepancy has been accomplished.

Let us take an example. If a man with the intention to write 'perceives' a pen and picks it up, he does so under the assumption of a belief in the validity of his perception. In other words, his cognition is its own 'pramana'. The 'pramanatva' of the cognition comes from within itself, 'Svatah'. No one after seeing a pen ordinarily broods :—'Let me think if this perception of mine is valid, for it may as well be invalid.

Are my senses in perfectly excellent condition and are other circumstances of cognition favourable to a valid perception ? Am I sure that it is only a pen I have just seen and no other object ? etc. etc. If such was the normal procedure of thought after perception, all practical activity of life would become paralysed. But such, however, is not the case, and this establishes the self-validity of our cognitions. And therefore only those cognitions are false which are either due to defects in our sense organs or which are later on sublated. But all other cognitions are *ipso facto* true.

Kumarila goes on to add, that if cognitions did not have this 'Sakti' of self-validity, nothing could produce it in them. If the validity of a cognition is made to depend upon conditions other than itself, the process would lead to an infinite regress without establishing the validity of cognition at all. Hence is assumed the 'Svatahpramanyam' of all cognitions. While in other systems of epistemology, it is the truth of a cognition which has to be ascertained, in 'Mimansa' epistemology on the contrary, it is the falsity which has to be established. The validity of an apprehension cannot come from outside 'paratah', and even when a cognition is later on sublated and disproved, it only disproves the validity that belonged to the previous cognition originally. If validity did not already belong to the previous cognition, it could not later on be set aside.

'The question now is, how is this theory of the 'svatahpramanatva' i.e. the intrinsic validity of cognitions related to the 'Svatahprakasatva' or the intrinsic cognisibility of cognitions ? It seems reasonably clear that the two theories mutually imply one another and are complimentary, if not actually identical. To say that a cognition is inherently valid is only to say that it is self-luminous. 'Svatahpramanatva' means only 'Svatahijnanatva'. Just as when one has perceived an

object, he does not doubt that he has *cognised* when he has *cognised* an object ; the reason being, that in both cases, cognition or awareness carries its own revelation along with itself. If cognitions were not self-luminous and had to depend for their own cognisibility upon other conditions, then their intrinsic validity too, could not be immediately and directly established. In fact, the concept of the intrinsic validity of cognition presupposes the intrinsic cognisibility of cognitions, if at all any distinctions can be made between the two concepts of 'Svatahpramanatva' and 'Svatahprakasatva'.

One looks in vain for anything more than the self-luminosity in the concept of self-validity. Self-validity hardly means anything more than self-cognisibility, which is same as Dharma-Kirti's famous assertion, that if one does not believe in the cognition as directly cognised, one could never establish the cognition of anything. Besides, almost the very same argument of infinite regress and the impossibility of apprehension, apply against the theory of non-self luminosity of cognitions which are advanced against the extrinsic validity of cognitions. Our point is that hardly any difference of any importance can at all be made between the two above concepts.

Yet strangely enough, Kumarila who advocates the theory of 'Svatahpramanatva' in Sutra II of his Sloka Vartika turns later on, an opponent of the theory of self-luminosity of cognitions in the 'Sunyavada' of the same Vartika. His criticism of self-illuminacy of cognitions, is unsatisfactory, half-hearted and uninspired. No serious argument is advanced except the analogy that cognition is like the light in the eye which only illumines other objects but not itself. Just as it is not in the power of the eye to illumine itself, so is the case with cognitions too.

We have considered in detail elsewhere, the inappropriate-

ness of the analogy of the eye and the cognition and have also shown the difficulties of a theory of non-self-luminosity. The point here is to consider if one can reasonably hold the theory of the intrinsic cognisibility of cognitions.

It seems clear that what is not intrinsically cognised can not be established as intrinsically valid also, for what is dependent for its cognisibility upon later cognitions and inferences, cannot guarantee its own validity which can then be only extrinsic and due to external conditions. If the intrinsic validity of cognitions is to be admitted in order to avoid an infinite regress, the same must also be the case with the intrinsic cognition of cognitions. Kumarila admits that if validity did not belong to the cognitions inherently and intrinsically it could not be stamped on it from outside. Exactly the same must be said with regard to cognisibility too. If cognisibility did not belong to the cognitions intrinsically and inherently at the very first stage, it could not at any later stage be imported into it.

Cognitions are either cognised or uncognised and if they are cognised, it is far more satisfactory to hold that they are immediately cognised than they are subsequently cognised. Nor can we maintain the view that cognitions are uncognised, for in the first place, it would be absurd to maintain that objects are cognised without the cognition being cognised, and secondly, all systems of thought agree in holding that the cognitions are cognised by some means and at some stage.

If the above analysis of the relationship of the two concepts of the self-cognisibility and self-validity is correct, the question is, why did Kumarila contradict himself? It seems that Kumarila has been inadvertently led to a criticism of 'Svaprasaṅgavāda' in his chapter on 'Sūnyavāda' by the force of an overpowering anxiety to combat the 'Vijñānavāda' theory of the essential sameness of the subject and the



object of knowledge. It is generally feared, that the concept of self-illuminacy of consciousness or the theory of immediate perception, if established, would add weight to the subjectivist theory of 'Vijñānavāda' and therefore Kumārila, like most anti subjectivists, is anxious to maintain an absolute externality, independence, and otherness of the world of objects as against the theory of their being only a form of the inner subjective series of cognitions. As against the subjectivist Vijñānavādī, who does not make an absolute distinction between the subjective and the objective, it is thought necessary to uphold that the two separate worlds of the inner cognitions and the outer objects, do never fuse into one another or appear indifferently both as subjective states and as outer objects.

His process of mind would be like this :—To admit that cognitions are self luminous is to admit that an object can be both a subject and an object, and to admit this is to play the game of the subjectivists, ergo—cognitions cannot be self-cognised.

Kumārila therefore maintains, that nothing can be both a subject and an object, and that the two functions of the knower and the known cannot belong to one and the same cognition. Cognition therefore cannot be self-cognised, because a wide gulf between the knower and the known must at all cost be maintained in order to combat the subjectivists. Cognitions cannot be admitted to be their own objects, whatever may be the consequences of a theory of cognition by another cognition or by inference.

Thus, pressed by the need to maintain an absolute distinction of the internal states of cognition and the external world of objects as against the solipsist, Kumārila forgets what he had previously propounded in his second sūtra, pressed under a similar need of maintaining the immediate and intrinsic validity of the Vedic injunction. He obviously thought, that without the theory of an intrinsic validity of cognitions the

inherent authoritativeness of the Vedas could not be maintained. But in his zeal to demolish completely the subjective idealism, he overshot the mark by attacking the 'Svatah-prakasatva' of cognitions, little seeing the inconsistency involved in it with his own earlier position.

It is not a little difficult to see why, in order to restore the objectivity of our cognitions as against the subjectivists, it should at all be considered obligatory to deny self-cognisibility of cognitions. Yet the practice has been fairly common with a certain section of philosophers inspite of the repeated declaration, that by the theory of the 'Svatahprakasatva' of cognitions is not meant, either that cognitions do not have an extra-mental basis or that cognitions are their own subject and object.

On the contrary, a theory of self-luminosity of cognition is perfectly compatible with the belief in the fullest externality of the object of cognition, as shown by Sankara, who retains both the self-luminosity and the objectivity of cognitions and yields to none in his opposition to the Vijñanavadi subjectivist. To say that cognitions are grasped immediately and simultaneously along with the objects cognised is not to say that cognitions and their extra-mental substratum are identical, which is the conclusion feared by the anti-subjectivist. Nor to say that cognitions are self-luminous is at all to maintain with the Buddhist Vijñanavada, the theory of the unreality of objects apart from the cognitions. Yet the two contentions have often been unfortunately confused and taken as necessarily implying one another, and philosophers with the exception of Sankara and Prabhakara have not taken pains to separate the two distinct issues of the self-cognisibility of cognitions and of an absolute subjectivity of cognitions. The former, as an epistemological problem is far narrower in scope than the latter problem of the ontological status of objects. The epistemological doctrine of the self-cognisibility of cognition

can in no way be identified with a metaphysical doctrine of the mental solipsism of reality.

Kumarila is therefore inconsistent, for either the cognitions are not intrinsically valid or they are also intrinsically cognisable. He cannot have it both ways, i. e. retain 'Svapramanatva' and destroy 'Svaparakasatva,' for the two notions stand or fall together. It is refreshing to note in this connection, that Prabhakara who fully shares with Kumarila his theory of the self-validity of cognitions as well as his opposition to the subjectivist Vijnanavada consistently maintains unlike Kumarila, the theory of the self-luminosity of cognitions too.

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1. S. V. Sutra II.
  2. Chapter. IV.



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